THE GREAT SCHOOLMEN OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

" Now hands to seed-sheet, boys,
We step and we cast ; old Time's on wing
And would ye partake of harvest's joys,
The corn must be sown in spring.
Fall gently and still, good corn,
Lie warm in thy earthy bed,
And stand so yellow some morn
That beast and man may be fed.

" Old earth is a pleasure to see
In sunshiny cloak of red and green ;
The furrow lies fresh ; this year will be
As the years that have past have been.

" Old Mother, receive this corn,
The seed of six thousand golden sires :
All these on thy kindly breast were born ;
One more thy poor child requires.

" Now steady and sure again,
And measure of stroke and step we keep ;
Thus up and thus down we cast our grain ;
Sow well and you gladly reap."

T. CARLYLE.

THE GREAT SCHOOLMEN

OF THE

MIDDLE AGES.

AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR LIVES, AND THE
SERVICES THEY RENDERED
TO THE CHURCH AND
THE WORLD.

BY

W. J. TOWNSEND.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

CHAPTER II.

THE RENAISSANCE UNDER CHARLEMAGNE.

CHAPTER III.

THE HARBINGER OF DAWN.—JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA.

CHAPTER IV.

YEARNINGS FOR THE LIGHT.—POPE SYLVESTER II.

CHAPTER V.

THE FOUNDER OF MEDIÆVAL THEOLOGY.—ANSELM.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STRUGGLE OF RATIONALISM.—PETER ABÉLARD.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SWEET SONG OF MYSTICISM.—THE MONKS OF ST. VICTOR

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MASTER OF THE SENTENCES.—PETER THE LOMBARD.

CHAPTER IX.

THE GRECIAN DOCTOR.—THE ADVANCE OF ARISTOTELIANISM.

CHAPTER X.

THE UNIVERSAL DOCTOR.—ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

CHAPTER XI.

THE IRREFRAGABLE DOCTOR.—ALEXANDER OF HALES.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SERAPHICAL DOCTOR.—BONAVENTURA.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ANGELICAL DOCTOR.—THOMAS AQUINAS.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ANGELICAL DOCTOR.—HIS OPINIONS.

CHAPTER XV.

THE SUBTLE DOCTOR.—DUNS SCOTUS.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE INVINCIBLE DOCTOR.—WILLIAM OF OCKAM.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE MOST CHRISTIAN DOCTOR.—JEAN CHARLIER GERSON.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCHOOL AND THEIR WORK.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS.

CHAPTER XX.

THE RATIONALE OF SCHOLASTICISM.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

"'Old things need not be therefore true,'
O brother men! nor yet the new;
Ah, still awhile the old thought retain,
And yet consider it again.

'The souls of now two thousand years
Have laid up here their toils and fears,
And all the earnings of their pain—
Ah, yet consider it again!

"We! what do we see? each a space
Of some few yards before his face;
Does that the whole wide plan explain?
Ah, yet consider it again!

"Alas! the great world goes its way,
And takes its truth from day to day;
They do not quit, nor can retain,
Far less consider it again."

A. H. CLOUGH.

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THIS book is intended to supply a brief and simple account of a portion of Christian history which is not properly understood by many. It is encumbered as little as possible with technical notes or phrases, that the unlearned reader may not be turned from its pages by an undue array of classical references or quotations. It has been written with an earnest desire to estimate the service done in the cause of truth and humanity by a succession of Christian labourers who have never received the measure of appreciation or gratitude which is fairly their due. It has been the general habit of writers in referring to the Schoolmen to treat them as being solemn triflers with great philosophical or theological questions, or as mere metaphysical gymnasts who involved both themselves and their contemporaries in a dense cloud of dust raised by their interminable and useless wranglings. In the usual public references to the Schoolmen by preachers or lecturers, and in the accounts given of them in many text-books in use in the public schools, there is little or no recognition of their devotion, their learning, their unwearying industry, or of the signal service they rendered to the Church and the world; but it has been considered sufficient to repre-

sent them as a set of men engaged in discussing by ponderous method such fruitless questions as, "How many angels could dance on the point of a needle?" or "What were the differences between the morning and evening states of the angels?" It is time that this lamentable ignorance was dissolved, and there are not wanting signs that the day has come for a fairer and higher estimate of the great Schoolmen to take possession of the public mind.

Why the Scholastic system should have been stoutly opposed by Martin Luther and the great Reformers of the sixteenth century may be easily understood. In the previous centuries Scholasticism had been an enormous contributor to the formation of a European public opinion, which demanded a great religious reform; but like all systems of theology and philosophy which demand a *method* by which they can attain to the fullest expression possible to them in a certain age, the method having served its temporary purpose comes to be a clog and a serious hindrance to further development. It often therefore requires to be stript off by a firm hand, even though agony and struggle ensue in the process, in order that, free from swaddling bands or nurturing entanglements, the truth may expand itself in freedom and glory. The Reformers were led by the spirit of the times and the exigencies of the contest in their day to declare war against the methods and spirit of the Schoolmen, who had degenerated into vain and frivolous disputants, and who from being the leaders of the learning of Christendom were becoming objects of contempt by the uselessness and pedantry of their discussions. But it might have been expected that when a few generations had passed away, when the clang and roll of that gigantic conflict had subsided, when men

could think calmly, apart from the violent collisions of partisans or the din of raging controversy, they would have been able to appraise the work of the great thinkers of the past with fairness if not with generosity. This has already been attained in various departments of human learning, but the Schoolmen still lie under a load of obloquy, which has been accumulating for ages, with only at rare intervals a voice raised to protest against it as unmerited. A philosopher so acute as Hobbes declared of their works that "those who wrote volumes of such stuff were mad, and intended to make others so."[1] A learned and thoughtful historian of philosophy like Brucker[2] describes the discussions of the Schoolmen, although Hallam says he had not read their works, as "philosophical skirmishes with the help of verbal disputes, of worthless mental abstractions, of axioms assumed at haphazard, of distinctions destitute of the smallest foundation, and with the horrors of a barbarous terminology." A church historian so grave, trusted, and widely read as Mosheim,[3] dismissed them with the verdict that they were "wiser in their own conceit than they were in reality, and often did little more than involve in greater obscurity the doctrines which they pretended to place in the clearest light." The calm, judicial, and generally impartial historian of the Middle Ages, Henry Hallam,[4] declares of their writings that, "so far as he has been able to collect their meaning, they appear very frivolous," and expresses great surprise that he has found as many as four Englishmen who had given attention to Thomas

[1] Hobbes' "Leviathan," p. i. ch. 8.
[2] "Hist. of Phil.," p. ii. lib. ii.
[3] "Eccles. Hist.," i. 339.
[4] "Europe in Middle Ages," 684.

Aquinas. A writer of Church history of such good standing as Spanheim,[1] is so unfair as to affirm that the Schoolmen omitted from their works all authority from Scripture in these words, "The Scholastic theology was a compendium of divinity supported by the opinions and authorities of the Fathers, but chiefly by reason and argument, the Scriptures were quite omitted, while the doctrines of Christianity were reduced to quite a heathenish system." A writer of such deservedly high repute as the late George Henry Lewes,[2] says that he thrust with "depressing weariness and impatience" their works aside, because they were "monstrous and lifeless shapes of a former world, having little community with the life of our own, they having for us an interest similar to that yielded by the megatherium and the dinornis." In some modern books of science no more intelligent appreciation is shown of their work than that they were occupied with laborious discussions of childish and frivolous questions.[3] And the general sentiment, being formed by such judgments as these, concludes that the Schoolmen are unworthy of notice except as subjects of satire, and that they hindered rather than helped human progress.

It is surely time for a more sound judgment to be formed concerning them. A few of the most clear and erudite of our thinkers entertain a far different estimate of them, and in proportion as they have been qualified to render distinguished service in the cause of a lofty philosophy, they have been disposed to appreciate highly the work offered to the world by these great men. A few testimonies will show what an

[1] "Eccles. Annals," translated by Wright, 408.
[2] "History of Phil.," Trans. Period, i. 3.
[3] Tait's "Lect. on Recent Science," 54.

exalted opinion they have won from those who have most attentively considered their productions.

Sir W. Hamilton, in all his works, makes frequent reference to them in words of generous appreciation. In reply to the assertion of Archbishop Whately, that the Schoolmen misunderstood the nature of logic, using it simply as an instrument in making physical discoveries, and whilst beclouding everything with a mist of words, excluded all sound philosophical investigation, he says :—

"It has long been the fashion to attribute every absurdity to the Schoolmen; it is only when a man of talent like Dr. Whately follows the example that a contradiction is worth while. The Schoolmen (we except always such eccentric individuals as Raymond Lully) had correcter notions of the domain of logic than those who now contemn them without a knowledge of their works. They certainly did not attempt to employ it for the purpose of physical discoveries. We pledge ourselves to refute the accusation whenever any effort is made to prove it; till then we must be allowed to treat it as a groundless, though a common, calumny."[1]

Perhaps no modern writer has succeeded in combining sound learning and correctness of judgment with discriminating criticism more happily than Sir James Mackintosh, and this gives his testimony a peculiar value. He says :—

"Those who measure only by palpable results have very consistently regarded the Metaphysical and Theological controversies of the schools as a mere waste of intellectual power. But the contemplation of the athletic vigour and versatile skill manifested by the European understanding, at the moment when it emerged from this tedious and rugged discipline, leads, if not to approbation, yet to more qualified censure. What might have been the result of a different com-

[1] "Discussions," etc., 148.

bination of circumstances is an enquiry which, on a large scale, is beyond human power. We may, however, venture to say, that no abstract science unconnected with religion was likely to be respected in a barbarous age, and we may be allowed to doubt whether any knowledge dependent on experience and applicable to immediate practice, would have so trained the European mind as to qualify it for that series of inventions, discoveries, and institutions which begins with the sixteenth century, and of which no end can now be foreseen but the extinction of the race of man." [1]

It might have been expected that the eclectic mind of the late Professor Maurice would not have found in the Schoolmen much that was congenial to him, although it was, of course, to have been concluded that he would treat them with the candour so eminently characteristic of his nature. Like all those who have devoted much attention to their writings, he speaks of them throughout his history of the mediæval intellectual movement with frank and cordial esteem. Many quotations in illustration of this fact might be given, but this paragraph concerning Thomas Aquinas will be sufficient :—

"A time may be coming when it will be possible to derive more good from Aquinas than any age has owed to him, because we are free from his trammels, and have learned to walk at liberty under higher guidance. Protestant Europe may even yet do him a justice which cannot be done him by those who dread lest he should make them sceptics, or who sit at his feet and receive his words as those of one who understood all mystery and all knowledge. Meanwhile we will do what in us lies to give our readers some conception of the comprehensiveness of his intellect, as we have already attempted to give them a glimpse of its subtlety." [2]

One who has attained unrivalled theological reputa-

[1] "Works," i., 48, 9.
[2] "Mor. & Met. Phil.," i., 616.

tion within his own denomination, and who, whilst preserving himself within the strictest lines of British orthodoxy, has yet steeped his mind in the treasures of the German theology, has borne the following fair and modest testimony to the service rendered to Christendom by the School :—

"The Scholastic Divinity in the universities of Christendom wrought up the materials it inherited into systematic forms, which carried dialectic subtlety and philosophical speculation to their highest point. By the toil of many indefatigable minds, it laid the foundation of the complete system of Roman Catholicism as formulated in the Council of Trent; while at the same time it transmitted its method to Protestantism, the first century of which almost rivalled the work of the mediæval doctors in analytical severity and completeness. Whatever deductions may be made from the value of its results, the Christian Church owes very much to the industry and devotion of the Schoolmen. Systematic theology had its origin in their labours." [1]

One more extract from British authors only will be given, and that from one than whom none had more right to speak, if intimate knowledge of the Schoolmen, profound learning, and calm philosophic temper, constitute a claim to be heard on such a subject. Speaking of the Scholastic system, he says :—

"I only wonder that it has not attracted more notice than it has hitherto obtained. We meet indeed with some incidental remarks in works of philosophy or theology on the theoretic character of the system. But with these remarks it is usually dismissed as a method long gone by, which has had its day and is now extinct, and remains only a monument of frivolous ingenuity, to be neglected and despised by the more enlightened wisdom of the present day. But surely a pursuit in which the human mind has been so long engaged, and which has thus, as an indisputable matter of fact, educated the human intellect of

[1] Pope, "Compend. of Theol.," [2] i., 21.

the West for the larger views and more elevated thoughts and more masculine vigour of modern science and modern theology, demands more respect, more serious consideration. If it supplied, which it undoubtedly did, the elements of our present improvement, the stock of principles of which the Reformation, both religious and intellectual, of the sixteenth century availed itself—to which the Reformation was forced to address itself, whose language it was forced to adopt in order to be understood and received—neither the historian of the human mind nor the student of religion ought to leave this track of enquiry unexplored. The scholastic philosophy, in fact, lies between us at our present station in the world, and the immediate diffusion of truth from heaven, as 'the morning spread on the mountains,' an atmosphere of mist through which the early beams of Divine light have been transfused. It has given the celestial rays a divergency whilst it has transmitted them, and by the multiplicity of its reflections made them indistinct as to their origin."[1]

No modern writer has treated Scholasticism in a more genial and appreciative spirit than Victor Cousin, the patriot philosopher of France.[2] He divides the history of Scholasticism into three periods, (1) that of the subordination of philosophy to theology, (2) the alliance of philosophy with theology, (3) the growing separation, feeble at first, but which increases until it produces modern philosophy. In treating of these periods he passes the leading Schoolmen in review with generous and glowing criticism, and points out how on nearly every great question of controversy in modern philosophy they had anticipated such leaders of thought as Descartes, Berkeley, Locke, Reid, and others.

The statesman historian of France has also written concerning them in candid phrase :—

"We find in them many vast and original views; questions

[1] Hampden, "Bamp. Lect.," 8.
[2] "History of Modern Philosophy," ii., 12.

are often solved by them in their profoundest depths; the light of philosophical truth, of literary beauty, shines out each instant. The vein is covered in the mine, but it contains much metal, and deserves to be worked."[1]

In Germany the writings and influence of the Schoolmen have received much fairer and more general consideration than has been accorded them by British writers. Thus, Hagenbach supplies several testimonies, which are the more valuable as coming from a country which has produced so many of the most renowned metaphysicians of modern Europe. He says:—

"As early as the time of Semler complaints were made of the unjust treatment which the scholastic divines had to suffer. Semler himself says: 'The poor scholastici have been too much despised, and that frequently by people who would not have been good enough to be their transcribers.' And Luther himself wrote to Staupitz, though he contributed much to the downfall of scholasticism: '*Ego Scholasticos, cum judicio. non clausis oculis lego. . . . . Non rejicio omnio eorum, sed nec omnia probo.*'"[2]

The following extracts are also quoted by Hagenbach:—

"Scholasticism is the progress of the Church towards a school, or, as Hegel expresses it, though in other words, the Fathers have made the Church because the mind, once developed, required a developed doctrine; in after ages there were no more *patres ecclesiæ*, out *doctores*. The theologians of the primitive Church had to create the material, or to expound that which was expressed in its simplest and most direct form in the Christian dogma; they had further to set forth this material in distinct doctrines and formulæ, to present it to the religious world, and to procure its general adoption. Scholasticism, on the contrary, presupposed all this. The material and the contents were given; it now became the task of

[1] Guizot, "Cours d'Hist. Mod.," i., 220.
[2] "Hist. of Doct.," i., 426.

theologians to effect a reunion between that which, having acquired the nature of an object (in relation to the mind) had been subsequently separated from it, and the mind itself—a union such as would constitute a subjective union."[1]

The well-known Church historian, Ullman, offers a highly commendatory estimate of the work accomplished by these great thinkers. He says:—

"The scholastic theology was in its commencement a truly scientific advance upon the past, in its entire course a great dialectic preparatory school of Christianity in the West, in its completion a grand and highly-finished production of the human mind."[2]

If other testimony were required from Germany, that of the erudite, judicial, and judicious Neander might be given. The eighth volume of his "Church History" is largely devoted to a careful consideration of the productions of the Schoolmen; and not only by frequent praise of the results of their patient and profound labours, but by his own careful and minute study of their works, he shows the high estimation in which he held them, and demonstrates how largely they influenced the philosophical and theological thought of Christendom.

Such are a few of the witnesses who might be adduced as evidence that the Schoolmen are worthy of a higher estimate and a more cordial greeting than they have generally been accorded, and testifying that their services are more highly valued as they are better understood. If anything further were necessary to show that the time has come for them to be treated with more signal favour, and that they are beginning to assert for themselves a right to a larger measure of public atten-

[1] Baur, quoted in Hagenbach, i., 426. [2] *Ibid.*

tion, it may be found in the fact that such a work as the careful, elaborate, and sympathetic defence of Thomas Aquinas should be issued to the public, as has recently appeared from the pen of a member of the Society of Jesus, and which is to fill five large octavo volumes,[1] and also that in Paris of late years a beautiful issue of the *Summa Theologiæ*, in eight closely printed octavo volumes, has passed through several editions.

This book, then, humbly seeks to aid in the reversal of the general verdict of condemnation passed on the Schoolmen, and to offer some evidence that as men they were devout, liberal, and earnest; that as writers and thinkers they were learned, subtle, penetrating, and logical; and that as contributors to the philosophical and theological thought of Christendom they aided enormously the cause of human progress. All this may be made to appear, and even more than this, without one word of defence being offered in behalf of the trivialities which mar the works of some of the inferior Schoolmen, or of the huge system of spiritual and intellectual despotism which environed them, and under which they were born and disciplined.

[1] Harper, "The Metaphysic of the School." Macmillan, 1879.

CHAPTER II.

THE RENAISSANCE UNDER CHARLEMAGNE.

"To-day I saw the dragon-fly
Come from the wells where he did lie.

"An inner impulse rent the veil
Of his old husk; from head to tail
Came out clear plates of sapphire mail.

"He dried his wings: like gauze they grew:
Through crofts and pastures wet with dew,
A living flash of light he flew."

—TENNYSON.

II.

THE RENAISSANCE UNDER CHARLEMAGNE.

THE accession of Charlemagne as king of the Franks was the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Europe. The young monarch found himself the ruler of an extensive territory stretching from the Loire to the east of the Rhine, including Burgundy and Allemania; whilst entirely encircling his kingdom was a chain of vassal nations. Nor did this comprise all the responsibility which his inheritance involved. The Franks had already become the powerful patrons and protectors of the Church, guarding the Popes from the violence of Greeks and Lombards, protecting Christianity from the ravages of the Saracens on the south-west, and from the rapacitv of the Saxons, still pagan, on the north-east. Charles found his kingdom already assuming the position of governor of the German. nations, and as having become the strong bulwark of the Western Church. He was thus placed in circumstances requiring both an indomitable energy and the rarest faculty of government. Whatever the position demanded he was able to bring to it. No man ever more exactly suited his environments or fitted his hour than he did. The historian Gibbon has truly said that of all the heroes to whom the title of "Great"

has been given, he alone has retained it as a permanent addition to his name. Nor is the reason for this far to seek. Few men, if indeed any, have united in so large a degree the qualities which combine to constitute a hero, and in no man were they ever more skilfully fused so as to form a noble personality. He was possessed of boundless energy; he had a lofty ambition; he had an intense craving for various knowledges; he had a happy social nature; he had a refined taste and an exalted fancy; he seems to have united a robust body to a vigorous mind; he had a marvellous power of winning men to himself, and an exquisite skill in governing them, so as to make them contribute to his great aims and purposes. Thus he was able to transform the military power of the Franks, which he found rude and raw, though immense, into an organized, disciplined, and far-reaching dominion; he extended his kingdom until it became an aggregation of kingdoms, and he was crowned emperor of Rome. But as a higher achievement still, he laboured assiduously to engraft a Christian culture on the fresh vigorous nations of the north just awaking from barbarism, and to establish, on broad and lasting foundations, learning and philosophy.

If Charlemagne did not succeed in attaining all he purposed in these directions, it was because one lifetime was too short for the accomplishment of so great a design; but his reign became the starting-point of a new intellectual life in Europe, and from his assiduous efforts flowed new streams of knowledge, bearing to future ages freight of untold preciousness.

In the disintegration of the Roman Empire, it was in some respects unfortunate for Europe that there existed no great power sufficient to conquer, and

then to reorganize its gigantic parts. It was overrun by wild, fierce, disconnected tribes, none of which had risen to an understanding of statesmanship or political life, and all of which combined to render more awful the collapse of moral and intellectual order which ensued. At the accession of Charlemagne that collapse was complete. Fleury places the lowest depth to which the European mind has sunk in modern times in the century previous to the rise of the Germanic Empire, and both Guizot and Hallam concur in this judgment.[1] It was the arrest of progressive culture throughout Europe which caused so deep a shadow to rest upon the seventh century. It was indeed a catastrophe which swallowed up the existing state of things, but out of which would emerge in course of time an economy framed after a nobler type.

The Church had partaken of the general degradation. It had been diverted from its nobler aims and its higher life by a long distracting struggle concerning the worship of images, and had temporarily settled the dispute by the edict of the second Council of Nicea. Unfortunately for the cause of Christianity, the Pope and the monks triumphed, and as the result of their victory Christendom was filled with the worship of images, the invocation of saints, pretended miraculous cures, and worse than this, became the victim of a clamorous demand for uniformity of faith, which arose from the clerical orders,—a demand which, although never fully attained, was the occasion of bitter and virulent persecutions, which in their prolonged attempts to extirpate heretics and heathens made the persecutors many times worse than either. The doctrines of the Church were thus seriously endangered and corrupted; those dostrines now received as evange-

[1] Note A, end of chapter.

lical, to the revival of which the Reformation owes its brightness, were neutralised by the teaching that an offended Deity might be appeased by voluntary acts of mortification by large donations to the Church, or by an appeal to the superfluous merits of the saints. Thus the obligations of morality were loosened, men indulged in sin with a feeling of security, believing that by the intercession of saints, or by the influence of their priests in the heavenly court, they might obtain forgiveness of their sins and entrance to the paradise of God.

Amidst such influences learning sank to the lowest point, and the spirit of enquiry was almost extinct. It is true that in some Irish monasteries there was preserved a shining flame of piety and learning, which was destined to kindle a similar light in other places and in succeeding generations; and at Jarrow, in the county of Durham, the Venerable Bede, by his stainless piety and ardent love of knowledge, redeemed the English Church from entire barrenness; but as compared with the earlier centuries of the history of Christianity, which are ablaze with the distinguished names of Origen Jerome, Augustine, Basil, Athanasius, Chrysostom the Gregories, and a brilliant line of others scarcely inferior to these, the seventh and eighth centuries are characterised by mournful sterility of sanctified erudition and of loyal devotion on the altar of Christ.

Outside of Christendom there were signs of a revival of learning. They first became visible amongst the Arabian intruders into Europe. When the Arabs first emerged from their desert retreats under the caliphate of Abubeker, and submerged beneath their overwhelming hordes the Greek empire, they were destitute of any literature save some fugitive national poetry, which,

like the poetry of semi-barbarous peoples, had little to commend it except passionate emotion and fervid imagery. Of science they were entirely ignorant, except a slight tincture of astrology preserved from ancient times, and nursed by shepherds in their nightly vigils. The fervent and idolatrous attachment they cultivated for the Koran overbore all concern for other productions of the human intellect, and made them the insane incendiaries of ancient literature. Thus when Omar burnt the priceless treasures of the library of Alexandria, he justified his demoniacal Vandalism by saying that "what agreed with the Koran was unnecessary, and what did not was pernicious.

Intercous with the Christians of Syria awoke in the Arab marauders a taste for knowledge. The Greeks, even in their fall, ruled the intellect of the world, and their literature was largely translated into the Syrian tongue. Syriac and Arabic were languages nearly related, and Syrian physicians waited upon the Caliph Al Walid (*ob.* 711), and urged upon him their counsel so strongly, that he issued an order that from henceforth books were to be published in Arabic and no longer in Greek. Almanzor cherished a love for science, and especially for astronomy, and by his example and influence gave a great impulse to the pursuit of scientific studies throughout his empire. Haroun Al Raschid, who represents the golden age of Arabian empire, rejoiced to encourage literature of every kind; and his son, Almamun (*ob.* 813), sought most assiduously, and with overflowing generosity, to forward the cultivation of learning.

In this early spread of knowledge the Arabians were almost exclusively occupied with the physical sciences. True to Oriental traditions, they reverenced

the stars; they cultivated mathematics and geometry. Almamun collected books of science from all the surrounding nations, from Persia, Greece, Egypt Syria, Chaldea, and Armenia; he employed the most experienced scholars to translate them: he held discussions with these on all hard questions, and diffused on every side of him an ardent and healthy desire for knowledge. The result was gratifying and even amazing; the Arabs, still virtuous in habit and not over intoxicated by their immense military successes, took a mighty bound forward in civilization; they pursued the various sciences with avidity; they appropriated the classic stores they inherited from the ancients, and added largely to them. The spirit of learning spread quickly to the new Caliphates of Spain and Morocco, and these also became centres of intellectual influence. The industry of the Arabian scholars was unparalleled, and their progress marvellously rapid.

Quickly, signs of an awakening intellectual spirit were discovered in other quarters. Egbert, an intimate friend and disciple of the Venerable Bede, had been appointed to superintend the School of York, and here gave instruction in the sciences and lectured on the study of the Bible and the early Fathers of the Church. He formed a library also, consisting of the writings of the most eminent early Church Fathers, and the classical writers of antiquity. This School produced one who rose to be the most eminent teacher of his times, Alcuin, afterwards the friend and tutor of the Emperor Charlemagne. He became the master of the celebrated School of York, which rose under his management to be the greatest centre of learning in the north of England. Students flocked to him from all parts of the kingdom, and he affectionately laboured

amongst them until he was summoned to the nobler task of aiding to mould the intellectual future of Europe, and of guiding the reform of the Church under the patronage of Charlemagne. It was in this great and noble king that the advancing spirit of the times found its highest expression; he was the incarnation of the renaissance, his court became the focus in which were collected from the monasteries of Ireland, the schools of England, the conventual retreats of Italy and Spain, all who signalised themselves by genius and learning. He laboured earnestly to excite a spirit of progress throughout his dominions; he encouraged the pursuit of science in every city; he issued a circular letter to the bishops and abbots in all the dioceses of his realm, urging them to increased study, and especially to seek to understand more perfectly the my teries of the Holy Scriptures.[1]

Amongst the learned men who filled the court of his great monarch, Alcuin shone with such distinguished lustre as to justify a longer notice than need be given to others. In the year 780 he was despatched by the Archbishop of York on a mission to the court of Rome, and at Parma he was introduced to the notice of Charlemagne. The king invited him to his court, and offered him the management of the schools he was engaged in establishing throughout his dominions. Before he would consent to accept the flattering invitation, he returned home to seek permission from the king and the Archbishop of York; and on obtaining leave from them, he accepted the call to France, and wrote an adieu to the scenes and friends of his former years which vibrated with ardent affection and refined sentiment. The following lines, written on

[1] Neander, "Church History," v. 199.

leaving the hallowed shade of his quiet retreat at York for the busy engagements of his larger sphere, will give an idea of the tender sensibility of his soul.—

"O my loved cell, sweet dwelling of my soul!
Must I for ever say dear spot farewell?
Round thee their shades the sounding branches spread.
A little wood with flowering honours gay;
The blooming meadows wave their healthy herbs,
Which hands experienced cull to serve mankind.
By thee, mid flowery banks, the waters glide
Where the glad fishermen their nets extend;
Thy gardens shine with apple-bending boughs,
Where the white lilies mingle with the rose,
Their morning hymns the feathered tribes resound,
And warble sweet their great Creator's praise
Dear cell! in thee my tutor's gentle voice
The love of sacred wisdom often urged;
In thee at stated times the Thunderer's praise
My heart and voice with eager tribute paid.
Loved cell! with tearful songs I shall lament thee
With moaning breast I shall regret thy charms
No more thy poets lay thy shades will cheer,
No more will Homer or thy Flaccus hail thee;
No more my boys beneath thy roof will sing,
But unknown hands thy solitudes possess.
Thus sudden fades the glory of the age,
Thus all things vanish in perpetual change.
Nought rests eternal or immutable
The gloomy night obscures the sacred day,
The chilling winter plucks fair autumn's flowers;
The mournful storm the placid sea confounds,
Youth chases wild the palpitating stag,
While age incumbent totters on its staff.
Ah! wretched we! who love thee, fickle world!
Thou flyest our grasp and hurriest us to ruin.

On Alcuin's removal to France, Charlemagne bestowed on him the two monasteries of Troyes and Ferrieres

[1] S. Turner, "Hist. of Anglo-Saxons," vol. iii., p. 335.

with the double object of providing for him a suitable revenue, and of procuring through his training a body of educated monks. But he especially confided to him the management of a university *in ovo*, which he had established for the higher education of the youth about the court, and which was called the Schola Palatina. Alcuin was in constant communication with the king and his statesmen; his judgment was sought upon all important matters of Church and State; he even imparted instruction in rhetoric, logic, mathematics and divinity to his great patron, who was not ashamed to call him his "dearest teacher in Christ."[1]

The Latin version of the Holy Scriptures then in common use was rapidly becoming unintelligible through the ignorance and carelessness, perhaps also through the wilful perversions, of transcribers. With the penetration of a true reformer, Charlemagne perceived how important it was, for the sake of the general interests of learning and for the welfare of the Church, that the Sacred Text should be purified from errors and restored to its integrity. He commissioned Alcuin to undertake the great work of collating copies and revising the text—a task to which the learned monk brought a careful consciontiousness and a devout feeling, It was his felicity when congratulating Charlemagne on receiving the imperial crown, to present him with a copy of the Bible thus edited and revised by himself He gave eight years of splendid service to France engaged in these numerous and onerous tasks, and besides these he wrote forcibly in defence of the orthodox faith against the Adoptionists, engaging in a six days' discussion with Felix, bishop of Urgel at Aix la Chapelle, with the result of his adversary

[1] "Carissime in Christo praeceptor" Ep. of Alcum. 124.

declaring himself convinced of his error; and was employed by his royal friend in several important missions to Offa, king of Mercia. He led a busy life, being constantly engaged in composing poetry, which showed much tenderness and piety of mind, collecting and collating manuscripts, teaching a wide range of science and philosophy, and exciting the large circle within his influence to the ardent pursuit of learning. In 790 he visited his native land, and remained there two years; then he returned to France and resumed his beneficent labours till 801 when he obtained leave to retire from the court to the quiet retreat of the Abbey of St. Martin at Tours. There he rested, though not in idleness, till his death. He still taught as his strength permitted; he maintained a constant correspondence with Charlemagne, which manifests an ardent love of learning, a profound spirit of devotion, and an intense desire for the promotion of the great purposes in relation to intellectual progress to which his life had been devoted. He entered the heavenly rest, May 19th, 804. "He was a burning and a shining light" and happy were they who, in that restless warring, semi-barbarous age, were content for a season to abide in his light. His work was the highest that could have been committed to human hand. In was the civilization of a kingdom; it was to aid in the renaissance of learning for Christendom; and his was the noble achievement of connecting the intellect of Britain with that of Western Europe. The result of the work accomplished by him and his royal master was that France passed by a quick transition from a state of semi-barbarism into one of comparative culture; it became impressed with a pre-eminence of refinement amongst the nations of

Christendom which it has never lost, and there was awakened in it a thirst for intellectual freedom which became a quickening spirit in the nations round about. It is not without sufficient reason, therefore, that an eminent writer has used these words:—"France is indebted to Alcuin for all the polite learning it boasted of in that and the following ages. The universities of Paris, Tours, Fulden, Soissons, and many others owe to him their origin and increase; those of which he was not the superior and founder being at least enlightened by his doctrine and example, and enriched by the benefits he procured for them from Charlemagne."[1]

These vigorous efforts after intellectual revival were the first movement of the Christian consciousness in rebellion to the bondage in which the Church was increasingly binding its members. They were the first protest in behalf of the rational exercise of the human judgment in arbitrating upon truth in science and philosophy and theology. Many efforts must still be made, many protests uttered, many vibrations felt, until the august hour arrived, when the right of private judgment could be fully secured, and the spell of ecclesiastical authority could be dissolved for ever.

The early Protestantism of the age, inarticulated even to itself, found a quick response in the mind of Charlemagne. He protected and patronised the Church, whilst maintaining an entire freedom from all subservience to ecclesiasticism. He dissented from the decision of the Council of Nicea with respect to the use of images, and summoned a Council at Frankfort, which under his influence pronounced an opposite decision. He viewed with disgust the ignorance and immorality existing amongst the clergy, and required

[1] Quoted in article "ALCUIN," *Encyc. Brit.*, 9th Ed., i, 472.

them both to study more carefully and to reform their lives. He showed a profound reverence for the Scriptures, whilst he rebelled against the dogmatic spirit of the Church, and in promoting the culture of science and literature on an extended scale, he laid the foundation of a new order of things, in which both philosophy and religion would be established on a basis more safe and natural than that of simple ecclesiastical authority. Even during the later years of his reign, when he became the strong stay of the Papacy, he required from the Popes attention and submission as the price of his protection.

If Charlemagne could have commanded a succession of kings and emperors like to himself—men with a royal largeness of heart, strength of will, and grandeur of purpose, who could gather up the highest spirit of the times and give expression to it, Europe might have been saved ages of agony and sorrow.[1] Such, however, was not the method of Providence, which seems to approve that humanity should be made peaceful, wise, and holy through the endurance of actual pang and anguish arising from its own sins and errors, rather than that the victory over these should be gained for it by a succession of universally endowed heroes.

When Charlemagne passed from his earthly empire, and was succeeded by his son Louis the Pious, he devolved a burden of responsibility upon his successor, which no one could have been more unfit to bear. He was a man for times of quiet and gentle piety, for "piping times of peace," not for times of restless energy and youthful struggle. He had good intentions but a feeble grasp; he meant to do well, but he could

[1] Notes B and C.

scarcely be said to have a definite purpose in life; he had a sensitive and cultivated conscience, but it was under the control of a morbid and superstitious religionism. The result was that his reign was one of tumult and rebellion; he was powerless to command the fierce Northmen who had bowed in submission, before the strong will of his father; the tide of civilisation which had begun to flow over the tribes of Saxony ebbed quickly away; the unity of the great empire was broken up by the unnatural civil wars carried on by his own children; hardy rugged Normans swept southward, crushing out the renaissance which the great emperor had induced, and for some ages Europe was doomed to endure the horrors of retrogression.

In a time of such strom and shaking the infant culture of Europe might have been hopelessly destroyed, except that the Church which previously had done much to discourage it—which by its passionate ambition for suprême dominion over the consciences of men, and its growing desire for a temporal sovereignty, was ill prepared to encourage any intellectual growths,—was able to afford a refuge to literature and learning in the schools of abbeys and monasteries which had been established in the late reign. The learning of the age was thus confined within narrow bounds, and was impressed with a spirit of extreme timidity. The Church which gave shelter to a culture it had formerly discouraged, could not but impart to it a trembling fearfulness, which resulted in an antipathy to all profane literature, and an abstinence from all criticism in respect to sacred subjects; it abhorred the former because of its pagan associations, it revered the latter with too superstitious an awe to dare to subject it to any rational examination. Thus narrowed in sphere,

and timid in nature, the newly planted learning grew feebly, only growing indeed at all by reason of an occasional healthful breeze which came from the genius of a vigorous civilisation which was advancing outside of it, and which made progress under the influence of the Arabian conquerors in Europe. The period thus spent is called the Dark Ages, but they were not really so dark as they are generally painted, nor did they really endure much longer than one century. There were stirring events transpiring which were unfavourable to the cultivation of literature; the Papacy by aiming at supreme temperal power caused much division, disturbance, and bloodshed, the Crusades began to dazzle the mind of Christendom; there was a great decline in the art of government; but, notwithstanding, the period characterised as Dark was redeemed from utter gloom by a few shining names. Such scholars as Rabanus Maurus, Eginhard, Anastasius, Smaragdus, Bertharius, Agobard, Hincman, and some others would have redeemed any age from a charge of intellectual barrenness, and would have been ornaments to times of greater intellectual activity: but within a generation from the death of Charlemagne there arose one who was the brightest light of those days of gloom, and one of the greatest metaphysicians of any age or country. John Erigena must become the text for another chapter.

NOTE A.

"Dating from Charlemagne the face of things changes, decay is arrested, progress recommences. Yet for a long period the disorder will be enormous the progress partial, but little visible or often

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[1] Note D.

suspended. This matters not, we shall no more encounter those long ages of disorganization, of always increasing intellectual sterility; through a thousand sufferings, a thousand interruptions, we shall see life and power revive in man and in society. Charlemagne marks the limit at which the dissolution of the ancient Roman and barbarian world is consummated, and where really begins the formation of modern Europe and of the new world. It was under his reign and as it were under his hand that the shock took place by which European society, turning rightly round, left the paths of destruction to enter those of creation."—*Guizot*, "Hist. of Civ. in France," vol. ii., p. 208.

NOTE B.

"The power of Charlemagne was really a power which emanated from himself; his empire did not give it to him, he gave it to his empire. The submission of his vassals was not the result of fear, but of admiration; the minds of these primitive Germans, like the minds of their modern successors, yielded that homage to individual intellect which they never yielded to individual authority. It was speedily to be made manifest that the empire without Charlemagne would experience the fate of the body without the soul. Its very vastness prevented it from being enduring, it was held together by a master hand, but the withdrawal of that hand must cause its dissolution. And the hand was now about to be withdrawn. In the height of his splendour, in the fulness of his years, in the blaze of his fame, Charlemagne passed away, and with him passed the glory of that Carlovingian race, of which his father had been but the founder; its life seemed to have exhausted itself in the overflowing richness of this one life, and those who followed in the train had not their due share of vigour. Charlemagne, as we have said, had two natures in him, that of the barbarous age, and that of the incipient renaissance,—the masculine roughness, the feminine tenderness. The former died with him, the latter he bequeathed to his posterity." —*Matheson*, "Growth of Spirit of Christianity," ii., 15.

NOTE C.

It may here be said that Charlemagne has been greatly censured by historians for the extreme severity with which he conducted his wars against the Saxons, and for his firm imposition upon them of the Christian faith. But before the great king is blamed too

everely his position should be fairly weighed. He knew that there was hope for the civilization of Europe only in the subjugation of those terrible freebooters of the north, and that when subdued their only hope for future peace and honour was in them becoming Christians. The following remarks by Sir James Stephens are marked by his usual thoughtfulness and discrimination :—

"That the alternative 'believe or die,' was sometimes proposed by Charlemagne to the Saxons I shall not dispute. But it is not less true that before these terms were tendered to them they had again and again rejected his less formidable proposal, 'be quiet and live.' In form and term, indeed their election lay between the gospel and the sword. In substance and in reality they had to make their choice between submission and destruction. A long and deplorable experience had already shown that the Frankish people had neither peace nor security to expect for a single year so long as their Saxon neighbours retained their heathen rites and their ferocious barbarism inseparable from them. Fearful as may be the dilemma, 'submit or perish,' it is that to which every nation, even in our own times, endeavours to reduce a host of invading and desolating foes, nor if we ourselves were exposed to similar inroads, should we offer to our assailants conditions more gentle or less peremptory."—Lect. "Hist. of France," i., 92.

NOTE D.

It has often been urged in disparagement of Charlemagne and of what he wrought, that in good part it perished with him, that the darkness, scattered for the moment, closed in again and swallowed up all. There is only partial truth in this statement. The cloister schools which he had founded lived through the tenth century, generally acknowledged as, of the Dark Ages, the darkest of all. In these schools were cherished, and from these proceeded, those new activities of the human mind which were to issue in the scholastic philosophy, the University of Paris being in direct lineal descent from the Palatine school at Aachen, of which Alcum was the founder. And if the reign of Charles does stand out as an isle of light with a night of darkness encompassing it on every side, so far from diminishing, this rather enhances the importance and significance of that brief season of refreshing, that breathing time thus obtained for arts and sciences, which might else have perished unable to live at all through the dreary centuries which were before them."—*Trench*, "Med. Church Hist.," 83.

CHAPTER III.

THE HARBINGER OF DAWN. ERIGENA.

"What we, when face to face we see
The Father of our souls, shall be,
John tells us doth not yet appear.
Ah! did he tell what we are here?

"A *Mind* for thoughts to pass into;
A *Share* for loves to travel through;
Five Sense to detect things near:—
Is this the *What* that we are here?

"We must believe, for still we hope
That in a world of larger scope,
What here is faithfully begun
Will be completed, not undone."

A. H. Clough.

In being's flood, and action's storm,
I walk and work above, beneath,
Work and weave in endless motion
Birth and death an infinite ocean
A seething and glowing the fire of the living
So thus at the wave my loom of time I plie,
And weave for God the garment thou seest Him by."

Goethe (translated by Carlyle).

III.

JOHN SCOTUS—ERIGENA.

CHARLES THE BALD, youngest son of Louis the Pious, was created King of Aquitaine in 832, and after adding much territory to his kingdom, attained the imperial crown in 875. This had been the great object of his ambition during life, and he received it from the hands of Pope John VIII. as the reward of having ceded to him several valuable privileges, and especially that of controlling the election to the Papacy.

Charles aimed at being considered a great patron and encourager of learning, and with this view he invited to his court many of the most accomplished scholars in Europe, insomuch that Heric of Auxerre affirmed that Greece was deserted by her learned men that they might flock to the Frankish court, and describes Ireland as being totally deserted by its philosophers.[1] Literature was thus favoured with much distinguished encouragement, but it must be borne in mind that the educational institutions by which Charlemagne had sought to give a lasting basis to learning had fallen into great neglect, and where they flourished

[1] "Pene totam cum grege philosophorum ad littera nostra migrantem."—*Patrol.* cxxiv. 1133.

did so because of their own inward vitality, or because of some local patronage and support.

Amongst those who were drawn from all parts of Christendom to the court of Charles was John Scotus, known better by the name of Erigena. He was born between the years 800 and 810. As his name indicates, he was a native of the British Isles, but of which cannot be determined, the evidence on the whole preponderating somewhat towards Ireland. His education certainly seems to have been received there, and he became the leader of those learned men whom the Irish monasteries sent forth in those times of darkness to aid so largely the intellectual progress of the West.[1] Almost all details of his life and career are lost, but the records of his controversies and literary toils survive, and one at least, of several works which he produced is preserved to testify of his learning and genius. It would seem that he never took priestly orders, and he always manifested a healthy independence of priestly influence. He travelled in various countries, and thus doubtless largely extended both his knowledge and experience. He was drawn to the centre of intellectual life in Europe, and from Charles experienced a cordial welcome. Speedily between him and the king there sprang up a close friendship, which continued through life. William of Malmesbury has preserved a few incidents of his life at the royal court, which afford illustration of the freedom of intercourse which existed between them. Upon one occasion the king and he were feasting, and sat opposite to each other at table. Erigena seems to have indulged in some irregularity, on which Charles, intending to rebuke him, asked, "What separates between a sot and a Scot?" to which,

[1] Neander, "Church Hist.," vi. 253.

with exquisite dexterity, the philosopher replied, "The table."[1] The king had the good sense to feel nothing but amusement at the clever retort. Another incident, which shows him to have been a man of small stature and thin habit, but of a lively and facetious turn, is also recorded. He was at the king's table, seated near two ecclesiastics of enormous size. The servant brought in a dish containing two large fishes and a very little one. The king asked him to serve the fish amongst them. His cheerful wit suggested a practical joke, and he conveyed the two large fishes to his own plate, and divided the little fish between the two priests. They complained to the king of the unfair distribution. "Not so," said Erigena, "it is fair and equal; here is one little one," pointing to himself, "and two great fishes," pointing to those on his plate; and then to the clergy and the little fish on their plates he added, "There are two great clerics and one little one"

His learning for the times was very great; he understood Greek, but with Latin he was perfectly familiar. It is said that he had some knowledge of Hebrew, but of this there is no evidence. He had read the Timæus of Plato in the translation of Chalcidius, the *De Interpretatione*, and the Categories of Aristotle, the *Isagogue* of Porphyry, the Compendium of Boethius, and many other noble works. Soon after his arrival in France he was appointed by Charles to the Mastership of the Schola Palatina at Paris, in which position he remained for some years, and while here he undertook a task the accomplishment of which affected greatly his future history, and influenced considerably the future learning of Europe.

In the year 827, Michael the Stammerer, Emperor

[1] Malm. in lib. v.

of the East, sent as a gift to Louis the Pious a copy of the extraordinary books produced by a monk who wrote under the skilfully chosen pseudonym of Dionysius the Areopagite. The present was graciously received, and deposited in the Abbey of St. Denys, near Paris, under the care of Abbot Hilduin. In an age which passionately raged for marvels and miracles, it was not wonderful that the Areopagite, the convert of St. Paul, and the reputed first Bishop of the Church at Athens, should be identified with Denys the Saint and Apostle of France. The gift, by a providential coincidence, arrived at the court on the very day of the feast of St. Dionysius, and such grace accompanied it that numerous miracles were forthwith wrought by the books. Very naturally the king desired to have a translation of the books from their original Greek into the Latin; but neither the Abbot of St. Denys, nor any other scholar of the day in France, could be found to perform the task. When Erigena had settled at the court of the son of Louis, the competent scholar was found, for not only had he learned Greek, but had ventured, albeit with poor success, upon original composition in that language. The royal command was therefore laid upon him to render the works of the Greek monk into Latin.

The history and nature of these writings require a few words of explanation. In the middle of the fifth century, when the factions of the Christian Church were in passionate warfare with each other, when bishops and clergy engaged in riots with clamouring rabble at their heels, and when stormy controversies in ecclesiastical councils destroyed the spirituality and stayed the progress of the Church, a monk who has not bequeathed his name to posterity was elaborating

in his cell's quiet seclusion a series of treatises which were to find a ringing echo down the long centuries, and which are reverberating in the nineteenth as loudly as ever, and to which treatises he attached, by a sagacious instinct, the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. He seems to have had his soul steeped in the peculiar admixture of heathen philosophy, Christian dogma, and cabalistic incantation which was compounded by the various teachers of the Alexandrian schools. Probably he had been trained under the tuition of Proclus, but at some important crisis of life, like Justin Martyr or Augustine, he exchanged the old philosophic teaching for the nobler teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ. He could not, however, cast off every trace and vestige of the old training,—he still wore the robe of the philosopher whilst he reverently bowed before the Divine Teacher of Galilee, and as he took his pen in hand the doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus came out in his writings arrayed in Christian garb, and baptized in the name of his new and adored Master. To understand aright the position assumed either by the pseudo Dionysius or Erigena, the nature of those doctrines must be briefly noticed.

Of the philosophy of Alexandria, Plotinus was the real founder; Proclus, while differing in some details, was but the logical expounder of his doctrines. When he was twenty-eight years of age, A D. 233, he became a pupil at Alexandria, in the school of Ammonius Saccas. He was baffled with and distressed by the sceptical tone prevailing amongst the learned, he was wearied with mere negatives and destructive criticism, he was painfully anxious for truth of a positive character, and he stretched forth his hands "feeling after it, if haply he might find it." On becoming a

disciple of Saccas, he studied profoundly the Dialogues of Plato and the Metaphysics of Aristotle; he practised the severest asceticism, in order to leave his mind the more untrammeled by the burden of the flesh; he became entranced by reading the life of Apollonius of Tyana, which had recently been issued, and readily drank in, not only the marvels of his magical skill, but the strange combination of Orientalism and Platonism which the philosophical hierophant expounded. He afterwards travelled in the East, and there, doubtless, became familiar with the old theosophies, with their favourite doctrines of the principle of evil, of the gradual unfolding of the Divine essence, of the creation of the universe by intermediate agencies; and probably also at this time he learned the noble but imperfect theosophy inculcated by Philo. On his return to Alexandria he was prepared to follow in the footsteps of his old master, Ammonius Saccus, and to attempt a more complete eclectic philosophy than had yet been offered to the world. The foundation of Plotinus' teaching was the philosophy of Plato; he adopted his doctrine of "sensibles" and "intelligibles," and intermediate or psychical natures. Unconsciously, however, he taught a radically different doctrine to Plato in insisting that the One, or the Good, which the Grecian master taught was the highest of the Ideas, is raised, not only above the Ideas, but above rational apprehension, and that the Ideas to which Plato gave independent existence are emanations from this One, that the soul in its turn is an emanation from the Ideas, and so on until we reach the "sensible," which is the last in the series of emanations. Another decided difference between him and Plato is that whilst the latter styles the Ideas gods, and the highest Idea the highest God,

the former teaches that the Ideas inhere in the Nous. Plotinus teaches also that the One, by reason of its absolute and essential unity, is exalted far above reason or rational apprehension, but by its superabundant energy it projects an image of itself, which image, by an involuntary intuition, turns to behold its original, and becomes the Nous, or mind. In this the Ideas inhere as real and essential parts of itself, and constitute the Nous in its completeness, as the parts constitute the whole. To the Nous real being and life belong, and thus we come to the radical defect of the teaching of Plotinus. The same ideal reality being at once the truly existing, the true object of knowledge and the knowing subject or reason. He makes the objects contemplated, and that which contemplates, absolutely identical; subject and object are confounded together; he rests his system on a fatal *petitio principii*, as many others have done, and thus anticipates by 1,500 years the errors of Hegel.

Plotinus now endeavoured to open a way for the soul to enter into unity with the Infinite, and therefore reduced it to the most abstract and subtle simplicity. He attributed to it a capacity by which it could exalt itself above both action and intelligence, the result being what he called ecstasy, the soul transcending its finite condition, and expanding into the Infinite. These blissful experiences, few and short though they might be, were "times of refreshing" and rejuvenation, a blessed solace and compensation to the student for his wearying and agonizing efforts to reach the highest truth. Here, however, Plotinus fell into another most serious error in teaching the possible absorption of the soul into the Infinite, thus adopting the conclusion of the Oriental pantheist of five centuries before Christ,

and of the German nineteen centuries after Him,[1] that an individual existence is but phenomenal and accidental. The soul is resolved into the most subtle unity, and then rises by ecstasy into the Absolute, the primordial essence itself. Such ethereal teaching could not suffice to satisfy the human consciousness very long; the abstractions of Plotinus were soon clothed upon by sensuous and tangible garb; degenerate followers began to describe the visions of the unseen world, which had been disclosed to them in their times of ecstasy, and a literature arose, filled with revelations of spiritual forms, angelic companies, heavenly hierarchies, gentle genii, astral influences, unseen encampments, realms of unspeakable brightness, with myriads of inhabitants arranged in orderly rank and phalanx; and thus the outcome of the Alexandrian effort to solve the enigmas of Being and Knowing was a curious compound of Greek metaphysic, Oriental pantheism, and magical pretension, which, however, exercised a talismanic influence over many minds of a high order.

Plotinus had not, in any large degree, the faculty of arrangement or classification. He left it, therefore, to his followers to reduce to system the philosophy he had taught, and into which he hoped he had condensed the good from all preceding systems.[2] This was not accomplished until the fifth century, when Proclus, who has been called "the scholastic of the Greek philosophers," "collated, arranged, and dialectically elaborated the whole body of transmitted philosophy augmented

[1] Note A, end of chapter.

[2] He is said to have exclaimed, when dying: "I am striving to bring the divine thing which is in us to the divine which is in the universe." These words strongly express the effort of his life, and the spirit of his teaching.

it by additions of his own, and combined the whole in a sort of system to which he succeeded in giving the appearance of a rigidly scientific form."[1]

Proclus differed from Plotinus and the earlier Alexandrian thinkers in a few particulars, which must be mentioned. He taught that the One, or the Good, is the First Cause of existence, and lies at the foundation of all Unity; that from it all things proceed, and to it all must return. That it is impossible to conceive of the nature of this Unity, as our usual conception of unity does not describe it; it is above unity and above the conception of Good and of Cause. From this Unity issue a plurality of unities, the number of which we may not know, but which are fewer in number than the Ideas of Plato or Plotinus, and which so exist in each other as to constitute, whilst plural, one Unity. These unities operate in the world, they are the agents of the primordial essence, they are the gods in the highest sense of the word, and they occupy higher ranks as they stand in closer relation to the One, the primal Unity. These unities are followed by three essences, which Proclus calls being, life, and thought which are different in rank, and which, while being an Unity in themselves, include within them various triads, divinities masculine and feminine, and Hebdomades, forming an ideal hierarchy of descending degrees. From one of these essences the Intellectual or Psychical emanates, and every soul is by its nature eternal, although by its activity it is related to time. Occupying a middle place between the Absolute and the material, the soul possesses freedom of will; if it err the evil is chargeable upon itself, and it has the power to turn back again to the Divine purity. In other

[1] Ueberweg, "Hist. of Phil.," I 255.

respects the teaching of Proclus seems to have been mainly that of Plotinus.

The monk of Alexandria, who with such sagacity baptized his writings with the name of the first convert under the preaching of St. Paul at Athens, and who thereby seemed to give them almost an apostolic sanction, must have had his nature saturated with the Alexandrian theosophy as formulated by Proclus. In his treatises the pantheistic doctrine of emanation, as taught by the Neo-Platonists, the evolution of the universe through successive orders of existence, beginning with the Primordial Essence called God, but which by some of the teachers might as well have been called Nothing, since it was said to have no relation at all to the created universe; and then the tendency of all being to return to that original One, to be re absorbed by it,—are all reproduced by the so-called Dionysius without any material alteration. The Divine Word, which occupies a prominent place in his system, is so far removed from man by a long succession of celestial powers and ecclesiastical officials as to be a remote Luminary rather than the Friend and Brother and Saviour of mankind. The ideal hierarchy of Proclus is reproduced by him without any change save that of names. The tendency of the whole system was sacerdotal. It was to advertise the Greek Church; to represent all truth as being symbolized by its ecclesiastical offices, to teach that these offices were the counterparts of those in the heavenly kingdom, and that the whole organization furnished a definite and popular exposition of the hierarchical system of the universe.[1]

[1] See a thoughtful and interesting article on the works and teachings of Dionysius in *Contemporary Review* for May 1867, from the accomplished pen of Canon B. F. Westcott.

The translation of the works of Dionysius was completed by Erigena, but speedily the Pope, Nicolaus I., complained to Charles that the translation had not been sent to him for his censorship and approval before its publication, and proposed to summon the philosopher before him to answer for certain heretical opinions which a keen scent had detected therein. It is affirmed by some historians that Erigena was removed from his position as conductor of the Schola Palatina in consequence of the Pope's interference; but, if so, he still remained the honoured friend and companion of the king. He seems after this to have carefully studied the writings of Maximus Confessor, the commentator on the works of Dionysius, of Origen, of Gregory of Nazianzum, of Gregory of Nyssa, and other Greek Fathers, and afterwards of Augustine and the Latin Church writers.

The greatest event in the life of Erigena was the publication of his work *De Divisione Naturæ*, which still survives, and bears ample testimony both to the strength and clearness of his intellect and to the thoroughness with which he had imbibed the notions of Plato, and the Platonists of Alexandria and the Christian Church. This book is written in a lucid and terse style;[1] like most of the mediæval works in theology and philosophy, it is in the form of dialogue, and makes a constant use of the syllogism.

He divides the book into four parts: into that which creates and is not created, that which is created and creates, that which is created and does not create, and that which neither creates nor is created. Under these heads he comprises all things in the universe, and deduces the general doctrine that as all things were

[1] Note B, end of chapter.

originally contained in God, and proceeded from Him into the various classes in which they now exist, so they shall finally return to Him, and be gathered up or re-absorbed into their original source, which supreme gathering up he calls Θεωσις, or the Deification of all things. Evidently the main elements of the Neo-Platonic philosophy had transferred themselves to Erigena with scarcely any perceptible difference. The foundation of his system, as well as that of the Alexandrian teachers, was the evolution of all things from the Absolute, of whom all forms of existence are simply theophanies; the universe is gathered up into the One, the original essence of Being; and, as He neither creates nor is created, all forms of Being are but manifestations of Him, forming one subject, but many accidents. It follows, then, that as all things are but one great Theophany, everything necessarily occupying its own place, evil as such cannot exist; and hence Erigena insisted that evil only existed for the sake of good, or as the means whereby good is produced and manifested. This necessarily led him a step further in the same line, that sin in individuals may be the transition point of evolution, and will tend towards that final Deification or restoration of all thing in God, to which his system naturally leads.

The view taken by Erigena of the Deity, that He is the substance of all things, made it necessary for him to discard the view of Aristotle, that individual or concrete things are substances of which the general may be predicated, but in which the accidental is contained. He regarded all things as being contained in the Divine Substance, the individual being inherent in the general, the general existing in individuals as in its natural parts. This teaching differs also from Plato's doctrine

of Ideas; for whereas he taught that individuals were copies of the Ideas existing in the Deity, Erigena identifies the relation of accidents to the subjects in which they are immanent. Erigena affirms this as the doctrine both of Dionysius and his commentator, Maximus; and made a vigorous, though not successful, effort to reconcile it with the doctrines of the Church. If this were true doctrine, then the teaching of the Bible and the Church concerning the personality of God must be rejected; and Erigena attempted to show that God may be conceived of as a Person in imagination, and not in thought. He made a similar effort to reconcile his views with the teaching of the Church on the subject of the Trinity, by asserting that Tri-Unity could not be predicated of God in Himself as the Absolute, but only of His development or outcome. Thus, he calls the Father the *essentia;* the Son, the *sapientia;* and the Spirit, the *vita Dei;*[1] but these were mere nominal distinctions, and had no corresponding distinction of essence in the Godhead. His view of the final absorption of all things into the Deity was also entirely out of harmony with the teaching of the Church on everlasting punishments.

The views of Erigena of the nature and office of evil necessarily led him to a theory of redemption which could not be held otherwise than dangerous by the orthodox Church teachers. Redemption indeed, as usually understood, has no place in his system. The incarnation of the Son he held to be a revelation of the Divine character in such guise of human nature as a Doketist might have accepted, for he states that it could not be that the Infinite Father could be revealed in finite form. The Redemption, he affirms,

[1] "De Div. Nat.," i., 14.

is a reduction of all things to their primordial causes; and his anxiety is not to enable man to escape from the death of sin to the life of righteousness, but to aid him in escaping from the material to the ideal, to rise from the concrete type to the metaphysical Archetype. But again, with a strange inconsistency in his logic, he taught that the final absorption of self in God was confined to the blessed, and that the impenitent are punished hereafter by fearful and horrible illusions of their own creating.

In viewing the whole theological teaching of Erigena, it must be reckoned as a system pantheistic in its basis, with a biblical terminology, surrounded with ecclesiastical accidents and functionaries, the pantheistic element being largely in excess of any other. Strange to say, these teachings were so much in advanoe of the current learning and understanding, that they challenged no special criticism at the time either favourable or unfavourable, although their author became involved in controversies which drew upon him ecclesiastical attention and censure.

In this *opus magnum* of Erigena the foundation was laid for the long-continued and virulent disputes of the Schoolmen on Nominalism and Realism. He taught that Universals (Ideas) exist before, and also in, the individual object.[1] Thus he ranks as a Realist, clearly and distinctly pronounced, and his whole system tends to Realism, excepting where he becomes confused by self-contradiction, making it possible for his opponents to deny that Universals substantially existed, but could only be conceived of as subjective forms.

In his "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy" the Rev. F. D. Maurice earnestly, and even almost pas-

[1] Note C.

sionately, argues against Erigena being ranked as a Pantheist;[1] but he is unable to give any reason for the position, except that he professed full belief in the dogmas of the Church, and that he manifested a spirit of tender and devout spirituality in some of his writings. This all will gladly admit; but none the less is his philosophical system based on the doctrines of the Neo-Platonists, and developed in some respects more fully than they had ventured to go. Mr. Maurice is indeed obliged to admit that in the last book of "*De Divisione Naturæ*," the Neo-Platonic principles are expanded with great fulness, and that not only with Plotinus and Proclus, but with ancient Buddhists and modern Germans, he speaks of the Absolute, in the contemplation of which the pure and perfected soul at last loses itself for ever.[2] This is the logical and inevitable result of his system; and if he writes, as indeed he did, in a strain which sometimes differed from this, it is but another instance amidst many how a man may be truer in the depths of his religious feeling than in the conclusions of his philosophical system. The devotional element in his nature, which had been nursed in the warm spiritual atmosphere of the Irish monasteries, seems often to have overmastered the metaphysical, and then he rose to the apprehension of grander and truer doctrine. Some of his writings vibrate with the holiest impulses, as an instance of which Mr. Maurice gives the following passage,[3] which he calls "The Student's Prayer":—

"Assuredly the Divine clemency suffereth not those who piously and humbly seek the truth to wander in the darkness of ignorance, to fall into the pits of false opinions, and to perish

[1] Maurice, "Mor. and Met. Phil.," i. 468, etc.
[2] Note D. [3] *Ibid.*, i. 494.

in them. For there is no worse death than the ignorance of truth, no deeper whirlpool than that in which false things are chosen in place of the true, which is the very property of error. For out of these, foul and abominable monsters are wont to shape themselves in human thoughts, while loving and following which, as if they were true, wishing to embrace flying shadows and not able to do it, the carnal soul falls ofttimes into an abyss of misery. Wherefore we ought continually to pray and to say, 'God, our salvation and redemption, who hast given us nature, give us also grace. Manifest Thy light to us, feeling after Thee and seeking Thee in shades of ignorance. Recall us from our errors. Stretch out Thy right hand to us weak ones who cannot without Thee come to Thee. Break the clouds of vain phantasies which suffer not the eye of the mind to behold Thee in that way in which Thou permittest those that long to behold that face of Thine, though it is invisible, which is their rest, the end beyond which they crave for nothing, seeing that there cannot be any good beyond it that is higher than itself.'"

The following prayer is also tenderly sensitive, with a beautiful devoutness :—

"O Lord Jesus, I ask no other reward, no other happiness, except that of Thy pure words, which are inspired by the Holy Spirit, without any erroneous or fallacious theories, so that I may perceive where Thou dwellest, and by earnest searching and diligence be introduced to that abode."[1]

In the year 831 Paschasius Radbertus, Abbot of Corbie, drew up a treatise on the Eucharist for the use of the younger monks of the Church. In 844, at the royal request, he presented the King, Charles the Bald, with a copy. In this work the real presence of the Saviour in the elements of the Lord's Supper was strongly affirmed, was buttressed by many arguments, and was illustrated by many highly-coloured and rhetorical quotations from the early Fathers of the Church. The doctrine, afterwards so famous by the

[1] "De Div. Nat.," iv. 306.

name of Transubstantiation, was broadly taught, although Radbertus insisted that the bread and the wine should be received by both the priesthood and the laity. This teaching was strongly protested against by many of the most learned men of the day. Rabanus Maurus, Walafrid Strabo, Florus, Christian Druthman, and others, denounced the idea of any other than a spiritual change in the Eucharist as being both unscriptural and novel. Ratramnus examined the book at the request of King Charles, and prepared a refutation of it, which he published under the title "De Corpore et Sanguine Domini." He divided this into two parts—the first dealing with the question whether the body and blood of Christ are taken by the faithful communicant in mystery or in fact; the second, whether it is the same body as that in which Christ was born, suffered, and rose from the dead. In treating of these points Ratramnus declared that there was a real, but not a corporeal presence in the Eucharist. Whilst the subject was in vigorous controversy, Erigena was invited by Charles to write upon it. If he did so, his production has been lost, although some, without sufficient reason, have ascribed to him the work of Ratramnus. His opinion can only be gathered from indirect evidence, that he declared the Eucharist to be simply a commemorative rite, and that he was reckoned to be heretical by other Church teachers on this subject. Paschasius was not deterred from vigorously urging his views by the opposition which they excited; he defended them with a great show of piety; and in an age which craved after the marvellous and miraculous, it is not wonderful that they won favour, and were accepted by large numbers in the Church. Erigena's treatise[1] must have

[1] Note E.

exercised some influence and attracted great attention in this discussion, as it said that part of the punishment of Berengarius for promulgating similar views to those it contained was to publicly commit this work to the flames. Whether this was so or not, it was condemned by the councils before which Berengarius was arraigned.[1]

Another controversy sprang up after this in which Erigena became more closely entangled. The ruling spirit of the Western Church was Augustine. He was the standard of orthodoxy, and he reigned with an undisputed sway. In one respect, however, the rigidity of his doctrine had become imperceptibly alleviated by the lapse of time and the impinging influence of other teaching. The dogma of Predestination as taught by him had been toned to a milder strain in the general ministrations of the Church, and was now held so divested of its original sharpness that the prevailing view tended almost to semi-pelagianism. The Augustinian doctrine was now to be revived in all its asperity by Gottschalk, the son of a Saxon Count who had been placed by his father in the monastery of Fulda, but who had been removed to the cloister of Orbais in the diocese of Soissons. He steeped his soul in the writings of Augustine and of his follower Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspe, and urged the doctrine of Predestination with such rigour as to imperil the doctrine of human freedom. The usual language of the Church now was that the righteous were *predestinate*, and the wicked *foreknown*. Augustine applied the term *reprobate* to the wicked, but Gottschalk applied the term *predestinate* to both classes. He insisted that there was a twofold system of decrees, *prædestinatio duplex*, which consigned

[1] Milman, "Hist. Lat. Chris.," iii. 393.

the good and the bad, elect and reprobate alike, to portions allotted to them from eternity irrespective of their conduct in the present life. Thus he identified Divine foreknowledge with predestination, he affirmed that the wicked were as much destined to be lost as the righteous to be saved, that each were so fated by an arbitrary act of the Deity, and that those doomed to eternal perdition could never be more than *nominal* subjects of grace, or more than *apparent* partakers of the sacraments. A warm controversy arose concerning these views; Rabanus Maurus, Archbishop of Mayence, and a man of profound learning, issued a reply to them, distinguishing between the Divine foreknowledge and predestination, and urging that only those whom the Lord foreknows as hopelessly wicked are doomed to eternal perdition. Gottschalk before the Synod of Mayence in 848 defended his views, declaring that the Scriptures, which speak of Christ dying for "all men," should be limited to the elect, and that the rest of the human family as the result of a Divine decree were hopelessly consigned to everlasting darkness. The Synod declared against him, and he was handed over to Hincmar, his metropolitan bishop, a man proud, persecuting, and restless, the worst possible hands for any one deemed heretical to fall into, who summoned him before an assembly of the various ecclesiastical orders held in presence of the King at Chiersey in 849. Here again Gottschalk boldly defended his opinions, but was condemned not only for holding such views but for treating with contempt his lawful superiors. The assembly declared him to be a teacher of erroneous opinions, he was condemned, and sentenced to be first whipped and then imprisoned. He was so cruelly scourged that in agony he consented to cast into the

flames a writing he had composed in defence of his views, and which consisted only of extracts from the fathers and from the Bible. He was then imprisoned in the monastery of Hautvilliers in the diocese of Rheims, where he lingered until 868. Many attempts were made to force him to abjure his doctrine, but in vain. Hincmar refused to grant him the communion in his last sickness, or to assure him of burial with Christian rites, except upon an unconditional recantation. But he would not yield; he quietly renounced these earthly consolations, and died peacefully, holding his faith in patience, and looking for his comfort to the Father in whom is all fulness of love and joy. The severe treatment to which he was subjected kept alive the controversy; many who had entertained sympathy with his views were indignant at the bitter suffering he endured, and not only protested against his persecutions, but partially defended his position, arguing that "the predestination of the wicked is not absolute, but is conditioned on the Divine foreknowledge of all sins that would result from the voluntary act of Adam."[1]

Hincmar found that to use weapons of intolerance against heresy was not the most successful method of battling with it, and turned to Erigena to aid him by his pen in the conflict. Charles also intimated his desire that he should take part in the fray. In 851 he issued his famous work *De Divina Prædestinatione*, which has been preserved, and which from the nature of its sentiments and the vigour of its style could not but exercise much influence in that age. He argued in this treatise for the freedom of the will on philosophic grounds, and in defending his position came into collision with all established doctrines of the nature of good and evil.

[1] Hardwick, "Church Hist. Middle Ages," 175.

He ingeniously sought to maintain by quotations from his works that Augustine believed that as evil was simply a negative it could not therefore be predestined by God. He argued that the idea of a *prædestinatio* cannot, properly speaking, be applied to God, since with Him there is neither a past nor a future. As, however, sin ever carries its own punishment with it, there is no need of a predestination of punishment. Evil does not exist at all as regards God, and therefore both the prescience and the predestination of evil on His part is out of the question.[1] Such a line of argument was equally embarrassing to friends and foes, and such an excitement arose concerning it that Hincmar was obliged to disown the advocate he had summoned to his aid. Prudentius, the Bishop of Troyes, and Florus, master of the cathedral school at Lyons, wrote warmly in reply to Erigena, charging him with Pelagianism and Origenism, taxing him with unfair treatment of his opponents, and declaring him to have substituted philosophical subtleties for Scripture statements and Church authority. In 853 a council met at Quiercy, which again condemned the views of Gottschalk; but Remigius, the Archbishop of Lyons, wrote a book against the decisions of the council, very abusive of Erigena, stating that he was ignorant of the very words of Scripture, and that instead of being consulted on points of faith he should either be pitied as a man out of his mind or anathematized as a heretic.[2]

In 855 a council was held at Valence, over which Remigius presided, which condemned nineteen propositions extracted from the book of Erigena, which it

[1] Hagenbach, "Hist. of Doct.," ii. 52; Guizot, "Hist of Civ. in France," Lect. v.

[2] Robertson, "Hist. of Church," ii. 331.

courteously nicknamed the "porridge of the Scots." After this the controversy slackened in its fierceness, and in 859 a council was held at Savoniéres, when seven hundred and fifty prelates agreed to ignore the decisions of the councils of Quiercy and Valence, and adopted several mild and general affirmations of the Augustinian doctrine. Then the combatants, as if wearied of the struggle, mutually laid down their arms. After this controversy Erigena fades out of sight in history. It has been affirmed, although without sufficient evidence, that he was invited to England by the great and munificent patron of learning, King Alfred, who bestowed on him an appointment at Malmesbury and another at Ethelingey, and that in a passionate outbreak but too common in that day he was stabbed by the boys under his care.[1] The authorities who affirm this are Asser and Matthew of Westminster, but the weight of evidence is decidedly against it.[2] It is certain that after the condemnation of his works by the council of Valence, Pope Nicholas requested Charles to send him to Rome, that he might be kept from further mischief. Charles, however, continued to protect him, and it is probable that he ended his days in France about 877.[3]

Erigena is undoubtedly the most prominent and interesting literary character of the early Middle Age. He was a man of unremitting industry he amassed such large stores of information as made him the wonder of his contemporaries; and he had great acuteness of mind. He was the greatest intellectual

[1] S. Turner, "Hist. of Anglo Sax.," iii. 365.
[2] Robertson, "Hist. of Church," ii. 327.
[3] Haureau, "Nouvelle Biog. Gen. Tour.," xvi.

force of the ninth century; but though he had a bold and adventurous mind, he did not manifest thorough originality in his thinking. He seems to have had a special aptitude for gathering knowledge from many sources, and then constructing systems and theories; but in many places the logical consistency of his theories is marred by his desire to remain within the limits of Church teaching, and by the occasional ascendency of the spiritual over the metaphysical in his nature. He rendered immense service to the cause of learning in his own and the following centuries; and especially he conferred a great blessing on the world in becoming the leader of a line of brilliant and powerful thinkers, who fought out to a successful issue the right of man's judgment and reason to pronounce upon matters of opinion and doctrine, in opposition to the absolute supremacy over reason and conscience claimed by the Church. Erigena was thus a Protestant born out of due time, and the forerunner of those who battled against spiritual assumption until the Reformation. He anticipated many of the metaphysical questions which have since agitated Europe, and which are being discussed now as earnestly as ever. His theories were framed and published when the world was not prepared to properly estimate or appreciate them, and therefore the heretical character of his philosophy was not fully recognised for some ages. He preserved a great reputation; and in the thirteenth century, when the great heresy of the Albigenses burst forth, his books—particularly his great works "*De Divisione Naturæ*," and his translation of Dionysius—were much read and studied in Southern France. To such an extent was this the case, that Pope Honorius III. ordered a search to be made for the manuscripts of his books in all libraries,

that they might be sent to Rome, to be there burnt.[1] When an English edition of his great work was published in England by Gale of Oxford in 1681, it was written in the Index Expurgatorius in the Vatican. Notwithstanding these persecuting measures, Erigena has ever stood high in the estimation of even Roman Catholic theologians. He is generally reckoned to have been the harbinger of the Middle Age Realism; to have been the interpreter of many of the teachings both of Plato and Aristotle; and to have antedated in many of their speculations the German philosophers of this century.

NOTE A.

"In the Hegelian system, Theism, with all its mighty influence on the human mind, is compromised; for the Deity is a process ever going on, but never accomplished; nay, the divine consciousness is absolutely one with the advancing consciousness of mankind. This being the case, the hope of immortality likewise perishes, for death is but the return of the individual to the infinite, and man is annihilated, though the Deity will live eternally. Religion, if not destroyed by the Hegelian philosophy, is absorbed in it, and *as religion* for ever disappears." "The system of Hegel is utterly inconsistent with the results of psychology—*i.e.*, with the most obvious facts of human consciousness. Human freedom entirely vanishes under its shadow. The man is but the mirror of the absolute; his consciousness must ever roll onwards by the fixed law of all being, his personality is sunk in the infinite; he can never be aught but what he really is."—*Morell*, "Hist. Modern Phil.," ii. 158-9.

NOTE B.

A few sentences from the commencement of this treatise translated by Mr. Sharon Turner will illustrate the vigour of his style, and present an idea of his system.

"Nature may be divided into that which creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; that which is created and does not create; and that which neither creates nor is created.

[1] Guizot, "Hist. Civ. in France," ii. 390.

"The essences, or what from Aristotle in those days they called the substance, of all visible or invisible creatures cannot be comprehended by the intellect; but whatever is perceived in everything, or by the corporal sense, is nothing else but an accident, which is known either by its quality or quantity, form, matter, or differences, or by its time or place. Not what it is, but how it is.

"The first order of being is the Deity; He is the essence of all things.

"The second begins from the most exalted intellectual virtue nearest about the Deity, and descends from the sublimest angel to the lowest part of the rational and irrational creation. The three superior orders are—1st, the Cherubim, Seraphim, and Thrones; the 2nd, the Virtues, Powers, and Dominations; the 3rd, the Principalities, Archangels, and Angels.

"The Cause of all things is far removed from those which have been created by it. Hence the reasons of created things which are eternally and unchangeably in it, must be also wholly removed from their subjects.

"In the angelic intellects there are certain theophanies of these reasons; that is, certain comprehensible, divine apparitions of the intellectual nature. The divine essence is fully comprehensible by no intelligent creature.

"Angels see not the causes themselves of things which subsist in the Divine essence, but certain Divine apparitions or theophanies of the eternal causes whose images they are. In this manner angels always behold God. So the just in this life, while in the extremity of death, and in the future will see Him as the angels do.

"We do not see Him by Himself because angels do not. This is not possible to any creature. But we shall contemplate the theophanies which He shall make upon us according to the height of His sanctity and wisdom."—*Sharon Turner*, "Anglo-Saxons," iii. 391-2.

NOTE C.

The views of Plato and Aristotle are thus clearly defined by a fitting hand:—

"The Platonic Idea (ἰδέα or εἶδος) is the pure archetypal essence in which those things which are together subsumed under the same concept participate." "The Idea is not the essence immanent in the various similar individual objects as such, but rather this essence conceived as perfect in its kind, or existing *per se*. The

idea respects the universal; but it also is represented by Plato as a spaceless and timeless archetype of individuals." "To express the relation of individuals to their corresponding ideas, Plato employs the term 'participation' (μέθεξις), and also 'imitation' (μίμησις ὁμοίωσις). The idea is the archetype (παράδειγμα); individual objects are images (εἴδωλα ομοιώματα). The idea though existing independently (αὐτο κάθ' αὐτό) has also a certain community (κοινωνία) with things; it is in some sense present (παρουσία) in them, but the specific nature of this community Plato has neglected more precisely to define."—*Ueberweg*, "Hist. of Phil.," I. 115-6.

The Aristotelian Notion.

"The principles common to all spheres of reality are given by Aristotle as four, viz., Form or Essence, Matter or Substratum, Moving or Efficient Cause, and End. The principle of Form or Essence is the Aristotelian substitute for the Platonic Idea. Aristotle argues against the Platonic (or, at least, what he held as the Platonic) view, that the ideas exist for themselves apart from the concrete objects which are copied from them, affirming, however, on his own part, that the logical, subjective concept has a real, objective correlate, in the essence immanent in the objects of the concept. As the one apart from and *beside* the many, the Idea does not exist; none the less must a unity be assumed as (objectively) present *in* the many. The word substance (οὐσία) in its primary and proper signification belongs to the concrete and individual; only in a secondary sense can it be applied to the genus. But although the universal has no independent existence apart from the individual, it is yet first in worth and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature, and the proper subject of knowledge. This, however, is true, not of every common notion, but only of such notions as represent the essential in the individual objects. These universal notions combine in one whole all the essential attributes of their objects, both the generic and the specific attributes; they represent the essential form."—*Ueberweg*, "Hist. of Phil.," i. 157.

The following extract may be of value to some readers, as defining the relation of Aristotle to Plato in this controversy:—

"The ideas of Form and Matter—the one as that which constitutes every substance what it is; the other as its condition and *sine qua non*—lay at the foundation of the metaphysics of Aristotle, and determined his thoughts upon every other subject. These

ideas are closely connected with logic, so that the fact of anything being capable of definition is with him the test of its having a form and being a substance. This is a distinction of great value and importance, but it can only be admitted as a distinction in and for the mind. For the moment it becomes more than this we get upon the Platonic ground which Aristotle believed to be merely imaginary. His forms become the ideas of Plato, and these ideas derive their meaning from the reality of One who is Himself THE BEING, not merely a particular form, though it be the highest form of being."

NOTE D.

M. Saint-Rene Taillandier, in his work "Scot Erigené et la Philosophie Scholastique," earnestly defends Erigena from the charge of Pantheism in these words :—"When Erigena refers to final union with God and the deification of the soul, he always maintains the permanence of human personality in the bosom of the Divine soul which receives and embraces it. One may remark the comparisons which he employs to illustrate this ineffable union, *i.e.*, those of iron which melts and disappears in the fire, and of air which is invisible and yet subsists in the light of the sun" (p. 191). But the passage here referred to unmistakably teaches such a final absorption of the soul into God as is quite inconsistent with the retention of personality. See "*De Div. Nat.*," lib. i., c. 10 :—"Sicut ergo totus aer lux, totumque ferrum liquefactum ut diximus igneum imoetian ignis apparet maneutibus tamen eorum substantiis : ita sano intellectu accipiendum, quia post finem hujus mundi omnis naturæ sive corporea sive incorporea solus Deus esse videbitur, naturæ integritate permanente, ut et Deus qui per seipsum incomprehensibilis est in creaturâ quodammodo comprehendatur, ipsa vero creaturâ ineffabili miraculo in Deum vertatur."

NOTE E.

Hincmar, censuring the writings of Johannes Scotus, says :—"He hath other errors against the faith, as that the divinity is triple ; that the sacrament on the altar is not the true body and blood of Christ, but only a memorial of it ; that angels are corporeal ; thar the soul of man is not in the body ; that the only pains of hell are in the remorse of conscience, etc."—*Fortin*, "Obser. Eccles. Hist.," iii., 90.

CHAPTER IV.

YEARNINGS FOR LIGHT.—GERBERT; POPE SILVESTER II.

"Cry, faint not: either Truth is born
Beyond the polar gleam forlorn,
Or in the gateways of the morn.

"Cry, faint not, climb: the summits slope
Beyond the furthest flights of hope,
Wrapt in dense cloud from base to cope.

"Sometimes a little corner shines,
As over rainy mist inclines
A gleaming crag with belts of pines."

TENNYSON.

IV.

POPE GERBERT.

AFTER the death of Erigena the hope of intellectual advancement in Europe seemed to be extinguished, and when Alfred the Great passed from his earthly kingdom a few years afterwards the last apparent flicker of life remaining from the renaissance of learning in the ninth century departed. At this point, we enter upon the Dark Ages, properly so called, or rather commonly so called, for the darkness was not so dense as is generally understood. At any rate they cannot be said to have lasted more than about a century, and even in that century there was considerable intellectual activity and progress. The Church also was making actual progress, although it was not of that character which challenges the attention of the casual onlooker It is true that during this period the secular power was losing strength, and the claims of ecclesiastical assumption were becoming stronger, the lists of saints were being enlarged, pilgrimages with the usual accompaniments of miracles and relics were increasingly the fashion, and the Papacy exhibited a corruption which was scarcely relieved by one touch of culture, or condoned by one healthy blush of shame. In the tenth century twenty-eight Popes reigned in the Church, and

with scarcely one exception their lives were scandalous with cruelty and debauchery. The result was that the Papacy repelled from itself the nascent culture and the honest feeling of the age, and was beginning to reap the fruit of those who sow unto the flesh, and of the flesh reap corruption. Still these *Dark* Ages were not without a bright and hopeful side. As though to keep hope alive in Europe, it was then that female convents sprang into being, which became a most important factor in future civilization and in the history of Christianity. For amidst the extreme licentiousness which prevailed amongst nobles, kings, and emperors, priests, bishops, and popes, it was of the first consequence that the idea of a noble womanhood should be preserved; that a high standard of purity and chastity should be set up, and when days were dawning of universal and unrestrained license, it was surely of more than human ordering that a home should be provided where the fairest and tenderest plant of human growth should be protected and matured for the blessing of all future time. Nor was this all; the schools and universities established by Charlemagne, and more notably by the Mohammedans, maintained a position, and had in them some distinguished teachers. In many quiet monasteries earnest students devoted themselves to the consideration of great theological and philosophical questions; and even Hildebrand, whilst bent on attaining for the Papacy the maximum of power, did not discourage intellectual progress, but rather prepared its way in the future by the great ecclesiastical reforms he sought to carry out.

The great name of what are with even approximate fitness called the Dark Ages, and which may serve as a link between Erigena and the man who next merits

the name of a great Schoolman, was Gerbert. He was not a Schoolman, but he was a great encourager and conservator of European learning in the latter part of the tenth century; and he may be used therefore as a means of bridging the period between Erigena and Anselm in this sketch of the condition of human learning in that age.

Gerbert was born in Auvergne about the middle of the tenth century, of parents in the humblest rank of life. At an early age he was admitted to the monastery of Aurillac, an establishment founded in the previous century by Count St. Gerard. He showed extraordinary aptitude for learning, and attracted the attention of all around him by the proficiency he easily obtained in every branch of letters. Count Borel, of Barcelona, was on a pilgrimage in the neighbourhood of Aurillac, and visited the monastery. He saw Gerbert, and being attracted by his abilities, invited him to accompany him to Spain. On his arrival there he speedily became expert in the physical sciences which were taught in the Mohammedan schools, and also in mathematics. He was able to speak with singular fluency in Arabic, and was well versed in all the intellectual accomplishments of the day. He then visited Rome in company with Count Borel, and was horrified to observe the contrast between the learning and morality of the Khalif's court, at Cordova, and the ignorance and immorality prevailing at the Vatican. Here, however, he became acquainted with Otho the Great which had a most important bearing upon his future career. Otho had become the conqueror of Italy, and had assumed the crown of Charlemagne as Emperor of the West. The union of Italy and Germany under one northern power had a great influence upon European progress,

and henceforth in the struggles which followed against ecclesiastical tyranny, and in the efforts which were made for intellectual expansion, there flowed two contemporary streams of influence, answering to each other and mutually helpful—one in the south, the other in the north; and thus they flowed on for several centuries, until the Lutheran Reformation movement broke forth, when the northern stream deepened and widened its channel, whilst the southern one fell back and allowed itself to be swallowed up for a time by overmastering influences.

Gerbert after his visit to Rome became master of the cathedral school at Rheims. Here he taught the sciences with which he became familiar at Cordova; he expatiated on the Latin classics, Virgil, Terence, Statius, and others; he introduced into France the study of mathematics, the Arabic numerals. and the decimal notation. He gathered a library of rare books and manuscripts, and even displayed an astonishing mechanical genius by the invention of a clock, of a rudimentary telescope, and an organ played by steam —this being the first effort to apply this marvellous power which by modern ingenuity has become such an important factor in the civilization of the world. He raised the seminary of Rheims to a position of unrivalled eminence, and greatly aided in the elevation of other schools. He became secretary to Adalbero, the Archbishop of Rheims, and in this capacity he was soon deeply involved in the political dissensions and intrigues of the times. In mixing up with any political movement, he was never actuated by other than the noble and disinterested object of restoring the Church to the moral and intellectual standing from which it had fallen; and for this purpose he was willing that

any instrument should be used, whether French, Italian, or German, which was most likely to achieve the result. He was appointed the Abbot of Bobbio, but his high and severe morality ill suited the monks, who were accustomed to a discipline less severe; and after many quarrels with them he retired from his post and resumed his teaching at Rheims. He had become acquainted, through the political tempests then prevailing, with Hugh Capet, who invited him to become tutor to his son, and who soon found him to be a useful helper in his designs for aggrandisement. A speech prepared by Gerbert and delivered by Arnulph, Archbishop of Orleans, in the Council of Rheims, in 991, has been preserved, which is distinguished by a noble independence of tone in protesting against the corruptions of the Papacy, and shows how deeply his indignation was moved by the wickedness of the ecclesiastical orders. The following sentences from this speech will afford an idea of the strength of invective against the prevailing vices in which it indulged:—"There is not one at Rome, it is notorious, who knows enough of letters to qualify him for a door-keeper; with what face shall he presume to teach who has never learned?" He gives an account of the horrible crimes of which the Popes had been guilty, and adds: "To such monsters, full of all infamy, void of all knowledge, human and divine, are all the priests of God to submit—men distinguished throughout the world for their learning and holy lives? The pontiff who so sins against his brother—who when admonished refuses to hear the voice of counsel—is as a publican and a sinner." "How do your enemies say that, in deposing Arnulphus, we should have waited for the judgment of the Roman bishop? Can they say that

his judgment is before that of God which our Synod pronounced? The prince of the Roman bishops and of the apostles themselves proclaimed that God must be obeyed rather than men; and Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles, announced anathema to him, though he were an angel, who should preach a doctrine different to that which had been delivered. Because the pontiff Marcellinus offered incense to Jupiter, must therefore all bishops sacrifice?"

Words like these indicated a spirit which was brave and independent in testifying against corruption, and show how soon a spirit of rebellion began to stir against the tyranny of the Papacy. In the unfolding of events Gerbert was promoted to the Archbishopric of Rheims, but he speedily found that with his courageous spirit and Protestant attitude his position was a dangerous one, and that even his life was in jeopardy. In this extremity he received a letter from Otho III., then in his fifteenth year, inviting him to the German Court. He accepted the request, was received with signal honour, and became the tutor and familiar friend of the young prince. But even here the enmity of the Papal court pursued him, and in the Council of Mousson, in which the refractory conduct of the prelates of the Council of Rheims was arraigned, Gerbert defended himself with great boldness, and even disputed the right of the Pope to exercise the extreme authority of interdicting him from the exercise of sacred functions. He was appointed by Otno, Archbishop of Ravenna, and he devoted himself assiduously in aiding the young monarch in effecting great reforms both in the Church and the State.

In the midst of general European discord and apprehension, Pope Gregory V. died in 999. An universal

and morbid terror took possession at this time of Christendom. It was the thousandth year, and then, as so often since, enthusiasts with heated imaginations announced the close of the dispensation, and the immediate advent of the Lord from heaven. The prevailing disorders and conflicts raging in Europe, the general unsettledness of the public mind, were interpreted by ardent students of prophecy to be an exact fulfilment of the signs of the end of the world as foretold by Jesus—wars and rumours of wars, men's hearts failing them for fear, apostacies, famines, pestilences, troublous forebodings, were all looked on as ominous and certain harbingers of the end. Thus in many places there was general social disorganisation prevailing, many gave themselves up to licentiousness, many left off attending to the ordinary affairs of life, many lived in profound and melancholy apprehension, and many left their countries to be in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, where it was expected the Son of Man would set up the Great White Throne for judgment. In such a time was Gerbert, the son of a humble French peasant, raised to the throne of the Papacy by his powerful patron Otho. He had been the most damaging foe of the immoralities which had disgraced the Papacy in his generation, and he suddenly found himself placed upon the throne, with a dangerous and difficult responsibility upon him. He took the name of Sylvester II., and manfully prepared himself to grapple with the enormous perplexities of his position. He had many qualifications for the office; he was a passionate lover of learning; his residence amid the Mohammedan schools had aroused in him the desire of raising throughout Christendom a noble Christian culture, and he loathed the corruption which disgraced the clerical

orders of the Church. But he was not destined to give full effect to his expansive aims; four years only were allotted him to occupy the throne, and in that short period he could but sow the seeds of a harvest which he was not permitted to see even the beginnings of, but which bore such fruit in succeeding generations as to change the course of the civilized world. He laboured to diffuse throughout the heart of his great spiritual empire an ardent thirst for intellectual attainments, to give new impulses to an awakening spirit of progress, and with a rare prophetic instinct he recognised that Christendom required a new enthusiasm, by which its long dormant energies might be aroused into full exercise, by which its profound emotions might be sympathetically engaged; and thus he was led to give the first signal of a crusade against the Mohammedan power, and to inspire Europe with a passionate desire to win from the power of unbelievers the land which had been consecrated by the life and death of the Lord Jesus. It was a suggestion of the most momentous character, and centuries had to pass before its full fruit could be realized. Gibbon well said, "A nerve was touched of exquisite feeling, and it vibrated to the heart of Europe."

On January 24th, A.D. 1001, his youthful but exalted patron, Otho III., died. His German biographers say that he was the victim of an attack of small pox, but such a death was too prosaic and commonplace for Italian romancists, who record that he was enticed to adulterous embraces by Stephania, the widow of Crescentius, the Consul of Rome, whom Otho had defeated and put to death, and that she by means of a pair of gloves administered to him a subtle poison which wrought his death. In the year 1004 Gerbert

followed his friend the emperor to the grave, and tradition has connected the same fair syren with his end, by stating that Stephania skilfully mixed poison in his food, which slowly corrupted his blood, ruined his health, and brought him to death. Then arose wild stories, conjured up by ecclesiastics whose excesses he had sought to restrain, and fostered by the prevailing spirit of superstition, of wizardry, necromancy, diabolism, and hellish compact, of which the great Pontiff had been guilty. The fables, oft repeated of divers celebrities in the Middle Ages, of a brazen head which he consulted on important subjects, of a familiar spirit kept in a secret apartment, which he could cause to be seen, or unseen, by the wearing of a ring, of magical arts by which treasure was discovered in the earth, and other similar stories, were furbished up by weak and wicked gossips, and circulated with bated breath and shuddering gesture by the peasants of Italy and France. The monks whispered ominously to each other, "Homaqium diabolo fecit, et male finivit."

Gerbert left no such name as his own behind him. and for a generation or more there arose no one as conspicuous as he was, nor any so able to give practical encouragement to European learning.[1] He left behind him a few friends and pupils who did not allow the cause of learning utterly to languisn, and in various directions slow but steady progress was realized. The schools of the Saracens in Spain shone with a steady light, and gave the impulse to the establishment of Christian schools in surrounding nations, not always in emulation of their love of learning, but sometimes to counteract what was held to be their baleful influence. Fulbert, one of Gerbert's pupils, taught the school of

[1] Note A.

Chartres, and became bishop of that city in 1007. He was devotedly loved by his pupils, who, perhaps with a youthful partiality, called him their Socrates. He was celebrated for the wide range of his knowledge, but he strove to maintain in all his teachings the closest adherence to the teachings of the Church. From the tutorage of Fulbert came forth Berengarius of Tours, in whom the independence of mind which distinguished Gerbert was clearly manifested. He signalised himself by professing certain rationalising views on the subject of the Lord's Supper, in which he was opposed by an opponent truly formidable, the learned, devout, and philosophic Lanfranc, once a law student at Bologna, then monk and prior in the famous monastery of Bec, in Normandy, and finally Archbishop of Canterbury. Berengarius, in turn, left followers behind him, chief of whom was Hildebert, Bishop of Tours, who was an enthusiastic admirer of his teacher. He was so learned a man, and so earnest a defender of Church dogma, that he won from Bernard of Clarvaux the title of "a great pillar of the Church." These names, however, were soon to be eclipsed by others, which shone with such lustre as to concentrate on themselves the gaze of Christendom for ages.

Now arose to prominence in Europe a race of men from whom learning and philosophy were to receive at once a noble impulse and a congenial home, and amongst whom they were to be nursed during coming ages, until they attained a glorious maturity.

They came as a band of marauding savages from the northern seas; they were wild and cruel, but they were marvellously impressible; and as they swept over the seas to the south, and entrenched themselves in the sunny provinces of France, native tendencies in their

nature towards refinement developed themselves, and led them to absorb the growing spirit of chivalry, of culture, and of poetry, so that in less time than it often takes a race to settle on a foreign soil, they had not only settled, but had imbibed the highest spirit of the times, and they emerged the most refined and high-souled people of the mediæval age. The Normans became in time the leaders of Europe; they headed the Crusades, they made England a land of poetry, of freedom, and of religious zeal, and with a catholicity of spirit, far from frequent in that day, they gave such encouragement to learning that ardent students hastened to them from all parts of Europe, and followed their beloved pursuits beneath the genial shades of their schools and monasteries.

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NOTE A.

"Sylvester was the best man of the dark ages: his life indeed was the transition point between the darkness and the dawn. His mind was imbued with the love of learning, his heart was impressed with the ideal of a cultured Christendom. He sought to inspire with this love the country over which he had been appointed spiritual guardian, to revive the thirst for knowledge which had gone to sleep, to resuscitate the life of civilization which had long been dormant. He sought to kindle into flame the heart of Christendom by presenting a new object of religious enthusiasm. It was by him that the first martial trumpet was sounded, the first call to identify the spirit of Christianity with the spirit of warlike heroism. He proposed a crusade against the Mohammedans. He felt that what his people wanted most of all was an object in life, a goal of aspiration, a point to strive after. He perceived that those days were dark chiefly because they were lethargic, because they brought no aim, because they came and went without a purpose and without a plan. Here was a purpose, here was a plan, which would dispel the aimlessness and awaken from the lethargy. Let the Church

put on its armour, let the spirit of Christianity go forth to battle for the truth, to win back the land of its birth, to expel the intruders from its native soil. Such was the voice of Sylvester, and in the circumstances of the time it was a wise voice. But Sylvester was before his time."– *Matheson*, "Growth of Spirit of Chris.," ii. 48.

CHAPTER V.

THE FOUNDER OF MEDIÆVAL THEOLOGY. ANSELM.

"WORKMAN of God! oh, lose not heart,
But learn what God is like;
And in the darkest battle-field
Thou shalt know where to strike.

"Thrice blest is he to whom is given
The instinct that can tell
That God is on the field when He
Is most invisible.

"Blest too is he who can divine
Where real right doth lie,
And dares to take the side that seems
Wrong to man's blindfold eye.

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"For right is right, since God is God;
And right the day must win,
To doubt would be disloyalty,
To falter would be sin."

FABER.

V.

ANSELM.

ANSELM was of noble parentage. His father's name was Gundulphus, his mother's Ermerberga, and they lived in wealth and influence in the city of Augusta, in Lombardy. His father was profuse in his hospitality, and given to the good things of life, his mother, as the mothers of the greatest men have so often been, was a woman of skilful management, of stainless purity, of excellent reputation, and of devout spirit. She was the good angel of her son whilst she lived, and after death her gentle influence rested upon him as a blessed restraint from evil. But at the age of fourteen this best earthly friend was removed from him. For some time he followed her instructions, he meditated upon religious themes, and living amongst the hills his youthful fancy conceived that the home of God was on the top of a high mountain. At the age of fifteen he sought to enter a convent, but, strange to say, for some reason not recorded, the abbot refused him admission. His health failed him, and during his sickness he longed with greater desire than before after a religious life. But as he regained his strength his good desires and serious impressions fled, he fell into temptation, gave way to some vices, and even became indifferent to the accumu-

lation of knowledge. He was not blessed with favourable influences at home; his father pursued a course of undue severity towards him, and the result was he fled from the parental roof and his native land. He travelled through various countries, and was sometimes reduced to the hardest straits, as on one occasion he was forced to pacify the cravings of hunger by eating snow.[1] He passed through Gaul, spent three years in wandering about Burgundy and France, and finally came to Normandy.

This province was then resounding with the praises of the monk Lanfranc, and Anselm was drawn by his renown to the monastery of Bec. He became a student under him, and by the inspiring teaching he received his passion for learning was not only revived but greatly stimulated. Shortly after his settlement here his father died, and Anselm sought counsel of Lanfranc as to which of three courses he would do best to follow: whether to accept his inheritance and distribute it for the benefit of the poor, to enter a monastery and pursue a religions life, or to live as a hermit of the woods. Lanfranc declined the responsibility of advising him, but his early passion decided his lot, and at the age of twenty-seven he became a monk in the monastery of Bec, of which Herluin was abbot, and Lanfranc, the prior and teacher. The latter was shortly afterwards, in 1063 removed to Caen, and in 1078 Herluin died. Anselm succeeded first to the office of Lanfranc, and then to the post of abbot. His unostentatious piety, and his thorough familiarity with all subjects in philosophy, theology, and grammar, caused his fame to be diffused far and wide. Students came flocking to him from every quarter, and Bec became the most noted

[1] Lupton, "Glory of their Times," 464.

centre of learning in Europe. Although he sought to diminish by skilful distribution amongst the monks the secular work of his office, the duty of management was so uncongenial, the publicity of his position was so distasteful, and both interfered so much with his opportunity for pious contemplation, that it was with much difficulty he was restrained from resigning his office, and becoming a simple monk again. This was prevented, according to a fable of the day, by his intention being revealed in a dream to Mauritius, the Archbishop of Rouen, who exereised peremptory authority by insisting on his retaining his office.

During the years of splendid service which Anselm rendered as abbot of Bec, he found time to compose several works, which were issued under the titles, "On Truth," "On the Freedom of the Will," "The Grammarian," "The Monologion," and "The Proslogion." Meantime Lanfranc, who had won for himself everlasting renown as the Primate of England, died, and William Rufus seized the revenues and possessions of the See, and declined to make any appointment thereto for upwards of four years. This worthless monarch being reduced by severe sickness to the verge of death, as he slowly recovered, having been led to serious thought by his affliction, nominated Anselm, who was then in England on a visit to the Count of Chester, to the Archbishopric. Anselm earnestly sought to withstand the appointment, but it is said he was carried by force into the chamber of the King at Gloucester, the crosier was placed in his hand, then he was hurried to a neignbouring church, crowds of people hailed him as Archbishop, and the clergy welcomed him as their Primate with enthusiastic acclamation. He reluctantly suffered himself to be consecrated on December 4th,

1093, the Archbishop of York officiating at the ceremony. He occupied this prominent and responsible post for eighteen years,—years of storm and conflict,—during which he boldly maintained the authority of the Pope as supreme ruler in all things spiritual, in opposition to the will of the King and of the temporal power. In the course of the struggle he was driven out of the kingdom, his possessions alienated, his followers dispersed, and he proceeded to Rome, where Pope Urban II. received him with great distinction. The Pope requested him whilst there to defend the doctrine of the Latin Church against the Greek Church on the subject of the Procession of the Holy Ghost, which he did with signal ability. Urban sustained such a relation to the King of England at this time that he could not afford to put him to defiance, and the quarrel of Anselm could not therefore be adjusted. Hence he retired to the little village of Schlavia, where he wrote his treatise "*Cur Deus homo*," which contained his celebrated theory of the atonement. Then he retired to Lyons, where he remained until the death of William Rufus occurred by the arrow of Sir Walter Tyrrell in the New Forest. Then he was recalled to England by Henry, who succeeded to the throne. But the new King demanded that he should permit himself to be re-invested in his office, thus palpably making the spiritual appointment subordinate to the royal will, than which nothing can be conceived more directly opposed to the theory of the Papacy, nor indeed to the spirit of the Bible. For whilst a spiritual despotism is of all things most hateful, and nothing operates more injuriously to the best interests of a nation than a rampant priestism, it is also of great importance that spiritual offices and sacred functions should not lie at the mercy of the temporal

power, and that the Church should not be subordinated to the world. A long and bitter controversy took place between Anselm and the king upon this subject, the result of which was that in 1107 the king withdrew his pretensions. Anselm resumed his functions, which he discharged with great honour to himself and advantage to the Church for two years. Then he died, amidst universal lamentation. He was canonised in 1494, and if loftiness of motive, transcendent abilities, and burning piety ever justified such a distinction, they did in him. He was a man of enormous learning, and he exercised a mighty influence on European thought. He was the Augustine of the Middle Ages, and may fitly be considered the first Scholastic philosopher, and a theologian of the highest class. Erigena, although a man of great boldness of thought, and far ahead of his age in learning and philosophical acumen, was rather a forerunner and herald of the School than belonging to it, and was much inferior to Anselm in constructive theology and in consistency of general thought.

The doctrines of Anselm in religion and philosophy require now brief consideration. About 1070 Anselm published the *Monologion*, in which the great principles of his system are laid down. The title of the book explains its purpose, "Monologue of the method in which one may account for his faith;" and it represents an ignorant man seeking truth by the light of his reason alone. This was a bold position for any one to assume in the eleventh century, and especially one who was so devoted to the Church as Anselm. He built his system on the basis of pure Realism, and argued that Universals exist independently of Individuals, that the latter exist simply as a result of the former; and from this starting-point he framed an argument for the existence of God

after this manner. We seek many goods, some for their utility, some for their beauty. These have various degrees of excellence, and hence possess a relative value, *i.e.*, are related to some standard by which their worth is measured. Relative goods thus by necessity argue an Absolute Good, which is God. Thus also, in regard to all that is great or high, these can only be relatively so; and thus he argues something Absolutely Great and High, to which these stand related. But as there cannot by possibility be an infinitely ascending scale, there must be One highest and greatest of all, which is God. That there can only be One such high and supreme Being he shows by the consideration that if there were more than one they would either all join in one Supreme Essence, or be that Essence itself. If the former were the case, then the Essence which included these would be the Crown of Existence; or if the latter, then the many would be absorbed in the One. Thus he reaches a God, the Absolute, who is self existent and independent. From these principles as a starting-point Anselm draws in seventy-nine chapters the attributes of God, the Trinity, creation, relation of man as intelligence to God, and the whole course of theology.

The phenomena of Nature, he says, is not derived and does not emanate from the Absolute as rays from the sun, but is created by it, and exists only by the providential presence of the Creator. So also it is with the ideas of justice, goodness, and wisdom which the human mind contains; they are only relative; they stand in necessary relation to the all-perfect and absolute justice, goodness, and wisdom; and these all necessarily involve the attributes of eternity and omnipresence. God is thus the eternal Archetype, and all creation is but the copy of His fulness.

Anselm pursued this argument still further in the "Proslogion," or "The Faith which Seeks to Demonstrate itself." In the former work he supposes himself to be seeking the truth, but in this he assumes he is in possession of it, and tries to demonstrate it. He states that the *idea* of a God existing in the mind of man is the best proof that there is a God. "The fool may say in his heart, 'There is no God, but he thereby shows himself a fool, because he asserts something which is contradictory in itself. He has the idea of God *in* him, but denies its reality."[1] He further said, God is the Being than whom none greater could be conceived; but if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists only in the intellect, *it* would be the greatest, for we could add to it *real* existence. Thus the greatest conceivable Being—viz., God—must have real existence. It is somewhat remarkable that Descartes, who most likely knew nothing of Anselm, in his "Meditations"[2] has produced the same argument, and seeks to establish the *existence* of a perfect Being—*i.e.*, God—from the mere fact of the idea of a perfect Being. Leibnitz adopts the same line of thought, but refers it to Anselm: and thus by these three great philosophers has this argument been largely diffused through modern thinking[3]

Gaunilo,[4] a monk in the monastery of Marmontier, wrote in opposition to the views of Anselm, in the spirit of empiricism, saying, "The idea of a thing does not necessarily imply its reality; there are many false

[1] Hagenbach, "Hist. of Doct.," i., 473.
[2] Mahaffy, "Descartes," 90.
[3] Note A.
[4] Neander, "Church Hist.," viii., 220; Hagenbach. "Hist. of Doct.," i., 474.

ideas. Yea, it is very questionable whether we can at all form an idea of God, since He is above all idea."[1] Anselm replied to Gaunilo with great spirit and ability. His ontological argument has always commanded profound respect both from friends and foes; it was freely criticised by Aquinas and Kant, but by many writers it has been variously developed and applied. The following is the testimony of Hegel to its value:—

"Anselm was right in declaring that only to be perfect which exists not only subjectively but also objectively. In vain we affect to despise this proof, commonly called the ontological, and this definition of the perfect set forth by Anselm; it is inherent in the mind of every unprejudiced man, and reappears in every system of philosophy, though against the knowledge, and even the will, of philosophers, as well as in the principle of direct faith."[2]

Having treated largely on the existence and nature of God, Anselm proceeded to deal with the subject of the Trinity. He tried to show that the Son must be regarded as the Wisdom of God, and the Holy Spirit as the Love of God; thus departing from the teaching of the more orthodox of the ancient Greek fathers on this question, and approaching the views of Augustine, who rejected the distinctions made by the Gregories, Basil, and others, between the Persons of the Godhead, and taught that the distinctions in the Godhead were not distinctions of nature, but only of relation. The views of both Augustine and Anselm on this important doctrine approached Monarchianism.

In his book, "*Cur Deus Homo*," Anselm propounded the doctrine of the Atonement which has been identified with his name, and which has so largely moulded the doctrine of the Christian Church on this subject ever

[1] Note B. [2] Note C.

since. Before his day the doctrine, held by many even of the great Church fathers, as Origen, Ambrose, Leo, and others, was that Christ, by His incarnation and death, paid a ransom to the devil for the deliverance of man, and even Augustine had a similar argument.[1] But Anselm took a huge step in advance in the view he expounded. He abolished the devil from the line of argument altogether, and did not allow that he had rights to be considered or claims to be met. He urged that satisfaction for sin was imperative to be offered to God's honour, which had been invaded, and to His justice, which had been impugned. This satisfaction could only be rendered by a person of infinite merit and virtue, and who by offering a voluntary atonement could thus make amends for sin against an infinite Being. This theory he wrought out, with great ingenuity, into wonderful completeness; but he failed on one side of the theory—he presented the Atonement in a purely objective light, as being wrought out entirely outside of man, and apart from the moral change required in him, and which the Apostle Paul emphasises so strongly. Thus whilst his theory was an advance on the view entertained in the Christian consciousness of preceding ages, it left much to be done in the growth of a moral theory of the Atonement which should occupy the earnest attention of the Church in the future.[2]

Anselm did not command immediate recognition from the learned as a teacher of great grasp and power. This is to be partly accounted for by the form in which his writings appeared, not as formal or systematic treatises, but as tracts, dialogues, and fragments. But if they lost somewhat in immediate impression, they were characterised by greater freshness and interest for a

[1] "De Lib. Arbitr.," iii., 10. [2] Note D.

larger circle of readers, and they had so much of real force in them as to gradually grow into universal and lasting fame. If, however, Anselm did not adopt a Scholastic form in writing, he was called upon to engage in a controversy which showed him to be a dialectical athlete of the first order. The Realism which had been expressed by Augustine, which had been imbibed from the so-called writings of Dionysius by Erigena, and afterwards with greater precision and fulness by Anselm, —viz., that general conceptions (*universalia*) were regarded as the archetypes in the Divine reason (*universalia ante rem*), and as copied or reflected in the various phenomena around, the species, lying at the basis of individual beings (*universalia in re*),[1]—had become interwoven with the general thinking of the times; but a divergence occurred in the teaching of Roscellin, a native of Armorica, educated at Soissons and Rheims, and Canon of Compiegne, about 1089, who boldly attacked the accepted theory, and taught that all knowledge must proceed from experience; that individuals only had real existence; that general conceptions were without objective reality, but were only abstractions formed by the understanding to aid it in grasping the infinite variety of things (*nomina non res, universalia post res*). Thus the word Nominalism came to be used to characterise this teaching.[2] The tendency of the views of Roscellin was undoubtedly towards scepticism. In dealing with the subject of "whole and part," he says "the parts must be prior to the whole;" "the whole presupposes the parts, and yet the parts really subsist only in reference to a whole." Roscellin boldly argued on these grounds that if, according to the accepted language of the Church, the essence of the Godhead

[1] Neander, "Hist. of Church," viii., 87. [2] Note E.

might be spoken of as One Reality (*una res*), the personal distinctiveness of the three Divine hypostases would be constructively denied. This would be to injure the Christian faith; it was to affirm that the three Persons of the Godhead were not distinct subsistences (*non tres res*), but names, and nothing more, without having any real counterparts. To avoid the rock of Sabellianism, he therefore urged that the Divine hypostases should be viewed as three real Beings (*tres res*), equal in majesty, will, and glory. To these views there arose immediate and strenuous opposition. A council was held at Soissons in 1092, which condemned Roscellin as teaching heresy, and denounced him as holding the doctrine of Tritheism. Anselm took up the matter, and issued a book against Roscellin, entitled "*Liber de Fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi contra blasphemias Ruzelini.*" Roscellin seems to have been quite unconscious that his teaching was discordant with the views of Lanfranc, who was the most prominent leader of opinion at that time, in consequence of his fame as the opponent of the heretic Berengarius; and both he and Anselm seem to have been ignorant of any radical difference between them, until one of the auditors of Roscellin addressed a letter to Anselm, submitting the views of the canon to him, and asking his opinion thereon. Thus called upon, Anselm came into the field. In his book he taxed Roscellin with teaching that the so-called universal substances are only emissions of sound by the voice (*flatum vocis*); and said his reason was so enslaved by his imagination, that he could not view those things which require to be looked at by the former alone without the aid of the latter. He clearly stated the points at issue between Realism and Nominalism. The former regarding the totality

of similar individuals as constituting a real unity, the totality of men as a generic unity (*unus homo in specie*); the latter holding that such unity existed only in name, and that the individual is the only unity. In advancing from this general ground to its application by Roscellin to the doctrine of the Trinity, he showed tha. in holding the view of three Persons in the Godhead which were not one in essence he was undoubtedly teaching Tritheism, and strongly affirmed the generic unity (*unus Deus*) of the three Divine Persons. Anselm further taxed Roscellin with impugning the doctrine of the Incarnation, pointing out that Christ could not have assumed human nature in all its completeness if it had not been something real and objective, something different from the nature of the individual man.

This controversy with Roscellin roused into extreme prominence the great dispute which raged for succeeding centuries, which had its root in the history of the Church as far back as the time of Porphyry, but which emphatically challenged general attention. The words Realism and Nominalism very inadequately describe the essential principles which lay at the foundation of this prolonged controversy. Although so many have described it as a mere dust of words, there were concerned in it all the solemn realities of religion and of philosophy, and when pursued to its deepest issues the faith and happiness of man were involved also. The question became this: Is the Universal, that Oneness which we must ascribe to humanity, a mere conception of the imagination? Has it no reality? Is it a thing or a name? As one powerful thinker puts it, "In divinity you must speak of a Name, as that with which we are sealed; that with which we are hallowed, and which is to make all else holy. This

is the language of the Baptismal formula, and of the Lord's Prayer. On the other hand, 'thing from 'think,' as '*res*' from '*reor*' (the subject of thought), is opposed in all the highest morality to the person, the thinker, the speaker, the actor. Yet the necessity of the argument drove him who was vindicating the Divine Essence as the foundation of all things to treat it as if it possessed the nature of those things."[1] Thus a problem of the greatest difficulty of solution was essentially involved in the discussion, of such difficulty, indeed, that it is still as ardently debated as ever. The men who devoted themselves to the contest, with few advantages and under enormous drawbacks, are worthy of some tender treatment and kind appreciation; with dust, and din, and anguish they fought on in the battle, and if victory did not decisively declare itself on one side or the other, many gains to the cause of truth and many benefits to the human race were the outcome of the struggle.

The character of Anslem was irreproachably pure and lofty. He was amiable, retiring, sympathetic; he was somewhat disposed to asceticism, and certainly set an example of abstinence to his monks; he was a devoted student, a rigorous logician, and a profound thinker: with his exalted philosophical genius he united a passionate love of the Church, and whilst often engaged in controversy, he was devotedly unselfish and self-sacrificing. He was a man fit to rank amongst the leaders of the world, and to him belongs the honour of having attempted the reconciliation of divinity and philosophy, and of having vindicated the place of reason in pronouncing on matters of faith.

[1] Maurice, "Mor. and Met. Phil.," i., 554.

The times were not sufficiently ripe for a settlement of such important matters.

NOTE A.

"It may appear at first singular, that the thought which suggested itself to the mind of a monk at Bec should still be the problem of metaphysical theology; and theology must when followed out become metaphysical; metaphysics must become theological. This same thought seems, with no knowledge of its mediæval origin, to have forced itself on Descartes, was re-asserted by Leibnitz; if not rejected, was thought insufficient by Kant, revived in another form by Schelling and by Hegel, latterly has been discussed with singular fulness and ingenuity by M. de Rémusat. Yet will it less surprise the profoundly reflective, who cannot but perceive how soon and how inevitably the mind arrives at the verge of human thought, how it cannot but encounter this same question which in another form divided in either avowed at unconscious antagonism Plato and Aristotle, Anselm and his opponents (for opponents he had, of no common subtlety), Leibnitz and Locke; which Kant failed to reconcile; which his followers have perhaps bewildered by a new and intricate phraseology more than elucidated; which modern eclecticism harmomses rather in seeming than in reality; the question of questions; one primary elemental, it may be innate or instinctive, or acquired, and traditional idea, conception, notion, conviction of God, of the Immaterial, the Eternal, the Infinite."

Milman. "Lat. Chris.," iv., 340, f.

NOTE B.

Gaunilo used a well known illustration in replying to Anselm's argument. "If one in speaking of an island which he asserted to be more perfect and lovely than all known islands, would infer its existence from this, that it could not be more perfect, if it did not exis, we should hardly know whether to think him the greatest fool who conducted such an argument, or him who gave his assent to it. The opposite method is to be adopted; we must first prove the existence of the island, and then show that its excellence surpasses that of all others," etc. Anselm, in eplying to Gaunilo, rejects the illustration as altogether inappropriate. He says that if Gaunilo could *really* imagine an island more perfect than could

ever be conceived, he would make him a present of it. "In the opinion of Anselm the idea of the most perfect being was a necessary idea, between which and the arbitrary and imaginary notion of a most excellent island no parallel could be drawn" (Mohler).—

Hagenbach, "Hist. of Doct.," i., 474.

NOTE C.

"Eadmer draws a remarkable picture, which is confirmed by Anselm's own account, of the way in which he was tormented with the longing to discover some one argument—short, simple, self-sufficing—by which to demonstrate in a clear and certain manner the existence and perfections of God. Often on the point of grasping what he sought, and as often baffled by what escaped from his hold, unable in his anxiety to sleep or to take his meals, he despaired of his purpose; but the passionate desire would not leave him. It intruded on his prayers, and interrupted his duties, till it came to appear to him like a temptation of the devil. At last, in the watches of the night, in the very stress of his efforts to keep off the haunting idea, 'in the agony and conflict of his thoughts,' the thing which he had so long given up hoping for presented itself and filled him with joy. The discovery, Eadmer tells us, was more than once nearly lost from the mysterious and unaccountable breaking of the wax tablets on which his first notes were written, before they were finally arranged and committed to the parchment. The result was the famous argument of the *Proslogion*, the argument revived with absolute confidence in it by Descartes, and which still employs deep minds in France and Germany with its fascinating mystery—that the idea of God in the human mind of itself necessarily involves the reality of that idea."

Church, "St. Anselm," 76.

NOTE D.

"The great work of Anselm, '*Cur Deus Homo*,' first developed that plan of salvation, which is the one subject of many Protestant preachers. In this work, the term 'satisfaction' is for the first time applied to the atoning work of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and it is a term employed to suggest an explanation of the whole mystery of redeeming love. When God commanded rational creatures, angels and men, into existence, the relation which He assumed towards them was that of a Sovereign. Sovereign power

implies the existence of a law, and a pledge to enforce it. The one law to all created intelligence is obedience, or the submission of the created will to that of the sovereign ruler. As long as this submission lasts, the creature lives and lives in happiness, there is no impediment to his happiness, there is no cause for his destruction. But this implies death and misery as the inevitable consequence of disobedience. The consequence cannot be avoided without the annihilation of law; and the annihilation of law would be the triumph of the created will over that of the Creator, and the conversion of the universe into a hell. On the fall of human nature, therefore, the well-being of creation required the misery and death of man, unless something were done which would maintain the majesty of the law as forcibly as our condemnation. But the obedience of God to His own law would be more than an equivalent, and this God condescended to render. But God, as God, could neither obey nor disobey. God, therefore, in the second Person of the ever-blessed Trinity, without ceasing to be God, became man also; and the God-man became obedient unto death. Thus we see why God was made man; how the demands of the law were satisfied, and the Divine honour vindicated even though the God of justice extended His pardon, under the condition of repentance, to a fallen and outlawed race."—*Hook*, "Archbishops of Cant.," ii., 270.

NOTE E.

The following definitions are given by modern writers of

REALISM AND NOMINALISM.

"The realists maintain that every general term, or abstract idea, such as man, virtue, has a real independent existence, quite irrespective of any concrete individual determination, such as Smith, benevolence, etc. The nominalists, on the contrary, maintain that all general terms are but the creations of human ingenuity, designating no distinct entities, but merely used as marks of aggregate conceptions. The realists, finding the one in the many—in other words, finding certain characteristics common to all men, and not only common to them, but necessary to their being men, abstracted these general characteristics from the particular accidents of individual men, and out of these characteristics made what they called universals, what we call genera. These universals existed *per se*. They were not only conceptions of the mind, they were entities."—*Lewes*, "Hist. of Phil.," ii., 61, 64.

"Some of the Schoolmen were Platonic realists, but the prevalent opinion was that universals do not exist *before* things, nor *after* things, but *in* things,—*i.e.* universal ideas have not (as Plato thought) an existence separable from individual objects, and therefore they could not have existed prior to them in order of time; nor yet (according to the doctrine of the Stoics) are they mere conceptions of the mind, formed in consequence of an examination and comparison of particulars; but these ideas, or forms, are from eternity united inseparably with that matter of which hings consist, or as the Aristotelians sometimes express themselves, the forms of things are from eternity immersed in matter."—*D. Stewart.* "Elements. Phil.," 169.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STRUGGLE OF RATIONALISM.—PETER ABELARD.

"Though exposed to a terrible storm Ajax reached the Gyrean rock and indulged in a rash boast of having escaped the defiance of the gods. No sooner did Poseidon hear this language than he struck with his trident the rock which Ajax was grasping, and precipitated both into the sea."

—GROTE.

"Look how the sheep, whose rambling steps do stray
From the safe blessing of the shepherd's eyes,
Eftsoon become the unprotected prey
To the winged squadron of beleag'ring flies;
Where sweltered with the scorching beams of day,
She frisks from brook to brake, and wildly flies away
From her ownself, ev'n of herself afraid;
She shrouds her troubled brows in every glade,
And craves the mercy of the soft removing shade."

—F. QUARLES.

VI.

THE STRUGGLE OF RATIONALISM.—PETER ABÉLARD.

THE name of Abélard sheds brightness upon a dull chapter in human history. In an age of some pedantry, of overweening ambition and ecclesiastical corruption, he rises like a free classic spirit. As associated with Heloise, he is surrounded by a golden haze of romance. Their letters, often republished, much wept over, widely read, the objects of literary criticism and poetic appreciation, have made them, as a pair of lovers, as notorious as Romeo and Juliet. It is to be regretted that the sentimental interest thus stirred has interfered with the fame of Abélard as a philosopher, for he was the brightest luminary of the twelfth century. He was an orator of the first order, a bold speculator, profoundly read in philosophy, giving voice to the insurgent spirit of the times as none other did or could do, and waging a fierce war in behalf of the sovereignty of reason and conscience, affirming the right of the human understanding to be the judge of truth and error as against the mere authority of ecelesiastical tradition. He was born at Palet, not far from Nantes, in Brittany, in 1079. He showed an extraordinary aptitude for intellectual pursuits. He first gathered up what knowledge he could in the schools of the contiguous districts, then he

studied in the advanced seminaries of learning in surrounding provinces, and then went to perfect himself at Paris. He was a student for some time under Roscellin, and was fascinated with his Nominalistic tendencies. He also repaired to William de Champeaux, the most renowned disputant of the Realist school then living, and drank in his teaching. He quickly surpassed his masters. As he sat in the great Cathedral school of Notre Dame listening to William, he stepped forward and engaged with his master in a dispute of dialectics. He proved himself far more than equal to him in the contest, and although still under twenty years of age he sought to establish a school of his own. The influence of William was too great for this to be done in Paris, and he proceeded to Melun, and after lecturing there for a brief time with great success he removed to Corbeil, so as to be nearer to the metropolitan city of France. The intense mental strain involved by his prelections, and the excitement resulting from the numbers who flocked to hear him, injured his health, and he was obliged to retire into privacy for a short period. In 1108 he returned to Paris. His old master and antagonist was no longer lecturing at Notre Dame, but in a monastic retreat in the neighbourhood of the city. He drew him out into combat once more, and by his vigorous exposure of the results of the extreme Realism he advocated, he forced him into a decided change of position. The fame of Abélard rose into unrivalled supremacy on this result being attained. William was still able to exert so much influence as to prevent him lecturing in Paris, and for a short time he retired again to Melun. Soon he came to the great centre once more, and set up a school on the heights of St. Genevieve in view of Notre Dame. He listened to

Anselm of Laon, a pupil of Anselm the Great, whose school had become the most famous in Europe; he entered into dispute with him in theology, and strongly denounced his Realistic views both in philosophy and religion. Then he assumed the chair of Notre Dame, and became a Canon of the Cathedral in 1115.

The position of Abélard at this point seems to have been one of pre-eminent popularity and influence. His talents were brilliant; he had obtained familiarity with the most subtle questions which then agitated the hearts of great thinkers; he had a splendid utterance, and an expressive eloquence; he was handsome in appearance; he combined the attainments of a scholar with the refinements of poetry and music. He had been followed by crowds of enthusiastic students at Melun and Corbeil, and now in Paris it is said thousands flocked to his lectures; they came from all parts of France, from Italy, Germany, Holland, and even from England, and drank in his teachings with ardour. Had he been as calm and devout in his piety as Anselm, had he been possessed of a magnificent and unselfish purpose like Luther, had he preserved himself in the spiritual humility of Bonaventura, he might have antedated the Reformation by many generations; or if the times were not then ripe for such a Titanic revolution, he might have left behind him a positive work of splendid beneficence to all generations, rather than a few obscure fragments which lay unheeded until a brilliant countryman of not unrelated spirit gathered and dressed them for the taste of the curious of this age.[1]

But he had great self-confidence; he was wrought upon by his popularity, he came to think himself the

[1] Cousin, "Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard."

only philosopher remaining in the world, and he feasted himself in the admiration of his students and followers. He seems not to have been of a devout spirit in these days, and such devoutness as characterised a Gerson or an à Kempis could be the only preservative from downfall amidst such flattery and adulation as were offered to Abélard.

Nor was it possible but that a widespread jealousy should arise in the hearts of many ecclesiastics concerning him. The society of Paris followed him; the learned listened to him with candour, the ignorant with reverential awe, the rich poured wealth upon him, the noblest felt it an honour to entertain him; some of the more enlightened or moral of the clergy hailed him as a teacher sent from God; but the herd of indolent and immoral ecclesiastics of all orders hated him with a fierce and uncompromising hatred. His relation to the Church was a strange one. He professed the profoundest reverence for it: yet he struck with mailed hand at the teachings of its most cherished theologians; he had become enrolled in its priesthood, but he was the stern exponent of clerical abuses; he was bound by his ordination oath to preserve unquestioning submission to Church dogmas and teachings, and yet his whole system of philosophy and religion was a prolonged protest against the blind subservience which the Church of Rome exacts from its sons, a subservience which degrades faith from being a living and expansive principle into a shrivelling superstition, which while professing to make men into Christians robs them of the very prerogatives of manhood. It will be needful here to attempt a brief account of the opinions he professed on leading doctrines both in philosophy and theology.

On the central subject of dispute, viz., Universals, he took ground midway between the extreme points occupied by his old teachers, Roscellin at Compiegne, and William at Paris. Realism up to this time had received its inspiration mainly from Plato and the Platonists of the Alexandrian school. But Abélard seems to have been mainly influenced by Aristotle, and in his leading positions touched with those laid down by the great Stagyrite. He taught that Universals did not consist in words as such, but in words considered in reference to their signification. The forms of things were in the Divine mind as conceptions before they were created. Realities were only to be found in individual concretes; here he agreed with Aristotle, but he also affirmed that they were not mere words, but that they consisted in the fact of predication. The mind, by a process of abstraction and generalisation, by combining the resemblances of things, and omitting their differences, constructed conceptions, general notions, universal cognitions, which however only exist within the mind which conceives them. These genera, or Universals, had an ideal but not a real existence, and form the objects which the mind beholds when it uses terms of an abstract nature, as humanity or plant. The teaching of Abélard is stated by Cousin to be Conceptualism, but he differed from many Conceptualists, in not concerning himself sufficiently with the mental subsistence of the conception.

In theology his teaching was a wide divergence from the received doctrine as laid down by Anselm and Augustine. He strongly denounced a blind belief in the mere authority of the Church, and insisted that faith must always have a safe foundation of fact and rational argument to rest upon He said conviction

should always be the product of fact and reason, and that from this conviction should arise the love which could prompt the soul to trust in God, to accept His word, because it is His, and to centre itself in Him as the object of its hope and action. In this view he anticipated many of the Protestants of the future in their contest for liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment. He also denied the authority of the early Fathers of the Church, and sought to sweep away the basis of tradition on which much of the doctrine of the Church rested.

He attempted to show the existence of entire harmony between Christianity and philosophy, and affirmed that the universally acknowledged truths of reason, and the moral laws with which the heathen were acquainted are confirmed, established, and supplemented by the higher authority of Divine revelation. He sought to establish the existence of God by moral proof, especially by the voice of conscience and by the moral freedom and accountability of all rational creatures. He agreed with Augustine that the attributes of God not only form one whole but are identical with the Divine Being, and cannot therefore be regarded as accidental, or as being simply attached, thus resolving God into an association of attributes. He affirmed that God can do everything that can be done without impairing His absolute perfection, and declared, in opposition to some others of he Schoolmen, that God could make nothing else and nothing better than what He has made. This opinion, which in effect was afterwards advocated by Leibnitz, was declared by Hugo St. Victor and others of his opponents to be blasphemous. In treating of the subject of the Trinity he professed views which it is difficult to distinguish from Sabellianism. He argued, from the

perfection of the Divine nature, that God must be infinitely powerful, wise, and good. These three qualities, power, wisdom, goodness, were the three Persons in the Godhead so called, and the difference was merely nominal. It will be recollected that Anselm was scarcely more orthodox in professing to defend the doctrine of the Church on the Trinity against the Tritheism of Roscellin.

On the doctrine of the nature of sin he vigorously attacked the teaching of John Scotus, which was widely diffused. This view treated sin as being simply negative in its character, and represented human nature as being passive under its infliction, comparing it to the leprosy which infected humanity, but which could be removed by the exercise of Divine mercy. Abélard taught that sin lay in the *intention* of the person committing it, and that the criminal element in sin was the approbation afforded it by the person committing it. But in the case of new-born infants, where the will is not as yet exercised, he considered that though by inheritance they shared in the results of sin, they were not guilty of sin until an evil intention was conceived by them and executed.

He strongly opposed the view of the Atonement propounded by Anselm. He viewed the Atonement in its moral rather than its legal aspect, and denied that its cause was that an equivalent must be paid to the Divine justice for the infinite guilt of sin. He taught with great emphasis and force that the cause lay in the free and infinite love of God, which by kindling love in the breast of man, leads him to the enjoyment of the forgiveness of sin, and of being cleansed from all its pollution. Both Anselm and Abélard in their views were wrong by defect rather than by actual

error,—and of how many controversialists may the same be affirmed.

In his view of the Incarnation he occupied a position of great weakness, and indeed extracted from it all its reality. He said that God and man by their very natures are so absolutely diverse that an incarnation on the part of God was an impossibility, but that in the man Jesus Christ God worked His wisdom, revealing itself in order to lead men to salvation by teaching and example. He took the stand, that as God is equally present as to His Essence He could not move from place to place; but he seemed to forget that God must be equally present as to His wisdom as well as to His Essence, and that thus no more could His wisdom be afforded to Christ in an extraordinary degree than could His Essence be incarnated.

His writings abound with fervent admiration of the ancient philosophers, especially as to the calm dignity of their lives, and he frequently and in words of fierce reprobation contrasted the severe purity of their lives with the profligate unchasteness of the clergy of the Church.

Such was the teaching, bold, startling, and as to its general tenor noble, which Abélard afforded in his prelections, listened to by anxious thousands. He drew from other schools in Paris all their pupils; he had many sitting round him who had such kindling inspiration stirred within them as to lead them to great fame in after days; amongst whom may be mentioned Pope Celestin II., Peter the Lombard, the Bishop of Paris, and Berenger the Bishop of Poictiers.

Evil days were in store for Abélard; he had many enemies around watching eagerly for an opportunity to effect his downfall, but he became himself the worst

enemy of his happiness and prosperity. His unequalled fame and popularity rendered him vain and unwatchful, he indulged in pride and was betrayed into undue pleasures. Manifold troubles came upon him which clouded his reputation, and when he was emerging from the afflictions in which he had been involved, he was met by an antagonist of formidable powers and of enormous influence, who wrestled with him as a disputant in several spheres, and who overwhelmed him, if not by the strength of argument, by the authority and anathemas of the Church.

There dwelt in Paris a young lady named Heloise, seventeen years of age, and niece to Fulbert, one of the canons of Notre Dame. Conflicting accounts are given of her appearance, for while some writers ascribe to her superlative beauty, others affirm that she was only moderately attractive. All agree that she had attainments and talents of the rarest kind. She had been trained carefully by the most accomplished masters, she was familiar with current literature ; like Aspasia, she could converse freely on the exciting topics discussed in the schools, and she even excelled Abélard himself in the knowledge of the classic languages of the world. She was the idol and boast of her uncle Fulbert, who considered nothing too valuable to be spent or to be obtained to promote her enjoyment. It was impossible but that such a damsel should meet with the versatile, brilliant, accomplished orator who was turning Paris upside down. It was scarcely less likely that in his desire to secure every advantage for his niece Fulbert should obtain for her the tuition of Abélard. It was not to be expected that there should grow between these two an affection of the intensest fervidness, which deepened by-and-bye into an impure and guilty attachment, but

which afterwards emerged into a constant and disinterested love of the most romantic character, which has caused their names to be linked by posterity as symbolising devoted and undying sentiment. Abélard was thirty-nine years of age, Heloise was but seventeen; he was devoted to the high pursuits of philosophy, he had been ordained to the sacred calling of the priesthood, and apparently had his mind filled by an intellectual enthusiasm, whilst she was but a girl, little likely to be absorbed by an overpowering passion for a man of middle age and devoted to a clerical life. But in spite of the unlikelihood of the case there sprang up between them an affection so unlicensed as to overleap all the barriers of prudence and morality. The way opened for Abélard to become an inmate of Fulbert's house, and he gladly availed himself of the opportunity. His conduct in this matter has been variously represented. Some writers aver that he by certain pretexts gained a residence there for the purpose of pursuing his amour, others that Fulbert induced him to accept a home with him in his anxiety to secure for Heloise the advantage of his incomparably brilliant conversation. In any case, and it may be best to acquit Abélard of the sinister intention, the result was bad; he and the too susceptible girl were carried away by the excess of evil passion, and while Fulbert was unsuspecting of harm the virtue of his niece departed. When he discovered the mischief which had been wrought, he attempted to separate them, but in vain. The lovers eloped and fled into Brittany, where shortly Heloise became the mother of a son, who did not live long. Abélard returned to Paris, gained an interview with the furious Fulbert, and offered to marry his niece secretly. In making a condition like this, Abélard was not

actuated by any shame of Heloise, or by any diminution of affection, but was simply conforming to the spirit of the age, which was so far in favour of celibacy that marriage in a public teacher of philosophy or religion was a certain barrier to his success. Fulbert consented, being anxious for aught that could help to repair the reputation of a girl he loved better than his life. The ceremony was performed, Abélard returned to his former lodgings in Paris, and pursued his work, whilst Heloise lived in her uncle's house. They saw each other only at long intervals, and all might have gone well but for the apprehensiveness of Fulbert. He was so anxious for the welfare of his niece that he divulged the fact of her marriage. She, inspired by a self-abnegation which was amazing, at the expense of truth and honour denied on oath that any marriage had taken place. This drove Fulbert to distraction; he became so outrageous that the life of Heloise was insupportable. Abélard and she a second time fled from Paris, and he placed her for refuge in the convent of Argenteuil. The distressed and exasperated canon became desperate; he hired a gang of ruffians, and with them broke into Abélard's apartment while he was asleep. They fiercely assaulted him, and inflicted on him a most shameful mutilation, and it was with the greatest difficulty that his life was preserved. When the crime was bruited abroad the city rang with cries for vengeance upon the perpetrators. Fulbert fled before the terrific storm, and was heard of no more. His goods were confiscated, and the sentence of death was written against his name in the court of justice.

Abélard found himself cast headlong from the pinnacle of honour into the pit of shame. He was overwhelmed with his misery; he retired into the monastery of St.

Denys, and took the oaths of the order of St. Benedict. Heloise also retired from the world, and became a nun in the convent of Argenteuil. Abélard for some time buried himself in his cell, and there by quiet exercises and meditations sought to soothe and heal his wounded spirit. To a mind like his the cloister did not bring peace, nor the cell contribute calmness. His heart was not there; both heart and sympathy were with the controversies and excitements of the Schools outside. Therefore in a year he yielded to many urgent solicitations which were pressed upon him, and he opened a school at the priory of Maisoncelle in 1120. His lectures were fragrant with a spirit of devotion, which in other days they had been destitute of, and were listened to by eager throngs of admirers; his old popularity returned, and his influence seemed to be greater than ever.

Whilst his lectures were more spiritual in tone than before, they were not less bold in speculation, nor less free in censuring ecclesiastical assumption and corruption. The old spirit of enmity was aroused against him, and a legion of angry antagonists watched for an occasion against him. They had not long to wait; he prepared his theological lectures, and issued them with the title *Introductio ad Theologium*, and a charge was fastened upon him of having taught erroneous doctrine on the subject of the Holy Trinity. He was arraigned for teaching the heresy of Sabellius in a provincial synod held at Soissons, and presided over by the Archbishop of Rheims. He was incapacitated by his recent troubles from making a bold defence, his views were stigmatised by the council as blasphemous and heretical, and he was condemned to commit the book containing the obnoxious teachings with his own hands to the

flames. He was then again immured in the convent of St. Denys, but with the same experience which attended his previous effort of monastic life. His free spirit chafed and fretted against the isolation and uselessness of his position. Like a caged bird of the woods, he beat himself against the wires of his cage until he was weary and wounded. Then he aggravated the monks of the convent by affirming that their patron saint was not, as the tradition of several centuries affirmed, Dionysius the Areopagite converted by St. Paul. To attempt to rob them of their presumed patron, and France of its idolised saint, was sufficient to stir up the most bitter hatred of him, which the monks showed with such virulence that, finding his life was in danger, he fled secretly from his retreat, took refuge in the wood of Nogent-sur-Seine, constructed a rude hut of boughs and leaves, and there lived for a time in fellowship with the open face of Nature. But he could not be hid; his retreat was made known, students began to gather round him, and increased with such rapidity that the wilderness became thronged with eager souls, who improvised huts of reeds and straw, and once more reverently listened to the voice which was more potent than any other in that age. A building of stone to replace the humble cot was reared by their loving hands for Abélard, large enough for his lectures to be delivered in, and which he in gratitude to God called by the name "The Paraclete," as he had there found peace after bitter storms. He was not allowed to remain undisturbed long. His enemies followed him with efforts to disturb his peace, and he was filled with apprehensions of new persecutions which might overwhelm him. On receiving an invitation from his Sovereign the Duke of Brittany to preside over the Abbey of St. Gildas de

Rhuys, he left the Paraclete and accepted the appointment with great joy. It was a poor exchange; the Abbey was situated on a rock on the distant shore of Lower Brittany, the population were almost savages, the monks were rude and disorderly, and a more uncongenial sphere for such a man could not have been found. He was utterly wretched whilst here, but he endured the banishment and anguish for ten long weary years, and then, after the monks had, it is said, several times sought to poison him, both in his ordinary food and in the Holy Sacrament, fearing for his life he fled from the hateful spot, unable to endure its trials any longer. Whilst he thus suffered at St. Gildas, the convent of Argenteuil, of which Heloise had become prioress, was broken up on the ground of immorality, and an order of monks established in place of the disbanded nuns. It has never by any writer been affirmed that Heloise participated in the licentiousness prevailing in the convent. Abélard now exerted his influence with the Bishop of Troyes, and had the Paraclete with its surroundings bestowed on Heloise, who founded a convent, becoming the first Abbess, and being confirmed in her position by Pope Innocent II. in 1131. This position she filled with a prudence and piety which won enormous benefactions for the convent, and universal reverence for herself, insomuch that the Paraclete became renowned as an establishment of purity, and a succession of the noblest women of France followed Heloise in her office of Abbess.

Abélard after fleeing from St. Gildas dwelt for some time in Brittany, paying occasional visits to the Paraclete, to complete arrangements regarding it. It was during this period that Abélard wrote his famous letter, containing an account of his calamity, to Philintus, an

intimate friend. By some chance, which has never been explained, the letter passed into the hand of Heloise, who, recognizing the writing, and deeming that she had a right to peruse whatever came from him who was her husband, opened it, and read the full recital of the painfully romantic story, in which she had played a scarcely secondary part. This drew from Heloise the first of her letters, which stands without a parallel in female epistolary composition, as an expression of womanly devotion and passionate affection. Indeed, it would seem as though the severe restraint exercised by her in the long years which had intervened, and during which no word or line had escaped her as to her trials, was now swept away utterly by the overwhelming force of her emotions; and then followed the correspondence which has linked their names for ever in romantic grace. A short time after this it would seem that both body and mind of Abélard had recovered much of their former tone, and we find him in Paris. In the school on Mount St. Genevieve he poured forth, to numerous throngs of auditors, lectures more profound and brilliant than any he had given. Nor was this all: he sent forth a number of works, and especially one called "*Sic et Non*," which exerted an enormous influence in its day. It was well calculated to disturb the minds of ecclesiastics who sought only to preserve the authority of their Church as the unquestioned arbiter of human opinion and doctrine. It presented one hundred and fifty-eight questions, dealing with an immense range of subjects. Every matter of dispute or doctrine regarding the Divine Being, the Divine Persons, their natures, offices, and relations, Providence, Predestination, the Origin of Evil, whether God was the Author of it, was He free, the nature and offices of angels, the creation

and fall of man, whether man is free, whether Adam is buried at Calvary, whether Adam is saved, whether the Word in the womb of the Virgin was quickened both soul and body by God, whether Christ was susceptible of change of flesh, with questions concerning Mary, Pentecost, Paul, Peter, James, Philip, Baptism, the Lord's Supper, Presbyters, down to many inquiries about fornication, bigamy, and such matters. On all these subjects Abélard adduced testimonies of the most conflicting kind from the apostles, the fathers, the popes, and acknowledged teachers of the Church, setting Paul and Augustine in opposition to each other, Gregory against Jerome, Athanasius against Isidore, and presenting a strange variety of opposite teachings amongst men whom the Church acknowledged as reliable authorities. Grave charges of heresy were now freely made against him, and this book was seized upon with avidity by Bernard, the Abbot of Clarvaux, who issued in reply to it a series of letters, hard in assumption, bitter in irony, unfair in their dogmatism, seeking rather to overwhelm Abélard by Church authority than to meet him fairly in argument. Abélard retorted with great spirit, and a furious but magnificent contest waged for some time, which resulted in Abélard being summoned to answer a charge of heresy before a council summoned to try him. The assembly met at Sens in 1140. It was a scene of great splendour and of intense excitement. The King of France was present, and took a lively interest in the proceedings; his whole court attended, and presented a brilliant array of mediæval finery; prelates, ecclesiastics, and theologians crowded to it from all parts of Europe. Bernard was commanded to prosecute the charge against the accused. He shrank from the task, he

pleaded that he was unaccustomed to such disputation, that he was unfit for such an enormous responsibility, and claimed that Abélard should be condemned unheard on the simple testimony of his publications. This was only a natural manifestation of that spirit of bigotry and persecution which has ever characterised the leading advocates of the Church of Rome. Bernard was not allowed to shirk the office; he reluctantly accepted the responsibility, and prepared himself for the contest. He was a magnificent figure in such a scene, scarcely less notable or gifted than his great antagonist. He was animated by a noble enthusiasm for the Church, to which he had surrendered judgment, reason, will, and manhood; his piety had been sublimed by devotion into a rapture which has given to his hymns and sermons a spiritual glow which still draws the Christian heart towards them with cordial admiration, and he possessed a fiery energy of soul which subdued emperors, nobles, priests, and the multitude to his purposes for the promotion of the Church of his Saviour. If with his high-souled and chivalrous consecration he could have combined the lofty and free intellect of Abélard, or if Abélard could have conjoined with his learning, his great and daring spirit of enquiry, the perfect and lofty self-sacrifice of Bernard, no character could have been more complete, and no life more beneficent than either in the Middle Age of Christendom.

Abélard appeared before the Council, but his spirit died within him; the overwhelming opposition arrayed against him unfitted him for battle worthy of himself; he stood before his judges a prematurely old man, worn by trouble, broken-spirited by disappointment, battling with disease, a sad contrast to the gay, brilliant, scholarly orator of other days, who electrified by his

eloquence the crowds of students which clustered on the hill of St. Genevieve, and charmed the ladies of the court by his languishing songs of love. Instead of attempting a defence in an assembly where his condemnation was a foregone conclusion, he appealed to Rome, and left the scene. Bernard had it all his own way; Abélard was condemned by an unanimous vote, the ecclesiastics were jubilant, and his great opponent pealed his triumph in the words of the Psalmist: "I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay tree; but he passed away, and lo! he was not; yea, I sought him, but he could not be found."

In an earnest and dignified appeal Abélard laid his cause before the Pope. The Council of Sens also forwarded to Rome its view of the matter, while Bernard, with his sleepless energy, wrote to the Pope supplying a full list of Abélard's supposed heresies, and urgently calling for his condemnation. He wrote also to the Cardinals at the Papal Court, calling on them to aid in defending the faith from the dangers threatening it, and stating that extreme watchfulness became them, as Abélard counted on the influence of friends who surrounded the Pope. If he had such friends in court, they failed him, or used their influence in vain. Bernard triumphed at Rome as he had triumphed at Sens. As Abélard was proceeding to Rome, he was met by the Papal decree, which condemned him to perpetual silence. It pronounced excommunication on all his adherents, and gave to the Archbishops of Sens and Rheims and to Bernard the power to confine him in a monastery, and burn his writings. Abélard broken down in health and spirit, found refuge in the monastery of Cluny, then presided over by the learned, pious, and beautiful-souled

Peter the Venerable. He appreciated the greatness of Abélard, he recognised all the good there was in him, and gladly gave shelter to the weary and distracted spirit. He did more than this; he brought about at least a partial reconciliation between Bernard and Abélard, although it is to be feared that, from the constitution of his mind, as well as from the severe ecclesiastical trammels to which he had submitted, Bernard never felt entire cordiality towards the supposed heretic. Then Peter obtained from the Pope absolution for Abélard, and enrolled him as one of the monks of Cluny.

There the weary old man found rest and peace. He issued a confession, in which he sought to vindicate his motives in life, even if he had erred in practice. It opens thus:—

"Everything, however well said, may be perverted. I myself, though I have composed but a few treatises, and those of small extent, have not been able to escape censure; though in truth, in the things on account of which I have been violently attacked, I can (as God knows) see no fault whatsoever on my part; and if any such fault can be discovered I have no disposition to defend it obstinately. I have perhaps, from mistake, written many things not after the right manner; but I call God to witness that in the things for which I am accused I have maintained nothing out of an evil will or out of pride. In my lectures I have said many things before many. Publicly I have spoken what seemed to me calculated for the edification of faith or of morals; and what I have written I have cheerfully communicated to all, that I might have them for my judges, and not for my pupils."[1]

In this work he afforded an explanation of some of the views he had advocated which were deemed dangerous, but he retracted nothing. On the contrary,

[1] Neander, vol. viii., 143-4.

in a larger work he issued, called *Apologia*, he defended them, and taxed Bernard with misrepresenting him, and with dealing with matters he did not understand. It is important that his latest attitude in regard to Church doctrine should be understood, as his enemies delighted to represent him as being the victim of remorse on account of his sins and heresies.

He did not live long in his quiet retreat. He lived on the coarsest fare, and exercised an austere asceticism. His influence on the monks associated with him was beneficial, and he realized the picture he had often drawn in the days of his popularity, when exposing the corruptions of the clergy, of the serene and steady piety which should give its divine glow to a religious life. In his heart there burned to the last, with a tranquil, undying blaze, the old love for Heloise; nothing could quench that. The last letter he wrote to her, thrilling with exquisite tenderness, throbbing equally with affection for her and with sorrow for their sin, expressed his feeling up to the last. These are the concluding lines:—

"You have been the victim of my love; become now the victim of my repentance. Accomplish faithfully that which God demands of you. It is a manifestation of His greatness that the only foundation of His goodness to man lies in our weaknesses. Let us mourn over ours at the foot of the altar. He only waits for our contrition and humility to put an end to our misfortunes. Let our repentance be as public as our crimes were. We are a sad example of the imprudence of youth. Let us show our generation and posterity that the repentance of our errors has merited their forgiveness, and let us make them admire in us the power of that grace that has been able to triumph over the tyranny of our passions. Do not be discouraged by occasional attacks of tenderness, for it is a virtue to combat and overcome such attacks. May your knowledge of human weakness teach you to support the faults of your

companions. If I have corrupted your mind, compromised your salvation, tarnished your reputation, destroyed your honour, pardon me, and remember it is Christian mercy to forgive the evil I have done you. Providence calls us to Him; do not oppose Him, Heloise. Do not write to me any more. This is the last letter you will receive from me, but in whatsoever place I die I shall leave directions for my body to be conveyed to Paraclete. Then I shall require prayers, and not tears; then only you will see me to fortify your piety; and my corpse, more eloquent than myself, will teach you what one loves when one loves a man."

When his end was approaching, Heloise was sent for, and an interview extremely tender and affecting took place between them. Then death came. He met it calmly. His friends testified he was well prepared for its approach, and without a shudder or a sigh he breathed his life away. He died April 21st, 1142, aged sixty-three years. His remains were conveyed to Paraclete with a simple funeral, Heloise being chief mourner. She watched his grave whilst presiding over her nuns for twenty-two years, and then, in the sweetest odour of sanctity, fell on sleep. Her body was laid beside his in the grave; and it is not wonderful that in an age of pretended miracles it was said that the arms of Abélard were extended to welcome her as her remains were lowered to their resting-place. The Venerable Peter pronounced him after death to have been a true servant of Christ and a true Christian philosopher.

The impulse given by Abélard, not only to learning in general, but to the liberation of religious thought from mere ecclesiastical authority, was immense. Although his life had been marred by a sin which brought a harvest of trouble, and by much weakness and pride, and even though much error had mixed itself with his

teaching, he laid the succeeding centuries under great obligation to him. As to his work, the line of our great poet was reversed; and of him it may be said that the *good* he did lived after him, the *evil* was interred with his bones. The free and kindling enthusiasm he aroused in the souls of his pupils may be seen in the ardent fire of liberty which burnt in Arnold of Brescia, and urged him to unavailing efforts for the political enfranchisement of Italy and Rome. The impulse he gave to the cause of intellectual progress may be estimated by the spirit of enquiry and discussion which arose after his death, and by the number of really great and learned men who took such a part in those discussions as to have preserved an honoured place in history to this day; but, above all, Abélard served his generation and those succeeding by the earnest and unyielding manner in which he vindicated the right of the human reason to form a judgment on matters of religious belief in opposition to the claim of the Church to be the sole and dogmatic arbiter of man's faith. This was the corner-stone of all the teaching of Abélard. His voice gave expression to an estrangement from Church authority which was beginning to be felt in many hearts, and his determined stand against the prevalent spiritual despotism of the times became the starting-point of a new stream of influence, which increased in depth and volume until it became the general public opinion of Europe.

NOTE A.

Petri Abælardi. Sic et Non. Marburgi, Sumptibus Librariæ. Academy Elwertianæ, 1851. The following may serve as a specimen of these questions:—1. Quod fides humanis rationibus sit adstruenda, et contra. 2. Quod fides sit de non apparentibus

tantum et contra. 3. Quod aquitio non sit de non apparentibus sed fides tantum, et contra. 4. Quod sit credendum in Deum solum, et contra. 5. Quod non sit Deus singularis, et contra. 6. Quod sit Deus tripartitus, et contra. 7. Quod in trinitate non sint dicendi plures æterni, et contra. 8. Quod non sit multitudo serum in trinitate vel quod non sit trinitas aliquod totum, et contra. 9. Quod non sit Deus substantia. et contra, etc.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SWEET SONG OF MYSTICISM.—THE MONKS OF ST. VICTOR.

"And yet what bliss,
When dying in the darkness of God's light,
The soul can pierce these blinding webs of nature,
And float up to the nothing, which is all things—
The ground of being, where self-forgetful silence
Is emptiness—emptiness fulness,—fulness God,—
Till we touch Him, and, like a snowflake, melt
Upon His light sphere's keen circumference."

—KINGSLEY.

"Thy home is with the humble, Lord,
The simple are Thy rest;
Thy lodging is in childlike hearts,
Thou makest there Thy nest."

VII.

THE MONKS OF ST. VICTOR.

THIS book only professes to deal with the great Schoolmen, but in passing it is necessary to mention some other names, which, if not equal to theirs in point of importance or prominence, and not even belonging to their special department, yet were produced by their work, were related to them in many respects, and sustained a helpful and contemporary stream of influence which has contributed largely to the development of intellectual, and especially of Christian progress.

There existed at Paris a celebrated foundation for regular canonicals, bearing the name of the Abbey of St. Victor. A school in connection therewith was commenced by William of Champeaux, which speedily became famous, by reason of his lectures and the crowds of students which gathered round him. The foundation was increased by gifts from royal and noble donors until it became enormously rich, and the Abbot St. Victor established branches of the institution in various countries, until it had thirty abbeys and eighty priories in connection with it. This Abbey became the home of many learned and pious men, who diffused a gracious fame of the institution far and wide, and especially there grew up some who combined with profound

dialectical skill and culture a rich spirituality of mind, who gave expression to another and, on the devotional side, a higher phase of the Christian life than had yet appeared in the Mediæval Age, and who largely anticipated the Mystics of the fourteenth century. It is true that the monks of St. Victor had been somewhat anticipated in their work by St. Bernard, but he is entirely outside the purpose of this book, and only touched Scholasticism to persecute and destroy the rational element it contained. His enormous labours in the cause of the Crusades, in establishing monasteries, in settling matters in dispute between Kings and Popes, in preaching an ascetic and rigidly ceremonial Christianity, obscure a more real and noble service he did for the Church by his treatises on practical religion, and his hymns thrilling with a tender and beautiful devotion. In these productions he taught a pronounced Mysticism; not the extravagant and pantheistic form of it of Eckart, nor the rapturous extremes of St. Teresa or Suso, but that Mysticism which opens the way to identify our thoughts with a revelation from God, and by pious contemplation to transcend humanity and anticipate the fruition of the heavenly world. Such teaching of Mysticism, pure and simple, even though devoid of the excesses into which future Mystics plunged, is outside of the scope of these pages; but Hugo and Richard of St. Victor allied their Mysticism with so much of the Scholastic spirit and form as to require a brief notice.

Hugo, who by reason of seniority first claims attention, was born in 1097; he was of Saxon parentage, and connected with several noble families in Germany. He was born at Ypres, but when a boy was taken to Halberstadt, where his uncle was Archdeacon. He

studied in the Abbey of Hamersleben, and then, in 1118, he entered the school of St. Victor at Paris. It is singular that, both in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, the mystical element in Christian theology arose chiefly from the Teutonic nature, a fact which indicates how national temperament may influence modes and tendencies of thought. From his youth Hugo gave promise of future eminence; he sought after knowledge with unquenchable ardour; he scarcely gave himself time to eat or sleep, but stole for his precious studies every available moment both of night and day. He had not been long at St. Victor when the prior of the convent was murdered, and Hugo was elected to succeed him. He thus became teacher of philosophy and theology at an early age: he devoted himself to his work with enthusiasm; and although he died at the early age of forty-four years, he left behind him several ponderous works, to which the great Schoolmen were much indebted.

Hugo, by his deeply meditative spirit and his profoundly thoughtful nature, was led to look at many subjects in a widely different aspect to Abelard. In some of his writings he is evidently controverting the teachings of the great orator of Brittany, although he never permits himself to mention his name. The two works which most fully express his views are "*De Sacramentis Fidei*" and "*Eruditio Didascalica*," a treatise written for the direction of the monks. In these and his other works he affirmed the immediate consciousness of God by man; he said that "the uncorrupted truth of things cannot be discovered by reasoning," although he firmly insisted that what knowledge was obtained by the internal revelation must be in entire accordance with the doctrines of the Church. He said, "Three

eyes have been given to man: the eye of sense for the sensible objects lying without him; another eye by which the soul is enabled to know itself, and what is within itself, the eye of reason; a third eye within itself to perceive God and divine things, the eye of contemplation." "But by reason of sin the eye of contemplation is extinguished, the eye of reason obscured. Now as the eye of contemplation whereby man might come to the knowledge of God and of divine things no longer dwells in him, therefore faith must take its place." "Faith is called the substance of things invisible, because that which as yet is not an object of open vision is by faith in a certain sense made present to the soul, actually dwells in it."[1] He urges, however, that in faith there is both an objective and subjective element; it cannot exist without knowledge, although it is only a *general* knowledge of the being of its object. Having this to build upon, faith rises to a knowledge of the *nature* of the object, which becomes increasingly perfect until it is perfected in the heavenly world. Thus, in regard to divine doctrine, the understanding of it proceeds from faith, faith bases itself on the knowledge of the fact of the Divine Existence, and then by its own innate power rises to its final blessedness, the perfect understanding of eternal life. The practical effect of this theory is undoubtedly to lead the soul in pursuit of a more perfect intuition of God, as this is necessarily the ultimate end of faith, the only crown after which it strives. Hugo guarded himself against the extravagant conclusions drawn by later Mystics from his premises, as he taught that the revelations of the Divine to the individual mind could or should never transcend the authorized teachings of the Church.

[1] Neander, viii., 149.

It is easy to see how illogical such a position was, and how soon his successors would be likely to overleap the bounds he had constructed to preserve himself and them from the extreme vagaries to which his principles palpably led.

Hugo strongly opposed the optimism advocated by Abélard, that in creation God could not have done other nor better than He did. He considered such a view as being really blasphemous, as it sought to place bounds to the Divine Omnipotence, and in writing of God's relation to existence, he seems to have been a thorough Realist, saying that all things which were created by God in time existed uncreated in Him from all eternity, and that because they existed *in* Him they were known to Him in the very manner in which they existed in Him. He also opposed Anselm's view of the Holy Trinity, which, as previously stated, differed but little from Sabellianism, but wisely kept himself free from any charge of heresy, by avoiding dogmatic hardness or precise terminology in writing upon it, finding illustrations of it in nature and in humanity, rather than arguing of it in Scholastic method. He seems, however, to have adopted the false and fanciful division of the Godhead by the Scholastics into the Father as Power, the Son as Wisdom, and the Holy Ghost as Love, and in a strain unlike to his usual style he tries to account for this distribution, clearly advocating, however, that each of these attributes must be predicated equally and eternally of all the Persons in the Trinity.[1] Concerning the nature of man primeval, he said he had power both to sin and not to sin; but the disposition to good was stronger than the tendency to evil. But when man sinned he abandoned the right

[1] Hagenbach, "History of Doct.," i., 515.

propensity of his nature, and strove in pride and presumption to be equal with God, and to possess the perfect knowledge of Him before the appointed time. From this view it would result that sin simply consists in not setting a proper bound to our various desires or appetites. The first sin, he said, consisted in Adam ceasing to desire the good.

In treating of the Atonement, Hugo adopted a somewhat eclectic view. He believed with Anselm that in order to exalt the Divine honour which had been defied by sin God became incarnate; that by submission to the penalty of sin—viz., death—He might render satisfaction to His offended justice, and thus present a foundation on which He could save man in accordance with His infinite holiness. But he also taught that it was needful in the Atonement to conciliate the devil, and thus revived the antiquated notion which Anselm had sought to discredit. And as though he were anxious to associate in the spirit of eclecticism all the various theories current on the subject, he also urged the view of Abélard, that the essential element in the Atonement was the full and free grace of the Almighty, which took this method of begetting love in the hearts of His sinful creatures, and of leading them to receive His forgiving mercy.

Hugo sought to infuse into the doctrine of the Sacraments a more spiritual meaning. He professed himself dissatisfied with the view of Augustine, that they were signs of sacred things, and said that it was a merely verbal definition. Letters, pictures, and many things might be called signs of sacred things, and he denned a sacrament to be a visible sign of an invisible grace inwardly received. He divided sacraments into three orders: (*a*) those on which

salvation is founded, and by the enjoyment of which the highest blessings are imparted, in which division he included baptism, the Lord's supper, and confirmation; (*b*) those which encourage a holy Christian life, although not positively essential to salvation, as the use of holy water, fasting, etc.; (*c*) those which prepare for other sacraments, as holy orders, consecration, and others. He reckoned, however, that baptism and the Lord's Supper were pre-eminently important, and occupied a place of higher significance than the others.

The whole spirit of Hugo's writings testifies that his nature refused to be content with that mediate and partial apprehension of the Divine Nature which is the measure of knowledge permitted within that awful realm to man upon earth. He yearned to rise higher than the limitations of the human constitution allowed, and insisted that by an eye of the soul man rose to a direct intuition of the Deity. He was a man of immense erudition, of deeply devotional spirit, and he prepared the way for a more tender and living view of God and His indwelling in the human soul. He gave more clear expression to a tendency of the Christian consciousness than it had had before, and which reproduced itself more definitely still in the Mystics of the fourteenth and the Moravian teachers in the eighteenth centuries. He united in very harmonious degree the Mystic and the Scholastic, he was contemplative and dialectic, and whilst his Scholasticism saved him from being carried into the vagueness and vagaries of later Mystics, his devout and tender Mysticism redeemed his dialectic method from much of the rigidity and hardness of the later Schoolmen.

RICHARD ST. VICTOR was a Scotchman, who, like many others, was drawn from his northern land to the brilliant centre of learning, united himself with the establishment of St. Victor, became a friend and student of Hugo, rose to be Prior of the monastery, and died 1173. He adopted and professed the views of his master on most points in theology, but he carried to a further extent the tendencies of Hugo to Mysticism, and professed a strong dislike to certain teachers of the age, evidently pointing to Abélard, who sought after new inventions for the sake of gaining popularity or notoriety. He said there were three stages of Religious Development: that by which man rises to know God by faith, that by which he can know Him by reason, and that by which He is known by contemplation. To this last no one may rise save by the spirit rising in blissful ecstacy above itself. It is an enjoyment above that given by either faith or reason. The reason falls back into retirement when the spirit beholds direct unfoldings of the Godhead, or receives blessed inspiration from Him. Such a lofty privilege is bestowed directly by God, but only on those who seek it by intense and passionate yearnings. In moments when the excessive rapture has passed by, and quiet thoughtfulness supervenes, a man may reproduce the revelations which have been made and tone them to the common understandings of men. Thus it will be seen that whilst the pseudo Dionysius, and his disciple Erigena, laid the foundation of Mysticism in their theosophies, later followers excluded from their systems those intermediate orders of Divine or spiritual beings by which the human spirit was to mount by degrees to a knowledge of the Eternal, but pressing directly to the door of the Holy of Holies, strove

for entrance, that it might enter on the direct enjoyment of the Godhead Himself. It was not shnply a *knowledge* of God which Richard taught as being enjoyed by the entranced spirit, but a real participation in the Nature of the Godhead. At the same time, in order to guard himself against various errors, he sought to introduce distinctions into the Divine Being, which are ingenious if not convincing. He affirms that the attributes of God are His Substance, that His power, wisdom, eternity, and other qualities constitute His Being—His very Self, which is not in any sense communicable. How, then, can God be communicated to the spirit, enraptured and entranced in the act of contemplation? In answer to this he says that there is an individual substantiality and a general substantiality. The first belongs to One alone, and can never be communicated to His creatures; it includes that single, simple substantiality which is the Essential Deity. But through the Trinity God has in Himself a Pleroma, a Fulness, which He can impart or communicate to the ecstatic soul without giving up Himself. The incommunicable element in God is the highest element, and constitutes God's uniqueness and individuality. But to the ravishing and overpowering love of the contemplative soul the Fulness is opened, it enters in, it attains the perfectness of nature, it passes through a mystical transubstantiation, it is swallowed up by excessive, ecstatic intoxication of the enjoyment of God.

The act of contemplation Richard divided into six stages—those of imagination, reason, and intelligence; each being divided into two.[1] By these men may rise to the highest and ripest enjoyment of God, although it is not given to all, even of the good, to reach the crown

[1] Note A.

of such blessedness. In such as do arrive at the perfect bliss the spirit is joined to the Deity, transcending itself and becoming one with Him; all within and without is forgotten until the rapture is past; the glory fades into the light of common day, leaving but the memory of its rich and unutterable happiness.

Richard combined with his Mystic temperament an energetic nature and a stalwart love of righteousness, which made him a reformer as much as a philosopher. He protested vigorously against the corruption, the avarice, and worldliness of men who professed to be wedded to a sacred profession, and who ought to be ensamples to the flock. He entered the lists even against his Superior at St. Victor, when he permitted and encouraged evil ways in the monastery; and he had the satisfaction of aiding in restoring its reputation for a high sanctity. He exaggerated the qualities of Hugo both as a Mystic and a Scholastic. He carried his Mysticism into extremes, from which Hugo shrank; and he indulged in an elaborate dialecticism which Hugo would have mourned over, but he preserved a life as pure, and a devoutness as commendable, as his great predecessor. They were both men who would have adorned any Church and any age,

Of similar spirit to Hugo and Richard was Walter, a Canon and Prior of St. Victor, and sometimes called Walter of Mauretania, in Flanders, who wrote with great severity against Abélard, and who called him, with Peter Lombard, and Gilbert, and Peter of Poictiers, "the four labyrinths of France;" protesting against the devotion they manifested to the method and teaching of Aristotle, and charging them with teaching in a spirit of levity the great doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

If entire approbation cannot be entertained for the opinions of the leading monks of St. Victor, especially as they were carried to their legitimate issues by their later followers, the influence they exerted on the morals of the clergy and the piety of the age, must be regarded with entire satisfaction. Such an influence was loudly called for as a counter-charm against the vices practised by many members of the religious orders, and the mere perfunctoriness of others. Even many teachers devoted to the training of students led lives entirely unworthy of the faith they professed and the functions they fulfilled. The Victorines were men of blameless life, of high spirituality, of heavenly yearnings; and Peter Cantor, a successor to Hugo and Richard in the Abbey, and afterwards Bishop of Tournay, vigorously fought against the deadening tendencies of the age, and sought to baptize both Church life and theological studies with a new spirituality; and thus the whole circle of the Victorines for a long period seems to have been used by Divine Providence as a means to correct the too bold and exclusive dialecticism of the day, and the irreligion which affected so injuriously both Church life and Church teachers.

NOTE A.

"The six degrees of contemplation are as follows ('De Contemp.' c. 6, fol. 45):—

"1. In imaginatione secundum solam imaginationem.

"2. In imaginatione secundum rationem.

"3. In ratione secundum imaginationem.

"4. In ratione secundum rationem.

"5. Supra rationem sed non praeter rationem.

"6. Supra rationem videtur esse praeter rationem.

"The office of imagination to which the first two belong is thought (cogitatio); the office of reason, investigation (meditatio); that of

intelligence, contemplation (contemplatio).—*Ibid.*, cap. 3. These three states are distinguished with much care; and his definition of the last is as follows:—Contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas undequaque diffusus.—*Ibid.*, cap. 4. He draws the distinction between intelligibilia and intellectibilia in cap. 7. The former—invisibilia ratione tamen comprehensibilia; the latter—invisibilia et humanae ationi incomprehensibilia. The four lower kinds are principally occupied, he adds with created objects; the two last with what is uncreated and divine."—*Vaughan*, "Hours with the Mystics," i., 162.

NOTE B.

Of similar spirit to the Victorines was Robert Pull, or Pullein, a distinguished doctor of Oxford, and created a cardinal in 1144. He published a book called "Libri Sententiarum," whtch professed to base every dialectic process upon the Bible and the writings of the early fathers of the Church. This book became a suggestion, or a model, for a work, the "Book of Sentences" of Peter Lombard, which superseded its forerunner, and became a most important factor in the Scholasticism of the succeeding century. Pullein also wrote a treatise on the Apocalypse, and twenty of his sermons are preserved in the Lambeth collection.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MASTER OF THE SENTENCES.—PETER THE LOMBARD.

"ONCE in a golden hour
I cast to earth a seed;
Up there came a flower,
The people said a weed.

"To and fro they went,
Through my garden bower,
And muttering discontent,
Cursed me and my flower.

"Then it grew so tall,
It wore a crown of light.
But thieves from o'er the wall
Stole the seed by night.

"Sowed it far and wide,
By every town and tower,
Till all the people cried,
'Splendid is the flower!'

"Read my little fable,
He that runs may read,
Most can raise the flower now,
For all have got the seed.

"And some are pretty enough,
And some are poor indeed,
And now again the people
Call it but a weed."

—TENNYSON.

VIII.

PETER THE LOMBARD.

Two opposing streams of influence, which had their rise in the various philosophies and historic developments of the preceding ages, began in the twelfth century to flow, each with gathering strength and volume, and were shortly to come into violent collision. One came sweeping with the wave-like flood of ecclesiastical authority, and claimed to carry with it the supreme control of all matters of human opinion; the other rushed on in the wild and daring demand that human reason should be the arbitrating power to determine matters of human belief.

A man arose in the midst of the intellectual activity of the twelfth century who, without being distinguished by an exalted genius, was able by his learning, his calm dignity of mind, his correct judgment and force of style, to gather into convenient form the results of previous discussions in theology and philosophy; to give decided impulse to the tendency of the age for intellectual exercise, and yet to impose some restraint on the bold and rebellious spirit which would have overleapt traditional and ecclesiastical barriers, have implicated a revolution of public opinion before the due time, and have prevented by possibility human progress for generations.

This was Peter, born near Novara, in Lombardy, probably in the early part of the twelfth century. He was drawn from his Italian birthplace to Paris by that warm glow of learning which seemed to have irresistible attraction for all the ardent and eager souls of that age. He studied with such devotedness in the university as to win the commendation of Bernard, which is not only a guarantee of his studiousness, but also of his attention to spiritual exercises. He attended the lectures of Abélard, at St. Genevieve; but whilst fired with enthusiasm by his kindling eloquence, Peter was not disposed to be carried from orthodox standards of doctrine by his brilliant teacher. He was made Bishop of Paris in 1159, but was only permitted to wear his honours a brief period as he died in 1164. It may be doubted whether his promotion to a bishopric did not rather lessen than increase his influence as a teacher; for then, as now, such a position often was injurious to the work of a man of commanding genius and learning. Peter's title to fame rests solely on one book, framed on a pattern followed by others both before and after him, and originally adopted by John Damascenus. The materials for a life of Peter are of the poorest; the very year of his birth has not been preserved; no achievements and adventures are recorded which give variety and brightness to his career. The one great book he wrote is his life and epitaph. No doubt he had a busy life, and was much honoured in his day; other books came from his pen, but his claim to a place in history, and the justification of the place assigned to him, rest on the one book which has made his name famous in the first rank of the Schoolmen. This book was the "*Quatuor libri sententiarum*," which consisted of a

comprehensive and elaborate compilation of passages from the ancient Fathers of the Church, especially Ambrose, Hilary, Augustine, Cassiodorus, and Remigius. Peter suppressed their names, and added only so much of his own composition as gave an appearance of completeness and system to the whole. It was divided into four parts, and these again into numerous "*distinctions*." In the first book he has forty-eight of these distinctions dealing with the mystery of the Holy Trinity; the offices and relations of the Divine Persons, the Divine Essence and Attributes; the Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom. In the second book he has forty-four distinctions, treating of the Angels, their capacities, qualities, and functions; their relation to the demons, with many curious questions as to the possibility of their falling, etc. He treats also of the creation of man and woman, of the nature of man, of original sin, and of many curious, if not absurd, matters, as to the nature, the modes, and the penalties of sin. In the third book he makes forty distinctions, and enlarges in them on the Incarnation of the Word, with numerous considerations as to the method of the Incarnation, the relation of the Father and of the Holy Spirit thereto, together with the bearings of the Incarnation upon the Divine Nature, on the Devil, and on man, to whom it is the means of redemption. He descends to many trivial questions; as, whether Christ had faith, hope, and charity; whether in death the soul and the flesh were separated in Christ from the Word, and so on. He then deals with many questions relating to Christian virtues and graces. In the fourth book he draws fifty elaborate distinctions, and deals at great length with many of the subjects. There is, indeed, more opportunity afforded for lengthy treatment of

these than of some of the hard and mysterious matters previously dealt with. He enters into the subject of the Sacraments, which he treats after the usual fashion of mediæval writers; and then goes on to treat of Church ordinances and offices. From these he proceeds to deal with matrimony and adultery, with the usual pruriency of Romish writers; and then ends with the great topics of the Resurrection, the Last Judgment, and the Future State.

The order and clearness of the book, its oracular character, and the skilful manner in which it concentrated the results of the Church's previous thinking, made it peculiarly acceptable in an age which was driven and tossed by the winds of many controversies, and which yearned for a safe harbour of refuge in matters of faith. The book was taken as a model by innumerable imitators; it was made a text-book in the universities; lectures were given upon it by nearly all Church teachers; and in some of the universities a special chair was devoted to its exposition. Other books written by the Lombard, long "Commentaries on the Psalms and Epistles," are forgotten; but the "Sentences" mark an era in human thought, and, as has been said, Peter's place on the "bead-roll" of time is due to this book alone.

The "Book of Sentences" was distinguished by a close and rigid adherence to the *letter* of Scripture and the interpretation put upon Scripture by the Church, in its creeds and authorised commentators. He gave great, indeed supreme, prominence throughout his work to the ethical principle, and thus the *moral* tone is admirable. He was a severe sacramentarian; but he swerved from a rigid sacerdotalism in treating of "the power of the keys," which he held consisted only in

showing how the souls of men were to be bound and loosed. He delighted in using all the dry and technical methods which give so much aridness to the treatises of Scholasticism; but this was not wholly a drawback in that age when the unsettled notions and the diffuse style of thinking then existing are considered.

The book was a contribution to human thought on the side of Realism. In the outset of his work, Peter attempts to draw a clear distinction between *signs* and *things*. The latter, he says, are eternal realities; and the former the tokens by which they make themselves known to the outward world. *Things* he divides into three classes: those which are to be enjoyed; those which are to be used; and those which themselves both use and enjoy. The first he says are the Persons of the Holy Trinity, by the enjoyment of whom we attain the highest blessedness; the second are those agencies which help us to rise to the enjoyment of this blessedness; and those which have the power both to use and enjoy are ourselves, who with saints and angels are placed between the two former classes to use the one, and to enjoy the other.[1]

His views on the Trinity, which assumed an important place in current controversies, seemed to assimilate to those of Augustine and Anselm, in advocating three relations in the Godhead rather than three Persons.[2] But although, by a literal and severe criticism, this interpretation may be placed on the writings of these great teachers, it is evident they did not recognize the real bearing of their modes of expression and illustration on this important subject, and doubtless they held the doctrine of the Trinity as defined in the authorised creeds and adopted by those Churches

[1] Note A. [2] "Lib. Sent.," i. 5.

deemed orthodox. Peter's view of this doctrine was opposed by Joachim, the Abbot of Flore, who taxed him with teaching that the Persons of the Holy Trinity being above all things, neither generated, nor were generated, nor proceeded. But in this case, as it is often in controversy, Joachim misunderstood Peter, who in using such words was urging the important distinction between the Supreme God as such, and God the Father as one of the Persons in the Godhead. Peter's words are these :—"It is not written that the Divine Essence generated the Son, because with the Son is the Divine Essence, and the Son already existed in the Thing by which He was generated ; and so the same thing must himself have generated himself, which is evidently impossible. But the Father only generates the Son ; and from the Father and the Son proceeds the Holy Spirit."

On the subject of the Incarnation Peter broached opinions which subjected him to subsequent charges of heresy, and to ecclesiastical censure. The Christian Church had been for generations distracted by the dreary controversies of the Monothelites and the Monophysites ;[1] and although they had been formally closed by the adoption of the Catholic doctrine, that in Christ "two natures and two wills were united in one and the same person," it still was evident that no definite and thorough understanding existed among great Church teachers on the subject. Therefore, even in the precise and dogmatic style of Peter, this doctrine was treated in so vacillating a manner as to expose him to misunderstanding. He attempted to discuss the question, "Whether a person, or a nature, assumed humanity ?" and "Whether the *Nature* of

[1] Note E.

God was incarnated?" In answering the first question he virtually conceded that both alternatives were true, and also affirmed that the Divine Nature might truly be said to be incarnated. He furthermore argued on the ground of the immutability of the Divine Nature that the Son did not *become* anything, by the assumption of our nature. These views exposed him to much opposition; an order was issued by Pope Alexander III. to the Synod of Tours, in 1163, to examine the phrase, "*Deus non factus est aliquid*," and after due discussion the Assembly pronounced it heretical.

In 1175, John of Cornwall wrote against the teaching of Peter on the Person of Christ; arguing that in the Bible Christ is described as a man, and hence that He existed along with other beings of like nature which took their rise in time. Thus he urged God did really become something, and to believe otherwise would lead to Doketism. This writer was far from clear as to his own views; for while arguing that God became man, he insisted that we are only to conclude that the *Divine Personality* without the Divine Nature, became man; and that the human nature became Divine Personality, but not Deity or the Divine Nature. In such useless and bewildering mazes did some writers of that age wander, and lose both themselves and their readers. Then followed Walter of St. Victor who charged Peter with the heresy of Nihilianism, as though he had taught that Christ had become Nothing. This charge was unjust, although in appearance some ground for it existed in the form of expression used by Peter, who, however, only sought to deny the existence of Christ in a certain individual form, and not to deny to Him real existence in human nature.[1]

[1] Note C.

On the subject of the Atonement, Peter combined somewhat the views of the older Church Fathers with the moral view advocated by Abelard. He, indeed, believed, with Anselm, in the doctrine of a substitutionary sacrince, and he also gave the devil some place in the transaction; but he dwelt mainly on the Atonement as a revelation of the eternal love of God, whereby the heart of man was to be won to love and holiness. He also united with Anselm in urging the doctrine of predestination as taught by Augustine; but he interposed many limitations, in applying the doctrine to human salvation. In his teaching concerning the operation of Divine Grace, and the appropriation of it by the believer, he followed in general the lead of the same great teachers. He exercised an important influence on the Church's belief and on future controversies by the views he inculcated as to the significance and the number of the Sacraments. Augustine had defined a Sacrament to be a visible sign of an invisible grace; *invisibilis gratiæ visibile signum* had been the usual definition; and Augustine also had said, *Sacramentum est, sacræ rei signum.* This simple definition did not accord with the elaborate system of dogma now working its way in the Church; it neither satisfied the mystical yearnings of the Victorines, nor the dialectical temper of Scholasticism. Peter interpreted exactly the prevailing spirit, and taught that a sacrament was a sign of a sacred thing involving sacred mystery; that it was a holy seal which must never be separated from the grace it signifies; that it was, indeed, an invisible grace taking a visible and outward form. Then as to the number of the Sacraments, the writers of the Church had been strangely divided. Rabanus Maurus and Paschasius Radbertus insisted

only on two; and when dividing the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist into two each, they spoke at the most of four. Victor said there were three, but Peter Damiani spoke of twelve. Peter gave decided testimony, which largely moulded the doctrine of the Church for ages in favour of seven—viz., Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Matrimony, and Holy Orders. These were adopted as sacraments by the great Schoolmen generally. Bonaventura, Aquinas, and others sustained them by many ingenious arguments, especially the former, who by a not very convincing logic founded arguments on such analogies as the seven deadly diseases in man, and the seven cardinal virtues. Peter seems to have been somewhat undecided on the subject of the Real Presence in the elements of the Eucharist. He gives several opinions, which were held by prominent authorities, but shuns a definite statement of his own view. He would seem to have inclined to the view held by some of the later Schoolmen, that the *accidentia* are *sine subjecto*, thus professing to hold the doctrine of Transubstantiation, which word was coming into use in his day, and yet avoiding the coarseness of interpretation indulged in by some writers.

The influence exercised by the "Book of Sentences" was amazing, far beyond the merit or genius of the author; thus showing how exactly it fitted in with the special temper of the times. Peter seems to have possessed a wide range of learning, and to have been carefully, even painfully industrious; but he had no originality, no inventiveness no sprightliness of fancy; and though he had no remarkable gift for reasoning, he had great reproductive facility a clear and compact method, and a perspicuous simple style. He was, never-

theless, a severe dogmatist, and slavishly devoted to the hierarchical system. His "Book of Sentences" was the antipodes and the antidote of the *Sic et Non* of Abélard. He sought to exhibit the unity of the Church Fathers in their religious teaching, as his great master had sought to show their endless diversity. He did for his predecessors what Proclus did for Plotinus; he arranged and systematised their views; he has been well called the Euclid of Scholasticism,[1] and his "Sentences" became the propositions and axioms of ecclesiastical reasoning for generations. The Church adopted his book as its favourite manual; although it was hard, dry, weary dogmatism, it had the merit of positiveness and simplicity; it came inscribed and recommended by the greatest Christian names of the past ages; it was most flattering to the pride of the Church as exhibiting the noblest minds of the past, bolstering up those authoritative and oracular declarations of ecclesiasticism which were opposed to the wayward wistful spirit of the age, in its desire to escape from such iron bondage. In the pages of Peter, Augustine and Gregory, Ambrose and Anselm spoke with such brevity, condensation, and force, that his book did much to fix the doctrine of the Church, and contributed largely to the bold decisions of the Council of the Lateran, which within half a century of Peter's death gave to Christendom its dogmatic formulas of faith, Scriptural and super-Scriptural.

NOTE A.

"Omnium igitur quæ dicta sunt; ex quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, hæc summa est. Quod aliæ sunt quibus fruendum est, aliæ quibus utendum est, aliæ quæ fruunter et utuntur et intereas,

[1] Milman, "Lat. Christ," ix., 104.

quibus utendu est, etia quæda sunt per quas fruimur ut virtutes et potentiæ animi quæ sunt naturalia bona. De quibus omnibus antequam de signis tractemus, agendum est, ae primum de rebus quibus fruendum est, scilicet de sancta atque individua trinitate." —"*Quat. Lib. Sent.*," Lib. I., Distinct i.. p. 6.

NOTE B.

Augustine compared the Three Persons in the Godhead with the memory, intellect, and will in man. He said the Persons were not to be regarded as species, for we do not say, *tres equi sunt unum animal sed tria animalia* ("Opp. Trinit.," V., 10).

"Vellem ut hæc tria cogitarent homines in seipsis. Longe aliud sunt ista tria quam illa Trinitas; sed dico ubi se exerceant et ibi probent, et sentiant quam longe sunt. Dico autem hæc tria; esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim, et novi, et volo; sum sciens et volens; et scio esse me et velle; et volo esse et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest."—*Conf.*, XIII., 11.

NOTE C.

"According to the view which the Lombard seems finally to adopt, God did not become objectively a man in Christ, but the humanity of God had an existence solely in the representations and notions of the human mind—representations and notions which He intended to take such a form. God clothed Himself objectively with the garment of humanity in order to appear as man. So also the reconciliation was not, strictly speaking, really effected by Christ; but His appearance and sufferings were merely objective occurrences, intended to be regarded by God and man as having brought about the reconciliation. The ancient Christian idea, that in Christ humanity was exalted to the Divine throne and to a participation in the Divine nature, be totally repudiated; and supposed himself to be justified in doing so by the circumstance, that highly esteemed teachers of the Church had found fault with the expression, 'homo dominicus.'"(κυριακὸς.)—*Dorner*. "Person of Christ," Div. II., vol. i., p. 317.

NOTE D.

"Sacramentum est sacræ rei signum. Dicitur tamen sacramentum etiam sacrum secretum, sicut sacramentum divinitatis; ut

sacramentum sit sacrum signans; sed nunc agitur de sacramento secundum quod est signum. Item sacramentum est invisibilis gratiæ visibilis forma."—*Lib. Sent.*, Lib. IV., dis. 1.

NOTE E.

These ancient heresies may be briefly described. The Monophysites, led by Eutyches, Dioscorus, and others, taught that in Jesus Christ there was but *one nature*, compounded of the Divine and human natures; so that, they said, the Lord Jesus was not properly either God or man, but a sort of third being—between the two, of a mixed compounded nature. The Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, decided that in the Lord Jesus Christ there are two perfect and distinct natures—the Divine and human, united in one person without mixture, change, or confusion.

The Monothelites affirmed that after the Incarnation there was but one *will* in the Lord Jesus, that of the Incarnate God. But if the *two* distinct and perfect *natures* are admitted, each possessing all its distinctive capacities and faculties, the doctrine of two wills, the Divine and the human, follows of course. This heresy was condemned by the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 680.

CHAPTER IX.

THE GRECIAN DOCTOR.—THE ADVANCE OF ARISTOTELIANISM.

"In proportion as reason and philosophy are extending their empire over the world, the rulers of nations are straining every nerve to check their progress and destroy the effects. The genius of liberty, however, is roused; and, aided by such powerful succours, victory must eventually ensue. The human faculties have been long under the dominion of a barbarous Gothic ignorance. The lights of knowledge begin to dissipate the gloom, and a successful example will convince all nations of the abuses that have been practised upon them."—*Manners of the Age.*

IX.

THE GRECIAN DOCTOR.—THE ADVANCE OF ARISTOTELIANISM.

It is important at this point to notice the growth to enormous influence, and indeed to supreme intellectual ascendency, of the philosophy and logical methods of Aristotle. As a teacher of the art of reasoning, and an adept in dialectics, he had already risen to a position of commanding prominence, although up to the commencement of the thirteenth century he was only known in Christendom by an abridgement of the *Organon*, by Gregory of Nazianzum, the abstract of Boethius, and the Isagoge of Porphyry, the last of which was a neat summary of Aristotle's logical system, with explanations and illustrations of his principal terms. Only a small number of advanced scholars had made acquaintance with the logical treatises contained in the *Organon*. Even to this extremely limited degree, the Church was jealous of his influence, and manifested uneasiness if any of its sons became unduly familiar with his teaching. Abélard dared to discuss theological questions by his rules, but the ire of a fervid dogmatism was aroused against him. If known by others, he was known only by his Logic; whilst, as a moralist, metaphysician, or physicist, he was almost totally unrecognized within the Church.

But now an uneasy, creeping dread began to be felt by the heresy hunters of the Church. The alarm was first experienced in the great centre of European learning, the University of Paris. It arose on the metaphysical and physical treatises of Aristotle having been introduced in a Latin dress into the schools; for some teachers who had studied them were said to have imbibed false tenets thereby. It was not only, however, the circumstance that the philosophy of Aristotle was being introduced into the schools of the Church that aroused the instinctive dislike of an intolerant ecclesiastical authority, but that it came through the dreaded Mohammedan unbelievers; a fact which led to the persecution of those who encouraged the study of the great Stagyrite, and to his works being first prohibited and then burnt in public.

The influence which the writings of Aristotle had produced upon Arabian learning had been amazing, and through the pure light cast by that intellectual movement in Europe, he was now to be seen enthroned—for centuries as the master of learned Christendom.

The Arabian civilization in Europe had attained to an extraordinary height. The city of Cordova is said to have numbered more than a million of inhabitants, and its streets were so spacious that at night there might be seen one unbroken line of lamps for ten miles. Palaces, of stately construction and elaborate decoration, were numerous; the gardens of the wealthy were luxuriant with fruit and flowers, with summer-houses and glistering fountains; the houses of the upper classes were stored with furniture of almost invaluable mosaic work, shining with pearl and ivory, with silver and gold, with malachite and carbuncle; ornaments of rarest porcelain and rock crystal, tapes-

tries and carpets of intricate embroideries; books in sumptuous bindings, and of delicately chaste illumination, were scattered in profusion,—all telling of a taste which had been cultivated to rare excellence, and wealth which might have sated the most luxuriant. It is indeed almost impossible not to believe that some exaggeration exists in the accounts recording the beauty and expensiveness of the gardens, the grandeur of the palaces, the refinements and furnishings of the apartments, owned by these Spanish-Arabians. The Mohammedans were equally advanced in the various branches of learning, and equally expert in the art of music and the science of mathematics. At Cordova there was a college of music, with rich endowments and a numerous staff of accomplished professors. Even the Khalifs were skilled in Algebra and the sterner branches of learning. From the close contiguity of France, a taste for dancing and amorous carolling was contracted; and the wise sages of Cordova and Seville were scandalized by hearing even in university court and learned cell, trolled forth in laughing song the praise of wine and women.

As many as seventy great public libraries existed in the chief cities of the Spanish Khaliphate; in connection with every mosque a school was established, and a thorough system of education rigorously and universally carried out; academies, with complete educational machinery, were established, regardless of expense, for the children of those who occupied a high social position; and in the chief cities, such as Cordova, Granada, Seville, Toledo, and others, great universities existed, to which flocked, from all parts of Europe, as well as from every hamlet in Spain, those who desired to familiarise themselves with the highest

learning of the times. It was impossible but that in connection with a system of education of such lofty standard and of such high culture, a great literature should arise. The Arabian philosophers produced copiously books of great excellence in every department of learning. Their lexicons of Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, and their treatises on the various sciences, were prepared with such careful and minute elaboration that one treatise alone consisted of sixty volumes. They had works on chronology, numismatics, agriculture, oratory, statistics, zoology, gems, botany, medicine, surgery, arithmetic, astronomy, anatomy, and other sciences. They abounded also in works of fiction and romance, in satires, odes, and all kinds of rhythmical verse. It is saying but little to affirm that in almost every branch of human learning the Arabs were the leaders of Europe; that of many of the scientific discoveries of later days they were the positive anticipators, and of some the unconscious prophets.

Amongst the thinkers and philosophers of the Arabian school, Aristotle occupied the chief place of homage. To them he summed up and represented the genius of the noble Hellenic philosophy; and what was even more to them, he seemed to deal with every subject which the Koran omitted. In him they had a great leader of thought in every department of knowledge which was left open to them by their book of fate; so that when the demand arose amongst them for a noble scientific culture, they enthroned Aristotle as their sovereign teacher, and to his system they referred on all subjects in science and philosophy. The Koran was accepted as their infallible guide in the moral or spiritual world, and Aristotle was considered as equally infallible in the world of philosophy and science.

The most illustrious name amongst the early devotees of the great Greek logician was Aviccenna, who died in 1037. He taught at Baghdad, and in him were gathered up the highest results of Oriental learning. He was followed by Algazel, who was called by his countrymen the Imaun of the world, and of whom was recorded the noble epitaph, "The man who practised what he taught, and who, of all others, feared to offend his Maker." When asked how he had attained his extraordinary learning, he replied, "By never having been ashamed to inquire when I was ignorant." In Spain, Aristotelianism was cultivated by Avicebron in the twelfth century; and in the thirteenth by Avembrace, who wrote commentaries on the physical treatises of Aristotle; and who again was followed by Abubacer, until appeared Averroes, in whom the Arabian Aristotelianism bore its latest and ripest fruit. But while Averroes adopted Aristotle as his text-book, and reproduced his method in teaching, he did not allow himself to become the mere echo of his master, but showed himself bold enough to rise into an independent range of thought. With Aristotle, he ascended from mere sense to the understanding, but affirmed, very emphatically, not only the permanent existence and immateriality of the thinking soul, but also its existence apart from individuals, who only shared it in proportion to the measure of intelligence possessed by them. The inspiring will and the ripest development of human reason lie in this universal soul, and within its embrace all the generations of thinking men live and move. This doctrine of the unity of intellect or soul gave rise to the belief that Averroes taught a theory of one soul common to all mankind. He sought to connect this active mind with the highest and universal intelli-

gence through such a hieraroby as Proclus or Dionysius had previously formed.

These Aristotelic Arabians were undoubtedly men of extraordinary learning and capacity; they had acute, agile minds; they united marvellous industry with the dry light of pure intellect; they were as patient in their researches as an Alexandrian algebraist; they were as subtle in their thinking as a Greek sophist. They grudged no labour; they sickened at no drudgery; they were intimidated by no abstruseness in their subject; they had a quenchless thirst for the noblest knowledge; they had a virgin taste for the highest studies; they ventured into the widest domains of philosophy; they attempted the boldest experiments in science, and they gave a mighty impulse to the intellectual development of the human race. It was not so much their fault as their misfortune, arising out of the circumstances of their times, that they became bound hand and foot by the fettering methods of Aristotle. These often entangled them in verbal disquisitions, instead of leading them to practical discussions. Fettered by logical predicaments, they were often tied down to gross materialism when they might have soared into higher regions, or attained more sure foothold. They were ofttimes left blindfolded when they might otherwise have penetrated behind the veil.

In the brief lull of intellectual progress which ensued after the publication of the "Book of Sentences"—which seemed at once to sum up the intellectual progress already attained, and to arrest for a time its further development—the teaching of Arabian philosophers was slowly but deeply permeating the mind of Christendom. In the previous century many had repaired to the Universities of Spain to drink at the

springs of the new learning, some of whose names are still bright upon the historic page; as, *e.g.*, Herman Dalmatus, the Venerable Peter, Abbot of Clugny, who translated from the Arabic the life of Mohammed; Gerard of Cremona, Robert Ratanensis from England, who translated the Koran; Adelard of Bath, who wrote in the form of a dialogue a book on "Difficult Questions in Nature": Daniel Morley, also an Englishman, who studied at Toledo in 1190, and attained great Scholastic proficiency; Michael Scott, the so-called wizard, and the last minstrel of Scotland, who translated Aviccenna's treatise on Aristotle's Book of Animals, dedicating it to the Emperor Frederick II.; and many others, who without going to Spain became familia with Aristotle through the Mohammedan authors, and were quickened thereby to a more eager intellectual acuteness. Averroes became the interpreter of Aristotle to the Schoolmen who followed him and was deemed worthy by Dante of being ranked amongst the noble and heroic spirits of the heathen world.

It was by no accident, but by the guidance of an infallible instinct, that the advancing spirit of learning in Christendom began to look upon Aristotle as its high priest; and it was by an instinct as unerring that the prevailing Ecclesiasticism aroused itself promptly to seek to arrest his growing influence. It is true that the great Greek master had been commended to the Church by such trusted and almost apostolic teachers as Augustine and the Gregories, and by the classic Boethius; but, on the other hand, were not the aberrations of Abélard, the pantheism of Amalric de Bena, and of David of Dinanto, the rebellion of Arnold of Brescia, and other disorders in the Church and State, to be traced to the insurgent spirit roused by the study

of his works? And might not the general diffusion of his philosophical principles and his logical method tend to disturb the serenity of the Church and to interfere with the exercise of its authority? The answer was plain; Aristotle had been described by Tertullian as the parent of heresies, and the morbid tone of this eminent North African father expressed the prevalent feeling of the Church. Therefore censures and protests were fulminated against the great Peripatetic; his writings were to be cast out of the schools; his commentators and disciples must be repressed, and his growing influence destroyed. If this were not done, there would be danger to the Hildebrandism of the Church, which would no longer be considered as the lord of the intellect and the conscience. But this could not be done; the light streaming from the Mohammedan Universities was beaming too brightly upon the surrounding darkness, and the spirit of intellectual life was pulsating too powerfully in the heart of Christendom to be extinguished. Within the Church itself had arisen an order of men who were both well able to appreciate the prevailing tone and to re-echo it; who, although loving sons of the Church, had no sympathy with the desire to lord it over the minds of men in accordance with the ruling passion of the potentates of the Vatican, and who, in the learned leisure and quiet seclusion of the monastic retreat, busied themselves with the study and discussion of questions of overwhelming interest and importance concerning Knowing and Being and Destiny, until the day of a free learning and of a new spiritual life dawned upon the world.

The monks of the Dominican order so far understood the prevailing spirit of the times as to perceive that

some such influence as Aristotle could exercise was required, as much for the sake of the Church as for the cause of learning. His avoidance of religious questions seemed to provide for the entire separation of revealed and natural religion, and to promise that Church dogmas might be left to their unquestionable supremacy; the clear and distinct lines within which each subject of discussion was marked off from all others seemed to be a guarantee against all danger from rashness of speculation; the severity of his logical methods promised, if nothing more, to give unerring conclusions on points under consi eration; and if such methods of reasoning could be successfully employed within the realm of Christian doctrine, might not the Church defy the very existence of heresy? Hence the great Schoolmen who arose in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries steeped their minds in the teachings and method of Aristotie; he became the master mind of Christendom, with what varied results will appear hereafter; and this supremacy remained until the Christian consciousness at length rose to its maturity, and disdained to be for ever bound either in the rigours of a severe logical method, or in the more ty annous restraint of an iron ecclesiastical despotism.

In coming to consider the efforts of the great men who for some generations laboured in building the enormous pile of mediæval scholasticism, the mind is bewildered by the stores of learning, accumulated with such industry and ingenuity and is sorely tempted to ask the question, "To what purpose is this waste?" Due consideration will lead to the conclusion that vast and ponderous as these intellectual pyramids are, and devoid of all charin to the modern reader, save as they gratify the sense of wonder by their gigantic quantity,

they are not waste. They have had a noble purpose, and a great if not an adequate result; and it might be shown, perhaps may be, that so imperative were the demands and circumstances of the times, that it was only through painful intricacies, by unwearied application, and accumulative industry that the battle of human progress and freedom could be won. It might also be shown that the dark windings of the Scholastic centuries were a needful course in the order of Divine Providence before the victory of Erasmus, Luther, and Knox was possible, even though in fighting their great battle these heroic spirits seemed to fight against those who, in former ages, had done so much to make their work less difficult and their triumph more complete.

NOTE A.

Averroes taught that there is a transcendent or abstract being which the world of nature is always *seeking*. "He is thought or intellect, the actuality of which movement is but the fragmentary attainment in successive instants of time. Such a mind is not in the theological sense a creator; yet the onward movement is not the same as what some modern thinkers seem to mean by development. . . . The preparation of the heart and faculties gives rise to a series of grades between the original predisposition and the full acquisition of actual intellect. These grades in the main resemble those given by Avicenna. But beyond these, Averroes claims as the highest bliss of the soul a union in this life with the actual intellect. The intellect, therefore, is one and continuous in all individuals, who differ only in the degree which their illumination has attained. Such was the Averroist doctrine of the unity of intellect—the eternal and universal nature of true intellectual life. By his interpreters it was transformed into a theory of one soul common to all mankind, and when thus corrupted conflicted not unreasonably with the doctrines of a future life, common to Islam and Christendom."—Art. "AVERROES," *Encyc. Brit.*, iii., 150; 9th ed.

CHAPTER X.

THE UNIVERSAL DOCTOR--ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

"OH! what a lively life, what heavenly power,
What spreading virtue, what a sparkling fire!
How great, how plentiful, how rich a dower
Dost Thou within this dying flesh inspire!

"Thou leav'st Thy print in other works of Thine,
But Thy whole image Thou in man hast writ;
There cannot be a creature more divine,
Except like Thee it should be Infinite."

SIR JOHN DAVIES.

X.

THE UNIVERSAL DOCTOR.—ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

ALBERT THE GREAT was the first of the Schoolmen who reproduced the Aristotelian philosophy on a systematic basis, and so shaped it as to meet the requirements of the Church in reference to dogma. He belonged to the noble family of the Counts of Bollstadt, and was born at Lauingen, in Swabia. The date of his birth seems to have been 1193, but some of his biographers fix it so late as 1205. He received a portion of his early education at Paris, and went thence to Padua, where he became familiar with the writings of Aristotle. The great order of preaching friars of St. Dominic had recently been established, and the world was going after it. In Padua, the head of the order was a Saxon monk named Jordan, a man of burning eloquence and all-consuming zeal. The ardent mind of the youthful Albert was enkindled by his influence, and he took the vows of the Order as a mendicant friar in 1223. Under its rules he studied theology at Bologna; then he repaired to Cologne and taught in the schools there, speedily rising to great renown as a teacher of extraordinary power. In 1228 he was elected to lecture in the school of his Order established in Paris in connection with the Convent of St. Jacobin. His fame

filled the city; and although he was limited to the dry and bony "Book of Sentences," as a text-book, his lectures displayed such familiarity with every branch of learning, such bold originality of treatment, and such clearness of method, that his multitudinous auditors listened with wondering and solemn awe. His admirers declared that never before had a creature received such plenitude of wisdom and knowledge from the hand of God; whilst others, moved by a base jealousy, whispered that he was a wizard, a magician, possessed by an evil spirit. For three years he held this position with such renown that he, a mere monk of the mendicant Order, threw utterly into the shade all who had preceded him, especially in his thorough knowledge of Aristotle and his Arabian Commentators. Then his career in the great intellectual metropolis closed, for a time, amidst a blaze of glory, which was undimmed by the few indications of envy and suspicion which here and there began to show themselves. He returned to Cologne, and his fame rose to such an extraordinary height that he was honoured with a visit from the Emperor William of Holland, who was filled with amazement at his stores of erudition and his varied powers. Although he was apparently absorbed in his favourite ecclesiastical pursuits, he was appointed by the Head of the Order to various tasks which may well be reckoned far from congenial to such a man. He was made a Provincial of his Order, and the enormous district of the whole of Germany placed under his supervision. This office was so far from being a sinecure that he was required by the Diet of Worms to personally inspect all the monasteries within his circuit. He discharged his functions with the utmost care and fidelity. He called the monks to account for idleness or looseness

of life; he rescued from oblivion many manuscripts which were rotting in dirt and neglect, and he sought to restore the discipline of devotion and morality which was largely transgressed.[1] In the midst of his active administrative labours and his learned pursuits he was summoned to Rome, and there by the Pope, Alexander IV., was made the Grand Master of the Palace. There, also, he was called upon to defend his Order against its most virulent assailants; and this he did not only with success, but so as to astonish the Cardinals and Doctors of the Church by his profound theological attainments. Finding the influences of the Papal court and the moral atmosphere of Rome to be disagreeable to him, he was allowed to resign his post of honour, and he repaired to the comparative quiet of the school of Cologne. In 1260, he was most unwillingly compelled to accept the Bishopric of Ratisbon, and for three years he bore the unwelcome burden of responsibility; not, however, failing to discharge his episcopal functions with invariable conscientiousness. He managed the affairs of his diocese so admirably as to relieve it of a crushing debt, and elevate its dignity and influence; then he obtained leave from his patron to retire from these unwelcome duties. He again sought the congenial quietude of his beloved Cologne, where he assiduously devoted himself to his loved and learned study and teaching. His course there was only interrupted by his being summoned to attend the Council of Lyons, and to aid in the deposition of the Emperor Frederick II. As he proceeded thither he was met by a great grief. It was revealed to him, as some of his biographers say miraculously, that his former pupil, Thomas Aquinas, the most conspicuous light of the Middle Ages, lay on

[1] Note A.

the verge of death, and he sorrowed for him with a great sorrow. After the tremendous excitements of the Council, he returned to Cologne, and resumed his teaching. He spent some years thus, occasionally preaching throughout Bavaria and the neighbouring principalities, until at length the weary wheels of life stood still. He was in the act of lecturing when his memory failed him It was a call to prepare to meet the Bridegroom,—his admirers affirm it was a sign which the Virgin had agreed to give him that his work was done. In quietness and calmness he waited for a little, and then he was at rest for ever. In the year 1280, at the advanced age of eighty-seven, and in his favourite retreat at Cologne, he fell on sleep.

An edition of his works, consisting of twenty-one tall folio volumes, published by Peter Jammy in 1651. attest the unwearied industry of his life. He was undoubtedly the most erudite philosopher of his generation, and this is an encomium of the rarest kind, when such rivals as Alexander Hales and Thomas Aquinas disputed the palm with him. But he was more widely read and more scientific than the one, and more learned and systematic than the other. Besides this, he showed extraordinary skill and aptitude for business, and the practical method of his life enabled him to compass the most gigantic toils. Seven volumes of his works out of the twenty-one consist of lectures and treatises on the philosophy of Aristotle, and on the interpretations of his Arabian commentators. His principal theological works are, a Commentary on the "*Book of Sentences*," in three volumes, and a "*Summa Theologiæ*" in two.

Albert was by nature and mental training the scientific interpreter of Scholasticism. Perhaps to Aquinas

the range of philosophy was more congenial, taken as a whole, but if he has occupied a larger place in the estimation of the Church, it need not be concluded that, reckoning the entire work of Albertus Magnus, it was less serviceable to humanity at large. The impulse he gave to the study of Aristotle throughout Christendom was very great His lectures traversed the whole of the Stagyrite's system. He was indeed called " the ape of Aristotle," an epithet he by no means merited, as will appear presently. He refuted the interpretations of Aristotle by Averroes, and expanded those of Aviccenna. He discoursed on all the Arabian experts who had exercised their dialectic skill on the Greek master and showed the utmost familiarity with their writings. He laboured even with painful desire to reconcile the conflicting tenets of Plato and Aristotle with the doctrines of the Christian Church. He showed such perfect intimacy with the secrets of natural history and science that the ignorant babbled about him as being guilty of magical arts. He speculated so boldly in astronomy, chemistry, and mathematics that he paved the way to the greater triumph, and more cordial recognition, of the ardent scientific spirits of a future age. In his philosophy he was a Realist, although in some features he differed from his great Greek master. He aimed at a kind of eclecticism in treating of the Universal. He said that the Universal existed in a three-fold manner: *universale ante rem*, as ideas in the mind of God, thus adopting generally the view of Plotinus and Augustine; *universale in re*, as the common basis in a class of individual objects, as taught by Aristotle; and *universale post rem*, or the subjective concept, the general notions or universal cognitions which arise out of the generalisations of the

mind. He thus seemed to combine the views of Realists, Nominalists, and Conceptualists, anticipating the eclectic philosophers of subsequent centuries. Although he generally adhered to the teaching of Aristotle, both in his physical and metaphysical theories, he by no means allowed himself to be enslaved by his influence, but differed from him in an independent spirit where his judgment led him to do so. He especially dissented from his views on the eternity of matter, and on the nature of the human soul. He insisted strongly upon the sole eternity of God, and that He alone had primary and essential existence. He formed a view of creation somewhat resembling that taught by Plato, and yet shrank with horror from the results of the doctrine of emanation when it seemed to demand that the Divine intelligence was absolutely one with the human. He recoiled from Pantheism as being blasphemous, and dishonouring to God. He laboured with earnest, patient ingenuity to define the provinces of the eternal and the temporal, of the infinite and the finite. He sought to preserve a clear line of distinction between natural and revealed religion, and said that such subjects as the Trinity, Redemption, and Original Sin were to be considered as matters of revelation, and not to be treated as subjects of philosophical speculation. Therefore he wrote concerning God in purely metaphysical strain. He insisted that the primary question in all science is that of Being as Being. From the knowledge of nature he rose to a knowledge of God as the great Creator, but affirmed that the relations of God and man as a sinner against God are to be learnt from the revelation of Divine grace. He rejected the ontological argument of Anselm, and confirmed the inductive argument as possessing sufficient force and clearness in

proving the existence of a Creator. He maintained the infinity of God and said that while man cannot fully comprehend God, he can and does arrive at a definite knowledge of Him. God is overflowing in energy, ever sending forth streams of Divine influence. He is a simple distinct existence, and must not be confused with the material universe; and as God is not common with His creatures eternity belongs to Him as His primary attribute. The universe was called into Being out of nothing, and so also was time, and all things must necessarily perish unless upheld by the eternal Essence and the mighty providence of God. As being able to arrive at a real and direct knowledge of God, the human soul is an heir of immortality; but in his definition of the soul Albertus not only included the active intellect, but those faculties which Aristotle enumerated as the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, and motival, which may all be separated from the body and become immortal. He taught that when appetite and reason come into conflict, the free will of man is called to decide between them, and that through this function of decision desire is exalted into perfect will. The law, he said, which regulates reason is conscience, which, as to its intuitive knowledge of the right principles of action, is imperishable and innate, but which in application to separate cases is variable, and requires continual enlightenment and education. He adopted the four virtues of the ancients as taught by Plato and Aristotle—Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice; and added to these the three Christian graces—Faith, Hope, and Love—as the Divine ideal of human excellence.

The system of religious philosophy taught by Albert was characterised by a spirit of daring which was only

restrained from rushing into fatal heresies by his profound submission to the vow of his order and his deeply devotional spirit. He was led to refinements and distinctions innumerable, both as to the nature of God and of man, until when it almost seemed a certainty that he would sacrifice the personality of both he would start back appalled at the logical result of his position, or turn with horror from the danger before him. His system attempts to blend the Ideas of Plato with the Forms of Aristotle and the Formal Concepts of Abélard. He was quite decided in affirming the personality of man, yet, as has been intimated before, he verged on Pantheism when he accepted a modified theory of the emanation of all things from the Deity. Moreover, in the final result of his system, he treads almost within the domain of Mysticism. He had become so perfectly familiar with the dialectical method that he was in great danger of being enslaved by the power it gave him of arranging and organizing; and whilst, on the one hand, this rare power enabled him to bring almost the whole circle of human knowledge into systematic form, it made him too much a logical machine, and too little spiritua as a teacher. He was exceedingly devout in his own life; he took great delight in religious exercises; he manifested a clear appreciation and knowledge of Christian doctrine; but the strong scientific tendency of his mind left his writings too much devoid of the practical element and of pious sentiment. His name has been enwrapt in a dim and uncertain haze of romance. He was an object of wonder, almost of awe; greatly admired, but little known; a marvel of attainments and application, but faintly understood; spoken of in the broken language of tradition as a mysterious person, possessed of pre-

ternatural powers and exercising magical arts, but more correctly estimated in the sober light of history as a many-sided philosopher, who was able to exercise a quickening influence upon his generation unsurpassed by any of his contemporaries, and whose labours contributed much to open the whole sphere of true philosophic enquiry to future explorers. He won from his followers the well-deserved and richly-bought title of the Universal Doctor.

NOTE A.

"His biographer assures us that he was a mendicant in the strictest sense, and determined to vindicate the dignity of poverty against all opposers and all hypocrites. In the course of his inspections he found that a lay brother had died with some unconfessed wealth. He ordered that his body should be at once removed from the consecrated ground in which it had been laid, that his judgment even in this life might be manifest."—*Maurice*, "Met. and Mor. Phil.," i., 597.

CHAPTER XI.

THE IRREFRAGABLE DOCTOR, ALEXANDER OF HALES.

"Abstract words are the gases of language."

"Analysis is the art of divination or invention reduced to rules."

"Philosophy is properly a home sickness, a longing to be everywhere at home."

"To know a truth well, one must have fought it out."

"Philosophy can bake no bread, but she can procure for us God, Freedom, Immortality. Which, then, is more practical, Philosophy or Economy?"

NOVALIS.

XI

THE IRREFRAGABLE DOCTOR, ALEXANDER OF HALES.

ALEXANDER OF HALES was born in the county of Gloucester in the latter part of the twelfth century. Educated in the monastery of Hales, he thence derived the name by which he is known in history, and on which he has conferred immortality. He received a liberal education, of which he was so receptive that he obtained preferment in the form of an archdeaconry at a very early age. But his thirst for learning was too keen to be content in so narrow a sphere, and he was soon drawn by the irresistible influence which made the University of Paris the centre of attraction to the young and ardent spirits of the Church. There he drank in learning with such avidity that he quickly surpassed nearly all his contemporaries, took his degree of doctor, and became a teacher of philosophy and theology. In 1222 he united himself with the Franciscan Order of monks, which had recently been instituted, and which divided with the Dominicans the enthusiasm of the most earnest and sanguine Christians of the age. Although he was at the very height of fame and popularity, he retired into a private retreat, and gave himself to close and absorbing study. He retained the title of

doctor, being the first of the Order to do so; and although he apparently violated the vow of complete and absolute renunciation of everything merely earthly, which he had deliberately taken, he was quickly followed by others who claimed the same privilege. He spent twenty-three years in quiet and laborious study, mingled with devout exercises, in the convent of Cordeliers in Paris, and in 1245 he died, and was buried within its precincts. He was so learned and eloquent as a teacher as to be called by many *Fons Vitæ*, the fountain of life. He was the first of the Schoolmen who made himself thoroughly acquainted with the writings of Aristotle and his Arabian commentators; but he was afterwards surpassed by Albertus Magnus in universal range of knowledge and in comprehensiveness of teaching. He wrote many works, only some of which have been preserved, and of these a few only have been published. He wrote notes on the Old and New Testaments, expositions of the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke, the Epistles of St. Paul, the Books of Moses, the Judges, the Kings, the Psalms, and the minor Prophets. His principal work, in which he gathered up his whole system of teaching, was the *Summa Theologiæ*, published at Nuremberg in 1452, at Venice in 1576, and at Cologne in 1622. It consisted of dissertations on the "Book of Sentences," by Peter the Lombard. It was undertaken by order of the Pope, and was approved by him and the principal theologians of Europe as a system of divinity to be taught in the schools of Christendom. It was in the form of a dialogue, and was rigidly logical in style and treatment. He was called away from his earthly labours before he was able to complete it, but it was finished by his pupils, and was published in

1252. He adopted the divisions of the Lombard, and treated the subject of theology in four parts: (*a*) the Deity, (*b*) the Creation, (*c*) the Redemption, (*d*) the Sacraments.

In regard to the great distinguishing question of the Middle Ages, Alexander was a Realist. He teaches *universalia ante rem*, the universal in the mind of God; the *universalia* not existing as independent essences apart from God, but constituting the *causa exemplaris* of things; not distinct from the *causa efficiens*, but being identical with it in God. The *universale in re* is the form of things.[1] He insists that in theology knowledge depends upon faith; that theology must first of all produce faith, and then that through faith man arrives at an intellectual understanding of Divine things. It is altogether different in regard to scientific or philosophical knowledge; these require the substratum of knowledge on which faith must rest. Faith is the illuminating principle of the soul, and the brighter its light the more keen is the apprehension of truth. Christian faith is only satisfied with really knowing its object; it springs out of experience, and stands above all knowledge. But reason has a part to play in the exercise and development of faith. As it is enlightened by faith, it helps the believer to comprehend more clearly the truth believed; as he makes use of the arguments supplied by reason, his faith becomes strengthened, so that faith and reason in their exercise are mutually helped; and in winning unbelievers to the faith reason is called upon to play an important part by affording proofs to a mind unwilling to be at first satisfied with simple experience. He taught that God is in all things, but is not essentially included in them. He is without

[1] Ueberweg, "Hist. of Phil.," i., 434.

all things, yet is not absolutely excluded from them. "He exists in things in a threefold manner, *essentialiter*, *præsentialitur*, *potentialiter*; these three modes, however, do not differ in themselves, but only in our idea of them."[1] He refused to accept the argument of Anselm for the existence of God, and yet argued that the idea of God was native or intuitive in man, in consequence of the connection existing between truth and his moral nature. He affirms that the idea lies at the foundation of man's consciousness, and is undeniable; but as there is a twofold tendency in man, if he allow the earthly to prevail he may lose the consciousness and sink into being the fool who says in his heart there is no God.[2]

Unfortunately Alexander led the way in discussing many trivial questions which subsequent Scholastics took up and multiplied, pursuing them into endless ramifications, a course which has irretrievably damaged the reputation of Scholasticism. He raised many questions concerning the attributes of God, especially as to His love; whether it is identical when manifested His creatures or to Himself, or to the Persons in the Godhead, etc. This habit, which, once begun, was likely to be very infectious, was a great waste of power on the part of writers of ability, and a great drawback to the utility and acceptability of their productions.

He did much towards revising the prevailing notions on the Trinity, which verged closely upon Sabellianism, from which, however, the Schoolmen would have shrunk back with dismay if they had recognised the tendency of their views. Discussing at length the subject of the Generation of the Son, he drew many scarcely perceptible distinctions between generation material, original, and ordinal, and concluded by affirm-

[1] Hagenbach, "Hist. of Doct.," i., 489 [2] Note A.

ing that by the language "begotten of the Father," it is only intended to teach that the nature of the Father and the Son are identical. He believed that every individual creature possesses its own perfection, although it might appear imperfect when compared with the whole. In writing concerning the angels, he said that whilst some fell from their first estate, the great majority preserved their purity and happiness. The angels are able to exert some influence upon the material world, although the influence does not extend so far as to enable them to work miracles. The fall of man involved his deprivation of the Divine righteousness he had previously possessed; and on the ground of the satisfaction rendered to Divine justice by the death of Christ, it is restored to him again.

He introduced into the theology of Scholasticism the notion of Fate, which he defined to be the co-operation of all causes directed by a higher law. By this he did not intend to infringe upon the notion of free will, because he reckoned it to be one of the co-operating causes. By Fate, all causes free and natural work together in their proper relations, and the actions of free will are only controlled by the connection in which they stand to other causes. He thought that evil served to contribute to the general perfection of the universe, inasmuch as it displayed in fullest measure the essential excellence of goodness. He taught that man was originally created in a state purely human, and that the Divine likeness was afterwards added, being thus an accidental and not an essential portion of the man, and showing, the distinction between a state of nature and a state of grace even in man primæval. Grace was not created in man, but was reserved until by reason he had become fit to receive

it. On the subject of the sinner's justification, he taught that no certain knowledge was vouchsafed, because Divine grace did not come within the circle of knowledge, either as to its cause or mode, and a man could only judge of his salvation by the measure of light, peace, and joy he experienced inwardly. The uncertainty arising from this condition he considered would have a helpful effect upon the believer by leading him to greater watchfulness, and by supplying an urgent stimulus to constant progress. He strongly dissented from the view of Augustine and other Church teachers concerning the freedom of man and the operation of Divine grace on the soul, and taught that the measure of grace received by the soul was entirely conditioned by the willingness or otherwise of the soul to receive it.[1]

He agreed with some of his predecessors in affirming the validity of the seven sacraments adopted subsequently by the Councils of the Church, but had the candour to admit that Baptism and the Lord's Supper had been alone instituted by the Redeemer, whilst the others derived their appointment and authority from the Apostles and priests of the Church.

Some of the sayings preserved of him breathe a fervent piety and a tender spirit. The following are but a sample of many similar passages which might be quoted :—

"Charity in the soul of a man is like the sun in the firmament, which spreads his beams upwards, downwards; upwards towards God, the angels, saints; downwards to the creatures, especially the poor, that are good; and as the sun shines upon the good and bad, so true charity dilates its beams over its enemies."—"Destruct. Vitior," p. vii., ch. xii., 3.

"A soul patient for wrongs offered is like a man with a

[1] Note B.

sword in one hand and salve in another; could wound, but will heal."—*Ibid.*, p. vi., ch. xxvi.

"What the eye is to the body, that faith is to the soul; 'tis good for direction if it be well kept; as flies do hurt the eye, so do little sins and ill thoughts the soul."—*Ibid.*, p. vi., ch. xxxii.

Alexander manifested throughout all his writings great independence of mind. He showed a strong tendency to break away from rigid Augustinianism and the trammels of mere ecclesiasticism; and he did much to vindicate the right of reason, to consider and judge on all matters of belief.

NOTE A.

"Yet," he remarks, "it does not follow from this fundamental relation that all men become conscious to themselves of the idea of God, and that it meets with recognition from them as an actual reality; for with regard to this knowledge in act (*cognitio in actu*), we must distinguish two separate tendencies of the soul, according as either the higher faculty of reason is developed and active in it, and it is directed upon that original revelation of God, hence perceives it, since the mind cannot avoid being conscious of that which is the principle of its own essence—or the lower powers only are active, as in the case of the soul that surrenders itself to earthly things when the consciousness of God is repressed in it by this predominantly worldly tendency,—and so the fool may deny the existence of God."—*Neander*, "Church Hist.," viii., 204.

NOTE B.

"Alexander of Hales says:—'All men are found to be alike corrupt. No one can make himself fit for heaven. God wills according to His highest love to save men, to communicate to them Himself; but it is presupposed that there is a recipiency, so far as this is grounded in the moral powers still remaining to man. The light shines everywhere; but its rays do not find everywhere a material susceptible of illumination. No one can render himself sufficiently susceptible for the reception of grace, unless God Himself makes him fit for it by His own inward operation. But if he only does what it depends on himself to do, the Divine grace ensues, by which he is prepared for the reception of grace."—*Neander*, "Church Hist.," viii., 305.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SERAPHICAL DOCTOR, BONAVENTURA.

"RAPT with the rage of mine own ravished thought,
Through contemplation of those goodly sights,
And glorious images in heaven wrought,
Whose wondrous beauty, breathing sweet delights,
Do kindle love in high-conceited spirits,
I fain to tell the things which I behold,
But feel my wits to fail, and tongue to fold.

"Vouchsafe then, O Thou most Almighty Sprite!
From whom all gifts of wit and knowledge flow,
To shed into my breast some sparkling light
Of thine eternal truth, that I may show
Some little beams to mortal eyes below
Of that immortal beauty there with Thee,
Which in my weak distraughted mind I see."

—SPENSER.

XII.

THE SERAPHICAL DOCTOR, BONAVENTURA.

JOHN OF FIDANZA, commonly called Bonaventura, was born at Bagnarea, near Viterbo, in Italy, in 1221. His father was named Johannes Fidantius, and his mother Ritelia; they were both descended from noble families of Tuscany; both were wealthy, and had a fragrant reputation for sanctity and charity. The son was early devoted to the Church by his saintly mother, but in his infancy it is said he had an illness so severe in its character that his life was despaired of. In her agony the good Ritelia carried him to St. Francis of Assisi, who by his faith and prayers was the instrument of his restoration, and as he was recovering gave him back to his mother with the words, "O buona ventura!" from whence came his well-known name in history. From childhood he showed a disposition, not only to cultivate piety, but many branches of learning; as a boy he delighted in visiting the poor and the sick, and in practising methods tending to promote lowliness of mind. In his twenty-second year he, like Alexander of Hales, took the vows of the Order of St. Francis, and thus added one more to the brilliant names which were to make the Mendicant Orders for ever famous. He is described as having been of tall stature, of grave

and winning countenance, and of so healthy a constitution that after his childhood he scarcely suffered from a touch of sickness during his life. He is said, but with much improbability, to have studied under Albertus Magnus; it is more likely that he listened to the lectures of Alexander of Hales at Paris; and it is certain that he attended the classes of John of Rochelle, the successor of Alexander. He rapidly became famous, and in 1250 he gained immense applause by a series of eloquent and learned lectures he gave on the "Book of Sentences," by the Lombard. In 1253 he occupied the chair of his teacher, John of Rochelle, in the University, and in 1255 he was honoured by receiving his degree as Doctor. He laboured with unremitting industry, familiarising himself with the writings of the great Church Fathers, and studying the classic authors of Greece and Rome, the former no doubt in their Latin garb, although one of his biographers says he read them in their Attic purity. It is said he framed a collection of "Sentences" from the Fathers after the manner of Robert Pullein and Peter Lombard; that he twice copied out the whole of the Bible; that he several times copied out the history of Thucydides and the orations of Demosthenes; and that these, which in themselves are not specially edifying, are only a small portion of his intellectual and spiritual exercises. So renowned and beloved did he become, that in 1256 he was appointed the principal of the great Franciscan Order, and at once he devoted himself with untiring ardour to restoring purity of life, more rigid discipline, and attention to the vow of poverty—all of which had been seriously neglected since the death of St. Francis. Such was his zeal in these directions that he effected a great

reformation. He was offered the Archbishopric of York by Pope Clement IV., but he was too much devoted to the interests of his Order and to his favourite studies to allow himself to become a mere ecclesiastical politician and administrator. He therefore refused the tempting bait.

He did not close his eyes to all that was going on in the outward world; he was aroused by rumours then becoming current of the magical arts and heretical tendencies of Roger Bacon, who was a monk of the Order; he obtained an interdict against his lecturing at Oxford, and an order that he should repair to Paris so as to be under careful supervision. Bacon submitted to this, and for ten years resided in Paris, abstaining from public demonstration, enduring such constraint that his life during that period was little else than a painful imprisonment, and fretting his noble heart against the shameful and unnatural yoke laid upon him. The chair of St. Peter had been vacant about fifteen years, and Bonaventura, on the death of St. Louis, King of France, actively laboured to secure the election of a new Pope. He was the chief instrument in the appointment of Gregory X. in 1272, who, in return, induced him to accept a Cardinal's hat, installed him as Bishop of Albano, and imperatively ordered his presence at the Council of Lyons in 1274. During the sessions of this Council he was summoned from his earthly honours and labours, and passed away probably more esteemed and loved than any man of his generation. A funeral of extreme magnificence, attended by Pope, Emperor, and King, a conjunction of dignitaries rarely if ever again occurring in history on such an occasion, testified to the extraordinary estimation in which he was held.

His works were very numerous; an edition of them in seven folio volumes was published at the Vatican in 1588, and numerous other editions of them have appeared. They consisted of two volumes of expositions of the Scriptures, one of Sermons and "Lives of the Saints," two of lectures on the "Book of Sentences," and three of various shorter treatises.

It is said that a close and affectionate friendship existed between him and Thomas Aquinas; one story has been preserved of them which is of touching interest. Thomas asked on one occasion to see the library from which Bonaventura had derived his extraordinary stores of learning. His friend pointed to a crucifix, and replied that all he knew he had learned there. A number of miracles were alleged to have been performed by him; but as to these one of his biographers says, wisely and significantly, "I force not any man's belief." His life was so blameless, and his piety so pure and radiant, that his great learning derived additional lustre from these; and he seems to have really merited the title bestowed upon him of "the Seraphical Doctor." He was canonised by Pope Sixtus IV. in 1482; and, as is well known, Dante accorded him a high and honourable place in his "Paradiso."

As a thinker and writer he occupies a distinct niche in the history of Scholasticism, and that a place both of high honour and of great prominence. Concerning the question of "Universals," which was the theme at the basis of nearly all the discussions of the Schoolmen, and which gave the distinguishing tone or tinge to their philosophic thinking, he believed, with Plato, that they were ideal forms existing in the Divine mind, and that they were the patterns from which all

existing things were shaped. Thus he takes rank amongst the great Realists of Scholasticism, although he diverges, as will be seen, from the leading thinkers of that School; and, inspired largely by the pietistic tendencies of his nature, he drifts into Mysticism, and stands side by side with such honourable company as Bernard of Clarvaux, the Monks of St. Victor, and the famous Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris.

He followed his teacher Alexander of Hales as to the relation existing between reason and faith. He distinguished between the material reason and the reason exalted by faith, to the latter of which is imparted, by the illuminating influence of the Holy Spirit, a knowledge of Divine things. The natural reason may become acquainted with some of the great moral truths on which all religion must finally rest, but the specific truths of the Christian system it can only know when the reason is rendered lustrous with Divine knowledge, to obtain which the soul must use appropriate means—as prayer, the practice of the highest virtues, and the calm contemplatiod of God whereby it rises into union with Him. In his most famous and much admired book, called "the Itinerary of the Soul to God," which is as much a handbook of devotion as a treatise of theology, he defines four degrees of light by which we may rise to union with God, viz., the external, the inferior, the internal, and the superior. By the first we learn the mechanical arts; by the second we perceive individuals; by the third we rise to Universals in conception; and by the fourth we see Universals in reality or in God. Bonaventura thus sought to soar to the highest height; he said that the supreme end of life is union with God, union in absorbing, intense, passionate love. In the contemplation of God he

taught that the mind passed through three grades: the senses, affording knowledge of outward things; the reason, which looks within and subjects itself to examination; and the pure intellect, which by an unspeakable effort grasps the very Being or Essence of the Almighty. To this idea of Absolute Being he ascribed objective existence. In his rapturous descriptions of the union of the soul with the one Absolute Essence in God, he hovers dangerously over the abyss of Pantheism, if indeed, but unconsciously, he does not fall into it. He does indeed partly save himself from this position by seeking to draw a distinction between the soul and God; and yet the practical tendency of his teaching would lead to the logical conclusion that the soul by absorbed meditation and beatific ecstasy becomes merged in the Absolute Essence.

As to the general doctrinal notions of Bonaventura, not much needs to be said, as he adhered with rigorous scrupulousness to the general teaching of the Church. On a few points he advanced views somewhat antagonistic to those adopted by Aquinas and others. In arguing the question, whether the end of the creation was the glory of God or the good of the creatures, he decided in favour of the former; urging, however, that there really could be no increase of the Divine Glory, but only a manifestation of it to the creatures, and a participation in it by them, and that thus the highest good is secured. He also may be said to have brought into prominence the notion previously taught by Alexander of Hales, and revived in some modern systems of theology, that the primæval blessedness of man consisted in certain chartered gifts being bestowed on him, which were forfeited and lost by the commission of sin; these blessings are restored through the

merit of the sacrifice of Christ. Upon the subject of the Atonement he occupied a position about midway between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus; for whereas the former said that there was superabounding merit in the death of Christ, the latter held that it was deficient in real merit, but accepted by God as being sufficient. Bonaventura taught that it was perfect and all-sufficient as a substitutionary offering for sin. As to the appropriation of the blessings of salvation, he held that the grace of God was measured by the susceptibility of man to that which was good, a view which was subsequently taken up and expanded by later Schoolmen until it emerged into the theory of the meritoriousness of good works.

The greatest blemish of the theology of Bonaventura was his fervent and rapturous worship of the Virgin Mary. This, whilst much to be lamented, was to be accounted for by the intensity and tenderness of his nature, which of necessity led him to cling with passionate ardour to such an object of adoration as was presented by the Church in the Virgin, the ideal embodiment of purity and affection. Protestants of a certain school may not understand this; but it is only fair to bear in mind that the human side of the Lord Jesus had not been recognised by the Mediæval Church, and that the Christian consciousness had no such complete and glorious view of the Lord Jesus as belongs to Christians of the nineteenth century. The view presented of the Lord Jesus was a mangled or imperfect view. He was seen as a helpless babe on His mother's knee, or as an agonised sufferer on the cross; and all the rich lessons of His human life in the intermediate years were overlooked; and especially what may be called the *feminine* side of His character, the side that

forms the greatest charm in all men of supreme influence and character, was totally unrecognised. Thus the ardent sympathetic religious instinct strove to fill up the blank as best it could, and placed the Virgin before it as an object of devout enthusiasm and of passionate love. It is vain to blame Bonaventura and others like him because they were unable to rise above their limitations and to supply what was lacking of Christ in the apprehension of the age. We have to accept men as we find them, with certain constitutions and surroundings, to consider the *possibilities* of the case, and if we lament that such men were the victims of religious vagaries, or of partial representation of the truth, seeking to piece out the deficiencies with the material nearest to hand, let us remember that they did not create their circumstances, and that on the whole they did their best, often a noble best, to glorify God and to promote the kingdom of truth. It has taken the centuries filled up by the names of Aquinas, Bellarmine, Luther, Calvin, Jeremy Taylor, Wesley, Edward Irving, and F. W. Robertson, to develop the enlarged and enlarging view of the full Christ which dilates and brightens in the literature of the present age.

Bonaventura seems never to have wearied in contemplating the passion of Christ, and in adoring the virtues of the Virgin, inasmuch as in these exercises he was said to have surpassed his master St. Francis. He united in himself the ascetic and the pietist, the Mystic and the Scholastic. He combined so many points of interest and such various characteristics that he has been a most attractive figure in the history of the Romish Church. His name is richly fragrant to a crowd of admirers, and he is reckoned higher in general

esteem than many who surpassed him both in erudition and in dialectical skill; the charm of his reputation seems mainly to lie in the fact that whilst being truly a Scholastic, he diffused through the hardness and formalism of the Scholastic method the beautiful and romantic glow of Mysticism,[1] and hence became a bright luminary in that galaxy of saintly names which sheds its brightness through the centuries extending from Bernard in the eleventh century to Fénelon in the seventeenth. His character, his earthly labours, his writings, are all suffused with a transfiguring glow of holy lustre; such was the impression produced on his contemporaries by his beautiful saintliness that Alexander of Hales said of him, "In brother Bonaventura the old Adam seems to have had no place."[2] A more valuable testimony to human excellence perhaps was never uttered, save that which came from Divine lips concerning a character of simple devoutness: "Behold, an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile." *O si sic omnia.*

NOTE A.

"In autem, O amice circa mysticas visiones corroborato itinere et sensus desere et intellectuales operationes, et sensibilia, e invisibilia, et omne non ens et ens et ad unitatem, ut possibile est, inscius restituere ipsius, qui est super omnem essentiam et scientiam."—"Itin. Mentat Deum," 2, 5, 7. Quoted by Milman, ix., 140.

NOTE B.

"Bonaventura resolves all science into union with God. The successive attainment of various kinds of knowledge is, in his system, an approximation, stage above stage, to God--a scaling of the heights of illumination, as we are more closely united with the Divine Word,—the repertory of ideas."—*Vaughan*, "Hours with the Mystics," ii., 150.

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[1] Note B.

[2] "In fratre Bonaventura, Adam pecavisse non videtur."

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ANGELICAL DOCTOR THOMAS AQUINAS.

"WHEN I myself from mine own self do quit,
And each thing else; then all spreaden love
To the vast universe my soul doth fit,
Makes me half equall to all-seeing Jove.
My mighty wings high stretched, then clapping light,
I brush the stars and make them shine more bright.

"Then all the works of God with close embrace
I dearly hug in my enlarged arms,
All the hid pathes of heavenly love I trace,
And boldly listen to His secret charms.
Then clearly view I where true light doth rise,
And where eternal Night low pressed lies."—HENRY MORE.

"A palace is measured from east to west, or from north to south, but a book is measured from earth to heaven."—JOUBERT.

XIII.

THE ANGELICAL DOCTOR—THOMAS AQUINAS.

THOMAS AQUINAS was the son of Landulf, Count of Aquino, in Sicily. He was born in the family castle of Rocca, Sicca, in 1225 or 1227. He was nobly connected through his parents on both sides, and could even claim kinship with some of the royal houses of Europe. His mother, Theodora, was of the royal line of Normandy, and by marriage his parents had become related to the great house of Hohenstaufen. His brothers rose to very high rank as generals under the Emperor Frederick II., and his sisters also occupied noble positions, three of them marrying Counts and one becoming an Abbess. He was sent in early childhood to be educated at the convent of Monte Cassino, and from the age of ten to sixteen he studied at the university of Naples. There he became acquainted with the Order of St. Dominic, which at this time was assiduously pushing its way into unrivalled notoriety, and was pressing into its service all the young men of talent it could influence. To his taking the vows of this Order his parents and family offered the sternest opposition, and fearing that he might be over persuaded by their influence, the monks sent him to Rome. His mother discovered his refuge, and then the Dominicans sent him to France. On the

journey thither, as he and his companions rested by the side of a well, they were surprised by a band of soldiers which had been sent in pursuit of him by his brothers and he was carried a prisoner to his father's castle. He resolutely resisted the imploring and affectionate solicitations of his mother and sisters to abjure the Order which had cast its glamour over him, and it is even recorded that a beautiful courtezan was introduced stealthily into his chamber by his brothers to tempt him to break his vow of chastity. She professed to have sought him to obtain pious consolation, but speedily broke from the pretext, and exerted all the arts of womanly endearment to win his love. The virtue of Thomas was proof against even such an attack as this; suddenly collecting his resolution, he pulled a burning stake out of the fire on the hearth, and with indignant rudeness scared her from the apartment. Then he threw himself before the crucifix and prayed for strength both to resist temptation and to be entirely devoted to the cause of his Master. Finding it equally impossible to move him from his purpose either by the allurements of beauty or by the entreaties of affection, his parents ceased to oppose him; they connived at his escape from confinement, he donned the habit of the great preaching Order, and took its irrevocable vows. He went to Cologne and thence to Paris, where he listened to the lectures given by the intellectual magnate of the day, Albertus Magnus, for four years, this being the term of probation each had to serve who intended to teach Theology in connection with the Dominicans. He is described at this time as being humble, modest, bashful, obedient, grave, industrious, absorbed in profound meditation, surrounded with such impenetrable shyness and reserve as to be reproached with stupidity.

These characteristics being combined with a huge frame, massive limbs, and a heavy cast of countenance, obtained for him the mocking epithet of "the great mute ox of Sicily." But Albert heard how on a certain day he had silenced and convinced some individuals who had presumed to instruct him. He called for him, questioned him on many of the most abstruse points of philosophy and theology, and confessed that he had found his equal or superior. Then he said to those who mocked at him that "the mute ox, as they called him, would one day fill the whole world with his roaring."

While he was in Paris pursuing his studies with indefatigable zeal, the great university which had filled Christendom with its fame was passing through a critical experience. Students of the mediæval age were not more docile and orderly than some of the students in the university towns of England in this nineteenth century. In 1229, a body of them had indulged in a drunken riot, and committed great outrages on some of the citizens of Paris. In retaliation, the police of the city attacked and subjected to violence many members of the university who had been in no way concerned in the matter. The professors and doctors took great offence at the treatment to which these had been subjected, and required satisfaction from the authorities. This being refused, they summarily dissolved their classes; both teachers and students dispersed, many came to England, and others settled in various cities on the Continent. The opportunity of the Dominican monks had come; taking advantage of the lull in the university teaching, they established a lectureship of Theology. The Pope sought earnestly to resuscitate the university staff, but the ecclesiastical authorities in Paris, having long experienced that the university inter-

fered greatly with their power and prestige, opposed his efforts with pertinacious zeal. However, in 1231 the Pope issued a Bull, restoring the university and declaring a code of rules for it, some of which showed that a more liberal spirit had begun to prevail through the influence of the Dominicans. The orders prohibiting the works of Aristotle were relaxed, but even then only such of his works were allowed as had been examined by competent clerical authorities, and purged of error. Thus the old order of the university passed away, and although the procedure of the Pope did not aim at the aggrandisement of the Dominicans, it resulted in them becoming the dominant theological teachers in the famous seat of philosophy, and out of them came shortly another order, called Jacobins, who might be called the democrats of the religious orders. In 1252, such jealousy of their power had accumulated that a majority of the learned doctors succeeded in enacting a rule, that no member of a religious order should be admitted amongst them who did not belong to a college, and that each college of the religious orders should be permitted to have only one Doctor and one School. Shortly after this, the authorities of the city and the professors of the university were involved in another dispute. Again the professors abandoned their duties, and swore that until satisfaction was made to them they would never teach again. Two of the Jacobin teachers refused to take the oath, and the university decided that they should not be allowed to occupy the position of master or doctor any longer. A fierce and bitter controversy ensued, the Pope was called upon to engage in the affray, he issued a Bull rebuking the Mendicants, and sustaining the authority of the university, and almost immediately following this act he was seized by death,

The Dominicans piously professed that his death resulted as an answer to their prayers.

The new Pope, Alexander IV., made it his first act to annul the Bull of his infallible predecessor. He promoted the monks to their former position, and affirmed to them all their previous privileges. The Doctors of the University rebelled against the decree, and William of St. Amour, a man of great learning and eloquence, maintained but in vain the cause of the University. On his return from Rome after his unsuccessful suit he was received in Paris with overwhelming applause. There, he denounced the Dominicans with a vehemence which all may wonder at, but none can admire, accusing them of being spiritual deceivers and despots, of intruding into families and leading astray silly women, and in short of being the sign of those "perilous days" spoken of by the Apostle Paul. The Pope firmly maintained the cause of the Dominicans; he issued other Bulls, denouncing the Doctors and Professors, excommunicating the recusants, expelling from office the rebellious, and calling on the King, St. Louis, to prosecute vigorously those who had the temerity to defend the authorities of the University. The outcome of the conflict was the complete victory of the Mendicants; in 1257 the University submitted to the Pope, and Thomas Aquinas representing the Dominicans, and Bonaventura representing the Franciscans, were admitted as Doctors of the Faculty. These prolonged disputes had excluded Thomas from this privilege for ten years, and exercised a very powerful effect upon his mind; leading him in after days to advocate views of a directly democratic tendency, in those of his writings which treat upon jurisprudence. He had been no uninterested spectator of the disputes;

ne had been chosen to defend his Order against William of St. Amour, in presence of the Papal Court, which he did with signal ability; and now, when the victory declared itself for his party, he issued a vindication of its proceedings.

From the reception of his university honours his life was an extraordinary combination of unremitting study, of unwearied toil in the service of the Church, and of the most devout practices of piety. Before he obtained his degree as Doctor of the Faculty of Theology, he had composed some metaphysical tracts, and had read a course of lectures on the "Book of Sentences." Now he engaged in public disputation on any questions in philosophy or theology which were proposed to him, and in 1258, being primary regent, he composed his Expositions of various Books of Scripture, both in the Old and New Testaments He was frequently engaged in travelling to and fro throughout France, Italy, and Germany, on the active business of his Order; and was the principal agent in drawing up a complete scheme of study for the use of the members of it. He was summoned more than once by the Pope to give his advice on perplexing matters of State; and in 1263 he was in London, taking an active part in a Dominican Council held there. In his lecturing achievements he seemed to be ubiquitous. In Rome, in Bologna, in Paris, in Cologne, in Viterbo, in Naples, and in Perugia, he was found at various times lecturing and teaching, and wherever he went crowds gathered round him and listened with a reverential demeanour. Meantime, he wrote Commentaries on Aristotle, dealing with his physics, metaphysics, and ethics. He composed his "Argument against the Gentiles," his "Commentary on Job," his "Questions on the Soul," and many other

works; but, above all, he found time to prepare, and nearly to complete, the "Summa Theologiæ," which is the literary wonder of the Middle Ages, and which, as a monument of human learning, ingenuity, industry, and piety, has never been surpassed by any writer in Christendom.

He commenced this stupendous work in 1265, and continued to spend upon it every minute he could spare from his urgent duties in the Church, until 1273, when his noble career came to a close. His varied and accumulated labours did not pass without recognition from the authorities of the Church. He had been offered the rich Abbacy of Monte Casino, and the more tempting position of Archbishop of Naples; but neither bait had any charm for him. He was prevailed upon by the earnest solicitations of Charles of Anjou to fix his residence at Naples, and he patiently wrought upon the book which was to make his name illustrious, until the midwinter of 1273 Then a powerful impression took hold upon him that his end was drawing near, and he relaxed his efforts. Pope Gregory X. summoned him, in 1274, to attend the Council of Lyons, which was held with a view to compose the dissensions which divided the Eastern and Western Churches. The summons came when he was totally unfit through weakness for such a journey, but the spirit of perfect obedience which actuated his life led him to undertake it. He broke down utterly on the road, and was carried to the Monastery of the Ciscertian Monks, at Fossa Nuova, in Terracina, where he waited for death in peaceful resignation during seven weeks. He received the eucharist prostrate upon the earth, and on being asked if he would have anything, he replied that "within a little he should enjoy all

things." When submitting to severe mortification by lying in ashes in his death agony, he said: "Soon, soon will the God of all comfort complete His mercies on me, and fulfil all my desires." In such a frame of perfect peace he passed into the Father's presence.

In appearance, we are told, he was "almost vast, tall, and massy in the bones, to which the spare flesh gave scarcely a complete covering; the expression of his eyes was most modest, his face oblong, his complexion inclined to sallowness, his forehead more depressed than the profoundness of his intellect might seem to require, his head large and round, and partly bald, his person erect."[1]

His character was so blameless that none has ever ventured to breathe upon it one shade of suspicion. His devotions were pursued with unbroken avidity and diligence, that his philosophical and theological studies might not dull the brightness nor mar the freshness of his piety; and he never commenced any great work without spending a preparatory period in fasting and prayer. His diligence was so unremitting that in the midst of scenes of social enjoyment his mind was preoccupied with grave and important studies, and on one occasion, when at the table of Louis the King of France, while the company was occupied with gay conversation he was absorbed in mental disputation, and startled all present by striking the table and exclaiming: "Jam contra Manichæos conclusum esse."

Several of his sayings are preserved, which show the modesty and probity of his nature. One asked him why he was so long silent under Albertus? To which he replied, "Because I had nothing of worth to say to him." Another asked what was the most pleasant

[1] Hamp., Aquinas Encyc., Met. XI., 807.

thing to him? His answer was: "To understand all that I read." Another told him it had been said that he was not so learned as he had been supposed. To which he answered: "I will study the more to prove his words false." A woman reproached him, saying that "seeing he was born of a woman he should not so shun them." "Yes," he said, "even therefore because I was born of them." Someone asked him how he might live without blame? and he told him, "if he would remember his reckoning to the Great Judge of heaven and earth."

That Aquinas should have been able to accomplish so much in his short life of forty-eight years is indeed a marvel. But he always seemed to live to the extreme verge of his possibilities; his nature was ever strained to its utmost limit, and it is more of a wonder that he lived so long and did so much than a matter of regret that he died so soon. His nature was intense, and he carried a burning fervour into all his labours, so that he was able to crowd much more of the real life of action and achievement into his shorter space than some other great men have been able to put into a long career of threescore years and ten. The Venetian edition of his works, published in 1787, and filling twenty-eight large octavo volumes, form such a monument of patient industry and ripe learning as no other mediæval writer was able to erect. To attempt to give any full list of his many works would not be in accordance with the object of this volume, and it will be sufficient to mention but a few of the most important. Far above all others in extent and importance is the "Summa Theologiæ," which is the ripest fruit of his genius and of Scholasticism, and, indeed, of the entire literature of the Latin Church.[1]

[1] Lupton, "Glory of their Times," 535.

"THE SUM OF THEOLOGY."

It was the noble if ineffectual ambition of Aquinas to make the *Summa* a complete, exhaustive, and final repertory of human thought on matters touching philosophy and religion, beyond which none need seek to penetrate; he sought to make it a perfect treasury of learning arranged in faultless order, and presented in entire accord with the decisions of the Church. If it did not reach this ideal, it was because it was too lofty to be attained by any production of the human intellect, but it certainly approximated more nearly to it than any work ever written, and it did succeed in presenting the most advanced theology of the Christian Church as expressed by the great Councils of Christendom, in the logical method of Aristotle and his Arabian expositors. In thus summing up the Theology realized by the Christian consciousness of his age, Aquinas conferred a great boon upon the world, for, whilst a work which sums up the results of the investigations and speculations of preceding generations cannot be regarded as leading on to new conquests in the realm of thought, it can and does become a firm foundation on which bright and chivalrous thinkers may reach forward and make further progress in the attainment of truth.

The *Summa* is divided into three parts: the first part treats of God, the second of Man, the third of the God-man. The author commences by explaining the nature of theology, the science which treats of God, but, of course, of God as He is known to us, and then proceeds to treat in the most comprehensive manner of His Existence, Nature, Perfections and Attributes, Works, Government, Providence and Mode of Existence, extending to matters physical, metaphysical, and

Biblical, with marvellous completeness and familiarity, dividing them into one hundred and nineteen questions, subdividing these into five hundred and ninety articles, which in their turn are distinguished into reasons for and against, with a final summing up of every article. The second division of the Book deals with Man, and is divided into two parts, the first containing one hundred and fourteen questions, which are separated into six hundred and fourteen articles, the second part having one hundred and eighty-nine questions, and nine hundred and twenty-four articles. The third part Aquinas was not able to finish; he had proceeded to the ninetieth question when he was interrupted by his last sickness. Additions were made to it by some of his followers, extracted from his Commentary on the Book of Sentences, and thus a form of completeness was given to it, which the pious author had been prevented from imparting. This part treats of the God-man; it has ninety-nine questions and nearly four hundred articles. The whole *Summa* contains five hundred and twelve questions, and more than two thousand five hundred articles. The twelfth edition, just published in Paris, consists of four thousand six hundred and ninety closely-printed pages of large octavo, which fact may give some idea of the extent of this stupendous work.[1]

The gigantic scale of the *Summa* is not the most remarkable feature of it. The thoroughness of the treatment which each question and article receives is much more remarkable. Each one of the twenty-five hundred articles is subdivided into objections, to the solution which is to be given; then follow arguments in favour of it, then comes the solution itself, and replies to the

[1] Note A.

objections urged, in the order in which they were stated.

The perfect candour with which Aquinas states the objections and arguments which may be adduced against his views is admirable and marvellous. On the one side he pleads the cause of scepticism, with a completeness and force which no sceptic could surpass and none has equalled, and he does this without one trace of fear, or one expression of rancour; he says all that can be said against himself, with the impartiality and passionlessness of a judge, he shows the clearness and force of a skilful advocate without any of the ardour of a polemic, he weighs both sides as though he were not at all concerned in the result, excepting that he never seems to doubt for one moment but that the truth must triumph; if any anxiety is ever shown by him, it is that what he deems to be error should have all, and the best said for it that can be said, that thus the triumph of truth may be the more sure and signal. A writer of sound and judicial mind has said of him in this respect:

"He is nearly as consummate a sceptic, almost atheist, as he is a divine and theologian. Secure as it would seem in impenetrable armour, he has not only no apprehension, but seems not to suppose the possibility of danger; he has nothing of the boastfulness of self-confidence, but in calm assurance of victory gives every advantage to his adversary. On both sides of every question he casts the argument into one of his clear distinct syllogisms, and calmly places himself as an Arbiter, and passes judgment in one or a series of still more unanswerable syllogisms."[1]

The influence of the *Summa* as a factor in the Christian thought of Europe can scarcely be over-esti-

[1] Milman, "Hist. Lat. Christ.," ix., 133.

mared. For three hundred years the *Secunda Secunda* was the ethical code of Christendom, and a noble exalted, and pure one. Upon the *Summa*, commentators and expositors of the first order, whose name is legion, from Suarez to Migne, have exhausted their learning and ingenuity; it was honoured by being laid on the table side by side with the Bible itself during the sessions of the Council at Trent; the first great Reformers excepted it from the other productions of the School as being worthy of great respect and attention, whilst writers like Erasmus, Vives, Fontenelle, Leibnitz, and many others, write of it in strains of high commendation. Six hundred years have passed since Aquinas' sun went down while it was yet day, but his influence is still great, and he is undoubtedly one of those sceptred kings "who rule our spirits from their urns." On the 4th of August, 1879, the present Pope issued an encyclical letter to the whole Catholic world, extolling the wisdom, piety, and transcendent abilities of Aquinas, setting out the homage done to his memory by Popes, Kings, Councils, and Universities, and concluding with these words, which clearly show that his influence is not willingly to be allowed to die:—

"While we proclaim that every wise saying, every useful discovery, by whomsoever it may be wrought, should be received with a willing and grateful mind, we exhort you all, Venerable Brethren, most earnestly to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to propagate it as widely as possible for the defence of the Catholic faith, the good of society, and the advancement of all the sciences. The wisdom of St. Thomas, we say, for if there is anything in the Scholastic doctors of oversubtle enquiry, or ill-considered statement, if anything inconsistent with ascertained doctrines of a later age, or lastly, in any way not admissible, it is by no means our intention to propose that to our age for imitation. But let teachers endeavour to nstil the doctrine of St. Thomas

Aquinas into the minds of their disciples, and to place in a clear light his solidity and excellence in comparison with others."

The other works of Aquinas scarcely require to be mentioned, except the *Contra Gentiles*, the *Opusculum*, a Commentary on the supposed treatise on the Trinity by Boethius, the Commentaries on the "Book of Sentences," the *Quodlibeta*, questions on all manner of subjects, Questions on Potentiality, on Evil, and on the Virtues, with Commentaries on many Books of Scripture. Many editions of his works have been published, the principal being that at Rome, in seventeen volumes, in 1570, and that, already mentioned, at Venice, in twenty-eight volumes, in 1787.

NOTE A.

The following neat summary of the contents of the "Summa" is extracted from *The Modern Review*, No. 1, p. 71 :—

OF THEOLOGY. ITS NATURE AND OBJECTS.

FIRST PART—INTRODUCTORY. OF GOD. I. *In Himself.* II. *As Cause of all things.*

I.—1. Of God in the Unity of His Being.
- (*a*) His Existence proved.
- (*b*) His Nature. One, Undivided, Infinite, Eternal.
- (*c*) His Action. (*a*) Within—His Knowledge, Will, Providence, Predestination.
  - (*β*) Without—His Power.

2. Of God in the Trinity of Persons.

II.—1. In the bringing of Things into Being.

2. Of the different kinds of things.
- (*a*) Of Good and Evil.
- (*b*) Of things (*a*) spiritual. Angels, their nature, creation, fall.
  - (*β*) Material. The work of the Six Days of Creation.

(γ) Spiritual and Material in One. Of Man, his Body, his Soul, his Creation.

3. Of the Government of all things by God.
   (*a*) Of the preservation of things in being.
   (*b*) Of their change. (α) By the action of God.
   (β) By their action on one another.

SECOND PART.—OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE RATIONAL CREATURE GODWARD.

I. OF THE END OF MAN in the attainment of the Beatific Vision.

II. Of Acts, by which man reaches or is frustrated of his end.

1. Of Human Acts in general.
   A. Of the Acts themselves.
   (*a*) Of Acts peculiar to man. Voluntary Acts.
   (*b*) Of Acts common to man and beast. Passions.
   B. Of the Causes of Human Acts.
   (*a*) From within. (α) Capacities or Powers of Action.
   (β) Habits.
   (*b*) From without. (α) Guidance of Laws.
   (β) Guidance of Grace.

2. Of Human Acts in Special.
   A. Of such as are common to every state of life.
   (*a*) Of the Three Theological Virtues, and Vices opposed to them: Faith, Hope, Charity.
   (*b*) Of the Four Cardinal Virtues, and Vices opposed to them: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance.
   B. Of such as are peculiar to certain states of life.
   (*a*) Of Special Gifts and Graces.
   (*b*) Of the Active and Contemplative Life.
   (*c*) Of Sundry Positions and Duties.

THIRD PART.—OF JESUS CHRIST, and the way to God opened up through Him.

I. Of JESUS CHRIST. GOD AND MAN.

1. Of the Incarnation.
2. Of the consequences of the Incarnation.
3. Of the Life of Christ.

II. OF THE SACRAMENTS, instituted by and dependent on Jesus Christ.

Of the Sacraments in general. Then

1. Of Baptism or Spiritual Birth.
2. Of Confirmation or Spiritual Manhood.
3. Of the Eucharist or Spiritual Food.
4, 5. Of Penitence and Extreme Unction or Spiritual Medicine.
6. Of Orders, for the Spiritual Government of men.
7. Of Matrimony, for the Spiritual Life of the Family.

III. OF THE RESURRECTION, which we obtain through Christ and the end of all things.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ANGELICAL DOCTOR—HIS OPINIONS.

"Reason is weak indeed, if it do not advance far enough to ascertain that there is an infinity of things beyond its range. It is well to know when to hesitate, when to feel certainty, when to submit. He who has not learnt this, has not yet determined the true province of reason. Men err in three ways—either in establishing everything by demonstration, because they are ignorant of the nature of demonstration; or in doubting of everything, because they know not where to yield; or in universal submission, because they know not where or how to exercise their judgment."—PASCAL.

"The scheme of Christianity, though not discoverable by human reason, is yet in accordance with it; link follows link in necessary consequence; Religion passes out of the ken of reason only when the eye of reason has reached its own horizon, and Faith is then but its continuation; even as the day softens into the sweet twilight, and twilight hushed and breathless steals into the darkness."—COLERIDGE.

XIV.

THE ANGELICAL DOCTOR.—HIS OPINIONS.

IN proceeding to give a brief statement of the opinions of Aquinas, it is important to notice the position he gave to the human reason in treating of Christian doctrine. He taught that we had two sources of knowledge, the Christian Revelation and human reason. In his treatise *Contra Gentiles*, he strongly urges that from both channels we may receive knowledge, although, as one might have expected, as a good Churchman he attaches the greatest importance to Revelation. He contended stoutly against those who believed there was an irreconcilable difference between faith and reason, and urged that the doctrines of Christianity must be apprehended through the reason, although they are above and beyond it. The opinion that Revelation and reason were necessarily opposed to each other was strongly current in his day, and it is much to his praise that he set himself in decided opposition to such an error[1] by showing that such contradiction could not possibly exist, because God was alike the Author of our reason and the Bestower of Revelation, so that the truths implanted by Him within our minds could not be opposed to those revealed in the Gospel. He also sought to

[1] Note A.

demonstrate that the truths which are abowe reason need not be and are not contradictory to it, but that it is competent to expose the false arguments offered against the truths which are beyond its full comprehension. He affirms that faith is the complement of reason, which should humble itself before is even as the natural desires of the heart should humble themselves before Christian Love. He held that Revelation flowed through the channels of Scripture and Church Tradition, and that the conclusions of reason came through the various systems of heathen philosophy, especially the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Corresponding to these two fountains of knowledge, natural and supernatural, there are separate faculties in human nature; the faculty of faith and that of reason, enabling man to apprehend such knowledge: both faculties, of course came originally from God, the real and only source of wisdom and truth. Aquinas is somewhat inconsistent with himself when he strives to show that in regard to distinct utterances by Revelation on certain subjects reason can make no demur. It may, he says, enquire, examine, and sustain, but in view of an imperative affirmation it may not criticise or object. He instances the doctrine of the Trinity as such a subject. But notwithstanding this, no previous Schoolman had insisted so emphatically on the province of reason, or had given to it so large a range, and none who followed him, reckoned orthodox, was more ready to recognise its true position. He insists that reason has a work of Divine authority in determining man's opinions, and in his works he argued even more upon the ground of reason than from the statements of Scripture. This clearly shows how little Aquinas was the slave of a mere ecclesiastical system, and how forcibly he laid down and

followed in his writings the great foundation principle of the Protestant movement of the fifteenth century.

On the great question of the Middle Ages, touching Universals,[1] Aquinas held views almost identical with those of his great Master, Albertus Magnus. He was moderately eclectic, he held with Aristotle that Universals exist in a two-fold manner, in the nature of particulars and in the concept into which the mind has collected and combined them. But he was not prepared to refuse the theory of Plato entirely. He rejected his view that Ideas are independent essences, but he believed with him that they are immanent in the Divine Mind, and that they operate indirectly upon the sensible world. So that he joined with Albertus and others in teaching the existence of the Universal *ante rem, in re, post rem.* He said that Plato erred in teaching that we can only have knowledge of truth by the Universal possessing reality, and existing in the same way in our thought and in external reality, that thus the great Greek was led to his foundation mistake in supposing that the Universal possessed distinct subsistence. Aquinas held that Aristotle was more correct in teaching that "as the senses are able to separate what in the *realiter* is not separate as the eye, *e.g.*, perceives only the colour and shape of an apple, and not its smell or taste, so, and much more even, the mind can effect the like purely subjective separation by considering in the individual only the Universal."[2] He came to the ultimate conclusion that the Universal exists really in the individual, as the essence of things, the one *in* the many; the intellect exercis the abstracting, power whereby the Universal becomes in the itellect the one *beside* the many. This may be called Realism, but it is so garbed

[1] Ueberweg, i., 445. [2] Note I.

in Nominalism as not to be at once perceptible; he so combines the two theories, as to preserve himself from being classed either with those who follow Plato and Plotinus, or those who fell into the opposite opinions of Roscellin and Ockam. It is impossible to show that Aquinas was consistent in holding these divergent views, but Eclectics are seldom consistent, and do not trouble themselves very much on that score. Their inconsistencies may however be more apparent than real, and in the case of Aquinas, the breadth and grasp of his mental constitution might have enabled him to discern truth in the various theories of Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism, which had been discussed, and have led him to accept them all without being anxious to make the one theory dovetail with the other.

In teaching upon a kindred subject to this, Aquinas involved himself in some scandal as teaching theological error, viz., the cause of individuation. Plato referred this to the Archetypal Idea existing in the mind of God, but Aristotle settled it by his theory of Form and Matter, the one as that which constitutes every substance what it is; the other as its condition and *sine qua non.* Aquinas accepted the principle of Aristotle; he said, matter as possessed of definite properties, and not in any abstract form, was the cause of individuation. Here arose a difficulty, for if this was so there could be no individuality in the case of pure spirits, and as he was bound to accept the plain statement of Scripture that spiritual individuals do exist, he was forced to the conclusion that every separate angel represented a distinct species. This opinion brought him under the censure of the Church, and his teaching on this point was condemned by the Archbishop of Paris.

He strongly argued against the theory of Averroes

concerning the indivisibility of the intellect. He adopted the view of Aristotle that the soul is the Form of the body; he defines it as the cause of the body, the spiritual entity which moulds and conditions the body; but on the other hand he affirmed that the soul could only obtain experience through the body, and that each is thus necessary to the other. This was a debasing view of man's better nature, and opposed to the high Christian teaching which taught the pure spirituality of the soul. Indeed, to take some of Aquinas' expressions and interpret them by a rigorous literalism, he would be found to deny the immortality of the soul, but against such an issue he guards himself by writing on other subjects, in a manner which sufficiently indicates his orthodoxy on this subject.

Passing to glance at the Theology of Aquinas, he approximated, in dealing with the question of the Existence of God, to the ontological argument of Anselm. He said that the proposition, "God exists," might be taken as proved if considered in itself, as predicate and subject are in entire agreement. He adduced five proofs in defence of the proposition: (*a*) the great moving principle which is not itself moved by any other; (*b*) the First Great Cause; (*c*) that which is necessary in itself; (*d*) the gradation of things, the argument rising from the imperfect to the perfect; (*e*) the adaptation of things. In which various arguments we have collected most of those adopted by modern writers—notably, Mr. Isaac Taylor and the authors of the Bridgwater Treatises.

As to the knowledge which may be obtained of God, he held with Albert that we can only have an approximate knowledge of Him; that all we can know is not adequate, but only the unfolding of Himself that He

makes to the creature. No man can know the Essence (*quidditativam*) of God, but only the attire or manifestation by which He makes Himself known to man. He also argued conclusively in favour of the Personality of God, in opposition to the Pantheism expressed by Erigena and his imitators, Amalric of Bena and David of Dinanto. He held that the knowledge of God in a general way is intuitive in man, that in all men there is a craving after Him, and that no true happiness can be experienced until He has been found and His favour enjoyed. He wrote very decidedly against the view advocated by Abélard, that God could do no other or better in creation than He has actually done, arguing that the Divine Wisdom and Power are co-ordinate. But the order and beauty attained by His Wisdom in creation are not the extreme possibilities producible by that attribute. If the end for which things were made simply concerned those things themselves, then we might say that Divine Wisdom had been confined to one line of necessary operation; but the Divine Goodness as an end is far above created things; hence, Divine Wisdom is not confined to one order of procedure only, and therefore could have done otherwise than has been done. Thus he draws a distinction between Divine Power as revealed in the Creation, and as an absolute attribute of Deity. If Abélard had lived after Aquinas he might probably have shown that such reasoning did not solve the difficulties of the subject, and was by no means impregnable.

The metaphysical subtlety of Aquinas genius nowhere shows itself more notably than in his disquisitions and discussions on the important subject of the Holy Trinity.[1] It is questionable whether any eye but his

[1] Note B.

could have perceived the microscopical distinctions he draws, or whether any one could trace his labyrinth without becoming utterly bewildered. He is not bewildered; he walks on with a serene spirit and a firm step, skimming no difficulty, not intimidated by the most awe-inspiring questions, and coming to conclusions which at least to him are quite irresistible. The line of argument pursued by Aquinas in treating of the Mode of the Divine Existence, proceeded upon an analogy he drew between the Deity and human nature as created in His image. He sought thus to rise from the inferior and derived, to a knowledge of the Perfect and Original The mind, intelligence, and will of man were treated as analogous to the distinctions given in Scripture of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the Godhead. In adopting this form of argument, he is peculiarly careful to guard himself from misunderstanding by urging the utter impossibility of adequately comprehending the Divine Being in cour present state, and hence the inevitable imperfections of all such illustrations. He then seeks to narrow the subject by a series of negations, and to reduce it to the utmost simplicity of Scripture statement. Guided by the analogy he pursues, he professes to have found the key to the Divine Procession in the Godhead. The Logos is the principle of Intelligence in the Deity, the Holy Spirit is the principle of Love; the former gives expression to the principles of created things, the latter is the bond between the Father and the Word. The former process is called Generation, because it is like producing like; as the thought is produced by the mind, so also is the procession of the Thought or Reason of God from the Godhead—a relation therefore fitly expressed by the term Son. The atter process is simply called a Procession as the most

expressive term for the outflowing of Divine Love, especially as the word Spirit signifies a breathing forth. The Holy Spirit is the mutual Love between the Father and the Son, therefore the Procession from both corresponds to the Being of the Holy Ghost. He said that only by a right understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity could there be a right understanding of the Creation. Plato defined the Deity into a general theory of the Universe; Aristotle sought to show that Deity was the Principle of Motion; but Aquinas, and others of the Schoolmen, urged with great skill and acuteness that Deity was the Principle of Efficiency, or Causation. Then, by a careful scrutiny of the principles of Causation, and intelligence, and action in the mind, Aquinas strove to show that these principles belonged to the Divine Being intrinsically and entirely, divested of their outward effects or accompaniments. The view of the Deity taken by the Schoolmen generally was, that He was pure Efficiency or Energy, looked at not in its effects or operations, but in its original and abstract nature.

Aquinas strove carefully to discriminate the true doctrine of the Trinity against Arianism, Sabellianism, and materialistic systems, which had at various times agitated the Church, and sought to determine the relations and functions of the Three Divine Persons. He insisted that there was no division of the Divine Being in the Trinity, but that "the entire Deity was transposed from the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit." The Persons were of one Essence or Substance rather than of one Nature, and were Consubstantial with each other. He strove to illustrate the doctrine of the Three Persons in the Godhead by figures drawn from all the various realms of being or knowledge. The light, the ray, and the heat of the sun; the fountain, the flood, and the

stream; the root, the stem, and the flower; the intellect, the will, and the feeling; the body, the soul, and the spirit; the metal, the seal, and the impression;—these and other illustrations were all made use of by him and many other of the Schoolmen, but all failed to afford a sufficient idea of the deep and sacred mystery of the method of the Divine Existence Human ingenuity has ever failed, and will ever fail, adequately to represent the sublimest fact of the universe; and probably a simple, childlike acceptance of the statements of Scripture on so profound and awful a subject, will lead to a clearer knowledge of it than the most acute and abstruse arguments of such a mind as that even of Aquinas. Certainly no one has ever rivalled him in the extraordinary ingenuity and logical dexterity with which he handles this great topic.

From these high reasonings it can scarcely be reckoned a descent to come to notice his theory of the Incarnation of the Lord Jesus—a subject which he treated of both with more fulness and intelligence than it had received from any previous writer. He develops three principal ideas on this doctrine. He seeks first to demonstrate that the Incarnation consisted not in the incarnation of the Divine Nature, but of a Divine Person.[1] By affirming this he sought to harmonise the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word and the Holy Trinity, as the Father and the Holy Spirit were not partakers in the Incarnation, which they must have been had it been of the Divine Nature. He also set forth, with great clearness, that in Christ two distinct Natures were united in one Person, and that these Natures, being distinct in themselves, remain distinct still. Then he proceeds to discuss many curious questions relating to

[1] Note C.

the knowledge and power possessed by Christ's human soul, some of which have come up for discussion in this day, and have sorely exercised enquiring and sensitive souls.

He next considers Christ as the recipient of Grace, which he divides into the Grace of *Union* and *Habitual* Grace. The former is that enjoyed by the Divine Nature as the result of its having honoured the human nature by uniting with it, and the latter is that which Christ experiences as the result of having His whole Being in close fellowship and perfect submission to the Divine.

He then proceeds to treat of Christ as the Head of the Church, and sets Him forth as being in His human nature exalted above all, the representative of humanity, the Head of the Body, and therefore grandly superior to the Body; the head is the crown of man, containing all the senses outward and inward, so also is Christ, the crown, and the fulness of man, next to God, all embracing and all containing. Enlarging upon this he rises into greater warmth of spirit than in any other part of his work. But he vitiates his really noble views on this subject by representing Christ as being far removed above any real experience of the feelings of human nature, as one to whom faith and hope were unnecessary on account of His perfection in grace and knowledge. He overlooks the fact, that by voluntary limitations the Saviour subjected Himself to an experience of human weakness was "touched with the feeling of our infirmities," and was thus intimately connected with human nature by a real tie of brotherhood and sympathy, that, "though He were a Son, yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered." It has taken the struggle and development of six hundred

years to bring the Christian Church to a clear understanding of this most precious and important truth.[1]

On the subject of the Atonement he taught generally the theory framed and enforced by Anselm. He held that the sufferings of Christ were the voluntary payment on His part of a penalty not otherwise due from Him to the Divine Justice, and that they were accepted by God as an equivalent for the delinquency of man, and as the ground of the offer of salvation being made to the human race. He carried this idea much further than Anselm, dwelling much upon the priestly office of Christ, and especially upon the superabundant merits of His death arising from the infinitude of His love, the rich savour of His life as the God-man, and the intensity of His sufferings.[2] Upon these grounds he urged that the compensation offered far exceeded the heinousness of the offence, and that this overplus of merit redounded to the remission of offences in others. Thus he introduced into Church teaching an element of error which was abundantly mischievous in its future application.

In treating upon the nature and fall of man, Aquinas combated the notion held by some theologians in this day, derived from Erigena, Hugo, and Bonaventura, that the original righteousness of man was a gift added to his purely natural condition; he urged that Adam in his creation was possessed of the so-called "added gift," or "chartered blessing," that it belonged really to his nature, and that he was deprived of it through his transgression. The origin of sin did not lie in any single act of disobedience, but in the spirit of rebellion

[1] This subject is ably and lengthily argued in "Dorner," vol. i., div. ii., 329, etc.
[2] Note D.

which arose from the indulgence of pride in the heart. The consequence of the fall was the loss of man's original righteousness and the introduction of discord into his nature, as set forth so vividly by Paul in Romans vii.

The salvation of man from sin was entirely the work of Divine grace, which, being imparted to him, produced several important results; the will moved Godwards, hatred to sin was begotten in the soul, forgiveness was bestowed as the mind exercised faith in the Lord Jesus. The Grace of God bringing salvation was bestowed by an act of predestination, or rather the Grace operated to salvation on those who had been rendered fit subjects for it by God having drawn their minds towards goodness.[1] Thus with some limitations he accepted the Augustinian doctrine of predestination; he would not admit a predestination of guilt, he could not see how this could be without the presence of evil in the Divine Mind. On the other hand, all goodness must find its origin in God, and where any good is willed there must be the exercise of love, where there is love there must be the choice of its objects, and by this line of argument he reaches both predestination and election.

The subject of faith occupied a large share in the discussions of the Schoolmen. To the term itself they assigned a variety of meanings. Aquinas held that the faith that justifies is that which enters into living fellowship with God, and makes the believer a member of the Body of the Lord Jesus. This faith becomes the parent of good works, as the Apostle says, "faith worketh by love." This doctrine led to strange conclusions in the Scholastic teaching, concerning the merits

[1] Note E.

of good works, which Aquinas sought to obviate by stating that there was merit *ex condigno* and merit *ex congruo*. The former receives a reward because it is *worthy*, from the hand of a just God; the latter is a reward given to the *unworthy* by a merciful God. Christ alone is entitled to the former on the ground of His own righteousness, but as God bestows grace upon all of those whom He accepts in Christ, He is just in bestowing such grace upon them.

Aquinas gathered up into his system a doctrine which had been floating indefinably in Church tradition for some ages but which now found definite and authoritative expression in his pages. This was that a higher perfection was to be obtained by observing the *consilia evangelica*. He drew a fine distinction between Counsel and Precept; by the former signifying the loftier habit, as he supposed it, of living in a state of closest fellowship with God, and being urged to this lofty communion not only by the discharge of regular duty, but also by the fulfilment of duties not obligatory in themselves; and by the latter he meant a life more remote from the perfect, which was guided by the precepts of the Word of God and by the discharge of obligatory duties. In making this distinction, Aquinas showed how much his soul was steeped in the spirit and method of Aristotle,[2] for the doctrine was simply an application of the philosopher's teaching baptized into Christian name and system. The "wise man" of the Greek corresponded to the perfect man of Aquinas, as distinguished from those who only seek to perform with care the humble and common duties of life. The application of this doctrine exercised a great influence on the future practice of the Church. It came to be

[1] 2 Tim. iv. 8. [2] Hampden, "Bamp. Lect.," 288.

held that as many as rose to the higher life of *consilium* performed holy works which they were not required by the Divine law to fulfil, that these were *opera supererogativa*, which might be imputed to those who had no good works of their own. As it was afterwards taught that this surplus stock of good works was preserved in the treasury of the Church and at its disposal, immense encouragement was given to the sale of indulgences, and the grossest abuses arose, as any Church history will testify.[1] In justice to Aquinas it must be said that he rejected the doctrine of indulgences as popularly taught in the Church. Against some who held that indulgences could only benefit according to the faith and love manifested by each individual, and who yet carefully withheld this condition from the people lest they should thereby be less ready to invest in them, he declared that their conduct was most dangerous to the wellbeing of the Church, and such as would undoubtedly bring trouble and disaster in its train. How true his words were the affray between Tetzel and Luther, with all its outcome, is the illustration.

In his full treatment of the Sacraments Aquinas drew out all the reserves of his subtle and discriminating skill, and in no field could he have found for it a more urgently needful sphere. He followed Augustine in defining a Sacrament as being a visible sign of an invisible grace; but he went further than this, and it was by his definitions that those of the Council of Trent were decided, that the Sacraments were both outward signs of inward grace, and also the cause of that grace being enjoyed within the soul. In the Romish system the Sacraments occupy a commanding position. On the one side there is man, depraved,

[1] Gieseler, "Hist. of Church," ii., 452.

enslaved, and corrupt; on the other is the New Man, Jesus Christ, the All-righteous and Universal Healer. That the streams of grace might flow from Christ into the broken and sorrowing heart of the sinner, there required some connecting *media* whereby the two extremes might be brought into union, and by which man might partake abundantly of the virtue which is stored up in Christ. The Sacraments formed these media, and Aquinas found ready to his hand rich accumulation of material on this subject. Especially the controversies of preceding centuries, fought out by Paschasius Radbertus, Erigena Berengarius, Ratramnus, Anselm, Peter Lombard, and others concerning the Eucharist, showed how effectually that Sacrament was assuming importance over all the rest. He sought to exert all the dialectic skill and all the store of learning he possessed to harmonize with reason and science the views which the accepted teachers of the Church were urging, and to demonstrate how the elements in the Lord's Supper were converted into the Divinity and Humanity of the Lord Jesus. It would be far beyond the purpose of this volume to enumerate the endless questions, ramifications, and refinements which Aquinas enters upon in order to defend the theory of the Church, and to present in its full development the doctrine of Transubstantiation. It is sufficient to say that if he does not command the assent of his readers to the doctrine he enforces by the convincing nature of his logic, he does excite their amazement by the exquisite metaphysical acuteness he manifests, and on the part of many deep regret will be felt that such transcendent ability should have been spent for such a purpose.

As an instance of the refined dialectics which he brought to bear upon the subject, and also to show the

extreme point of Realism which he reached, Aquinas urged that so long as the emblems of the bread and wine were sensibly present, so long in the same manner as the *substance* of both was before contained under these emblems, the *Body of Christ* was present under the same, and even if an animal nibbled the consecrated elements, the *substance* of Christ's Body did not disappear thereby. Neither, he held, did that Body suffer in dignity, because without loss of dignity he had submitted to crucifixion by sinners, and this the more as it was only the Body of Christ in respect to these emblems, and not in its *proper essence*, that was affected thereby. But such like abstract and minutely distinctive processes are endless and wearisome in his treatment of this question.

Up to the day of Aquinas the number of the Sacraments had been a matter of dispute amongst Church teachers, but his teaching had such authority that henceforth the sacred number of seven was fixed upon, which seven were Baptism, the Eucharist, Penance, Confirmation, Ordination, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction, of which he defines the offices with great clearness.[1] Some, as Baptism, the Lord's Supper, Penance, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction, are intended for the spiritual perfecting of the individual members of the Church, but others, as Holy Orders and Matrimony, for the growth and benefit of the whole Church. By Baptism, we are spiritually regenerated; by Confirmation, we increase in Divine Grace and renew our faith; by the Eucharist, we receive Divine nutriment for the renewing and invigorating of our souls, when we have incurred the sorrow of sin in our lives; by Penance we recover spiritual health, and as life is departing evil is

[1] Note F.

banished from both soul and body by Extreme Unction. By those in Holy Orders, the true Church is governed and multiplied spiritually, and by Matrimony its corporate estate is augmented. He taught also, as was held by most mediæval writers, that Baptism and the Eucharist are the chief Sacraments.

Concerning the views of Aquinas on Eschatology, it is not needful to dwell at length; he taught the generally received doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and delighted to exercise his philosophical acumen in speculations concerning the resurrection body; he believed in the second coming of the Lord Jesus to judge the world, and that the judgment will take place *mentaliter*, because a separate and verbal trial of the individual would consume an almost infinite period of time; he accepted the doctrine of Purgatory, and affirmed that the purifying fire was not a metaphor of speech, nor a fire of the imagination, but a real material fire, which in the absence of a material body will afflict the souls which pass through it in an ideal manner. He believed, however, that only those who require it pass through purgatory, while the really holy are exalted at once to bliss, and the desperately wicked are doomed to hell. In hell are different departments, corresponding to the degrees of wickedness in men, and so also with Purgatory and Paradise; there are different states of blessedness for the righteous; the fires of hell he held to be material fire, although the misery of the lost consists principally in unavailing repentance; this repentance is not the godly sorrow which needeth not to be repented of, but that which rebels against the endurance of the penalty without mourning for the evil of the sin. Thus he inscribed over the portals of the abode of future woe, "Abandon hope, all ye who enter here."

The Ethical system framed by Aquinas has extorted the highest praise from all parties. In the *Secunda Secundæ*, which is chiefly devoted to this department of philosophy, he takes a full and comprehensive view of human nature in its moral sentiments and actions; he investigates the causes of action, and carefully considers how the principles of action in human nature are affected or modified by divine grace. He discusses the virtues in succession, and succeeds in framing a moral code that was the rule of Christendom for ages, and which is still regarded by all Ethical writers with admiration. He successfully combines the moral teachings of Aristotle with the higher spirit of Christianity.[1]

In treating of the subject of jurisprudence, he was led by the principles he adopted into conclusions which, if followed out to their last result, would produce the most complete overthrow of all tyranny both civil and ecclesiastical. He insists that in the reason of man law is dominant. It is a standard of human action, and must be considered as the rule and measure of all acts of the reason. A law thus existing is powerfully operative, and the acts of the reason are within its operations. But this touches also the action of the will, in the attainment of the ends of which reason co-operates actively and effectually. These ideas he applies to social and political life; he affirms that the will of the majority of the people is the only really governing and legislative authority; that the Prince is only the interpreter and executor of the will of the great body of the nation. Thus he anticipated some of the most earnest pleaders for constitutional liberty in laying down this principle as a corner-stone of his system, and especially, as Professor Maurice has well

[1] Note G.

pointed out, he anticipated Locke in advocating a view of so democratic a tendency, which could not fail to produce practical fruit in the course of succeeding ages.

Without doubt, his writings contain much that is erroneous, much that is fantastic, and, judged by a nineteenth century standard, much that is ridiculous; but through the vast and curious fabric there are many golden threads interwoven. His *Summa* especially is an immortal memorial of indomitable patience, of penetrating logical insight, and of unquenchable zeal in the cause of truth and knowledge. It is painfully cumbrous in method, and inconclusive in some of its reasonings, but of these his circumstances and conditions must share the responsibility and condemnation, while to himself must be reckoned the merit of the many noble features which characterise his productions. His style was very lucid, his appreciation of Evangelical principles in relation to human sin, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, was profound; his masterly vindication of the right of reason to judge on subjects sacred and ecclesiastical constituted him a friend to religious freedom, and a forerunner, early indeed and not fully recognised as such to this day, of the Reformation which ushered in a brighter day of truth. To regret that he was unable to break through his surroundings and rise into a brighter region of spiritual light and liberty, is to regret that man cannot anticipate the providential hour, nor rise to the perfect state without passing through the necessary nurture and discipline out of which human perfection alone can come. It is to regret that Roger Bacon did not discover the printing press, and that Caedmon did not produce the works of Shakespeare. If Aquinas had been able to accomplish the impossibilities of rising into the clear white light of

advanced truth, and of grasping the perfect principles of Church life and work he would have raised the standard of revolt against ecclesiastical authority and tyranny only to have ignominiously lost the battle, and would have thrown the day of emancipation back for ages; he would have implicated the battle of humanity before the "fulness of time" had come, and before the conditions of success existed. In such a case any handful of enlightened souls who had hastened to his side would have been struck down by the mailed hand of power, and he would have been overwhelmed by persecution and death. But by the will of God, with much that was philosophically and theologically unsound, he enshrined in his pages a body of sacred divinity which was interfused with Bible light, and also urged the exercise of reason as the arbiter of truth, doing all this with a force of logic, a keenness of vision, and an ardour of devotion which has made him one of the mightiest creators of opinion the world has known, and which has aided largely in quickening the thought of succeeding generations.[1]

NOTE A.

"The aim of Aquinas as a Christian philosopher was to prove the reasonableness of Christianity, which he attempted to accomplish by showing, 1st, that it contains a portion of truth; 2nd, that it falls under the cognizance of reason; and 3rd, that it contains nothing contradictory to reason. In connection with the latter argument, he starts from the assumption that the truths of reason are essentially one with Divine truth because reason is derived from God. Philosophy consists, according to him, in Science searching for truth with the instrument of human reason, but he maintains that it was necessary for the salvation of man that Divine Revelation should disclose to him certain things transcending the grasp of human reason. He regarded Theology, therefore, as the

[1] Note H.

offspring of the union of philosophy and religion, and as a science derived from the principles of a higher Divine and spiritual science." —*Tenneman*, "Manual," p. 237.

NOTE B.

"It behoves us in what we say of the Trinity to beware of two opposite errors, temperately proceeding between both; the error of Arius, who laid down with the Trinity of Persons a Trinity of Substances; and the error of Sabellius, who laid down with the unity of Essence an unity of Person. To escape, then, the error of Arius we must avoid in Divine things the terms *Diversity* and *Difference*, lest the unity of Essence be destroyed. We may, however, use the term *Distinction* on account of the Relative Opposition. Whence, if anywhere, in any authentic Scripture, diversity or difference of Persons is found, diversity or difference is taken for distinction. Again, that the *Simplicity* of the Divine Essence may not be destroyed, the terms *Separation* and *Division* must be avoided, which are of a whole into parts. Again, that Equality may not be destroyed, the term *Disparity* must be avoided. Further, that similitude may not be destroyed, the terms *Alien* and *Discrepant* must be avoided. Further, to avoid the error of Sabellius, we should avoid *singularity*, that the communicability of the Divine Essence may not be destroyed. We ought also to avoid the terms One, Only, *Unicum*, that the Number of Persons may not be destroyed. The term *Solitary* also must be avoided, lest the *Association* of Three Persons be destroyed."—"Aq. Summa," P. I., qu. xxxi., art. 2; quoted "Hampden Bamp. Lect.," p. 136.

NOTE C.

"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ly se est reciprocum et refert idem suppositum. Natura autem divina non differt supposito a persona Verbi; et ideo inquantum natura divina sumit naturam humanam ad personam Verbi, dicitur eam se sumere. Sed quamuis Pater sumat naturam humanam ad persona Verbi non tamen propter hoc sumit eam ad se; quia non est idem suppositum Patris et Verbi et ideo non potest dici proprie quod Pater assumat naturam humanam. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod convenit naturæ divinæ secundum se, convenit tribus personis, sicut bonitas sapientia et hujus modi. Sed assumere convenit ei ratione personæ Verbi, sicut dictum est. Et ideo soli illi persona convenit.

"Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut in Deo idem est quod est et quo est; ita etiam in eo idem est quod agit et id quo agit; quia unum quodque agit in quantum est ens. Unde natura divina est illud, quo Deus agit et est ipse Deus agens.—"Summa," P. III., qu. iii., art. 2.

NOTE D.

Superabundant Satisf. "Conclusio.

"Passio Christi non solum sufficiens sed superabundans satisfactio fuit pro peccatis humani generis propter passionis generalitatem et vitæ depositæ dignitatem et demque charitatis magnitudinem."—"Summa," P. III., qu xlviii., art. 2.

NOTE E.

"Respondeo dicendum quod predestinatio secundum rationem præsupponit electionem et electio dilectionem. Cujus ratio est, quia prædestinatio (ut dictum est) est pars providentiæ. Providentia autem sicut et prudentia est ratio in intellectu existens preceptia ordinationis aliquorem in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem præcipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem nisi præ existente voluntate finis. Unde prædestinatio aliquorum in salutem æternam præsupponit secundum rationem quod Deus illorum velit salutem. Ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio. Dilectio quidem in quantum vult eis hoc bonum salutis æternæ. Nam diligere est velle alicui bona ut supra dictum est. Electio autem in quantu hoc bonum aliquibus præ alliis vult cum quosdam reprobat ut supra dictum est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in Deo eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum sed ex bono præexistente incitamur ad diligendum et ideo eligimus aliquem quem diligamus. Et sic electio dilectionem præcedit in nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas ejus qua vult bonum alicui diligendo est causa quod illud bonum ab eo præ alliis habeatur. Et sic patet, quod dilectio præsupponitur electioni secundum rationem et electio predestinationi. Unde omnes prædestinati sunt electi et dilecti.—"Summa," P. I., qu. xxiii., art. 4.

NOTE F.

"Per Baptismum spiritualiter renasimur, per Confirmationem augemur in gratia et roboramur in fide; renati in autem et roborati, nutrimur divina Eucharistiæ alimonia Quod si per peccatum ægritudinem incurrimus animæ per Pœnitentiam spirituaſiter sana-

mur, spiritualiter etiam et corporaliter, prout animæ expedit, per extremam Unctionem Per Ordinem vero ecclesia gubernatur et multiplicatur spiritualiter per Matrimonium corporaliter augetur."—"Summa," P. III., qu. lxv., art. 1.

NOTE G.

"The ethical system of the Schoolmen, or, to speak more properly, of Aquinas, as the Moral Master of Christendom for three centuries, was in its practical part so excellent as to leave little need of extensive change with the inevitable exception of the connection of his religious opinions with his precepts and counsels. His Rule of Life is neither lax nor impracticable. His grounds of duty are solely laid in the nature of man and in the wellbeing of society. Such an intruder as Subtlety seldom strays into his moral instructions. With a most imperfect knowledge of the Peripatetic writings, he came near the Great Master by abstaining in practical philosophy from the unsuitable exercise of that faculty of distinction in which he would probably have shown that he was little inferior to Aristotle if he had been equally unrestrained. His very frequent coincidence with modern moralists is doubtless to be ascribed chiefly to the nature of the subject, but in part also to that unbroken succession of teachers and writers which preserved the observations contained in what had long been the text book of the European schools, after the books themselves had been for ages banished and forgotten. The praises bestowed on Aquinas by every one of the few great men who appear to have examined his writings since the downfall of his power, amongst whom may be mentioned Erasmus, Grotius, and Leibnitz, are chiefly, though not solely, referable to his ethical works."—*Mackintosh*, i., 48.

NOTE H.

"His name is familiar to every one as the representative of the class to which he belongs. That very familiarity is an evidence of the conspicuous place which he holds amongst the Theological Philosophers of the Middle Age. But we have been taught at the same time to associate his name with all that is dark in Religion or in Philosophy; and we are apt to think of him therefore with some degree of ridicule or contempt as unworthy of the serious inquiry of enlightened times. In truth, however, Aquinas, when impartially examined, will be found not to shrink from a comparison

with the philosophers of the brightest period of literature. If we are to judge of the Philosopher from the intrinsic powers of mind displayed, independently of the results attained by him, which chiefly depend on the concourse of favourable circumstances, then may Aquinas be placed in the first rank of Philosophy. If penetration of thought, comprehensiveness of views, exactness the most minute, an ardour of inquiry the most keen, a patience of pursuit the most unwearied, are among the merits of the Philosopher, then may Aquinas dispute even the first place among the candidates for the supremacy in speculative science."—*Hampden*, "Aquinas Encyc. Met.," xi., 793.

NOTE I.

Scholasticism throughout was mainly eclectic, and Aquinas fully represented its real spirit; the following extract presents a fair idea of it in this respect:—

"It was pure Idealism so far as Platonism predominated in it; it was Realism so far as the Logical or peculiarly Aristotelic character pervaded the system. Idealism describes the system itself as to the nature of the principles on which it was founded, Realism describes the Method of investigation pursued, the action of those Logical processes by which it explored the Truth. We may characterize Scholasticism truly by one or the other of these two designations according as we look to its internal nature, or to its Logical method of proceeding.

"The Scholastic Philosophy is the only system in which Idealism and Realism have completely coincided. Plato gave the name indeed of Dialectic to the Supreme Science; for the train of thought by which he arrived at his theory of Ideas naturally suggested that name as the designation of the Science of Ideas. . . . In Aristotle there is a great deal of Realism, especially in his Physical Philosophy, which is for the most part an assumed Science of Nature deduced from the abstractions of Language. At the same time his views are entirely adverse to Idealism, and no philosopher of antiquity has displayed so fully through his writings the scientific value of experience and observation. But in the Schoolmen Idealism and Realism go hand in hand. In them there is no proper appeal to experience and observation. The visible world is to them only a shadow and a type of the Metaphysical, a writing as it were in cipher to be read by the key of those recondite truths which exist in the secret chambers of the intellect. But their very business is

argumentation. And thus conclusions, indicating nothing more than connections of thought in the mind, are continually realized in their mode of speculation, applied, that is, as if they were indications of real connections of Nature. This Idealism and this Realism correspond with the mystical and the argumentative character which were combined in the system."—*Hampden*, "Aquinas Encyc. Met.," xi., p. 807.

CHAPTER XV.

THE SUBTLE DOCTOR—DUNS SCOTUS.

"The rude discursive thinker is the Scholastic. The true Scholastic is a mystical subtlist; out of logical atoms he builds his universe; he annihilates all living Nature to put an artifice of thoughts in its room. His aim is an infinite automaton. Opposite to him is the rude intuitive poet: this is a mystical macrologist; he hates rules and fixed form; a wild, violent life reigus instead of it in Na ure; all is animate, no law; wilfulness and wonder everywhere. He is merely dynamical. Thus does the philosophic spirit rise at first in altogether separate masses. In the *second* stage of culture these masses begin to come into contact, multifariously enough; and, as in the union of infinite extremes, the finite, the limited arises, so here also arise 'eclectic philosophers' without number, the time of misunderstanding begins. The most limited is in this stage the most important, the purest philosopher of the second stage. This class occupies itself wholly with the actual present world in the strictest sense. The philosophers of the first class look down with contempt on those of the second; say, they are a little of everything and do nothing hold their views as the results of weakness, as inconsequentism. On the contrary, the second class, in their turn, pity the first,—lay the blame on their visionary enthusiasm, which they say is absurd even to insanity."—NOVALIS, translated by *Carlyle*.

XV.

THE SUBTLE DOCTOR—DUNS SCOTUS.

DUNS SCOTUS was probably born about the year 1274. It was noted by the members of the Franciscan Order as a remarkable providence, that in the very year in which their most shining ornament, Bonaventura, was called from his earthly labours, one equally great and celebrated, who afterwards raised their fame still higher, was born. The place of his birth is involved in hopeless mystery, and has given rise to disputations as keen as those concerning the birthplace of Homer. Leland earnestly insists that England produced him, whilst Dempster published a quarto volume to prove, by twelve convincing arguments, his Scotch descent; and Wadding is more positive than either that to Ireland belonged the honour of giving him to the world. England claims him chiefly because he probably derived his name from the village of Dunston in Northumberland: Scotland, maybe, considers that the land which produced Hume, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton was alone able to produce so incomparable a logician as Duns; whilst Ireland, unable to produce better arguments than these, urges its suit with a vehemence, not to say abusiveness, which argues either an absence of proof, which must be supplied by an overflow of posi-

tiveness, or such abundance of it as to justify extreme dogmatism, but which, for an unknown reason, has been withheld from posterity. This unprofitable discussion may be fitly left to those who have no serious work to perform in life.

It is said that when he was a boy he attracted the attention of two Franciscan monks, who, struck with his abilities, received him into their convent at Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Thence he went to Oxford, and studied at Merton College. He manifested the most remarkable facility for gaining knowledge, and especially for the study of mathematics. On completing his education he took the chair of his master, William Varron, who removed to Paris; and his lectures displayed such profound learning and conspicuous ability, that pupils gathered round him in crowds. Not less than thirty thousand students flocked to listen to him, it is said; but this is difficult to digest.[1] From Oxford he went to Paris, in 1304, and after winning great fame by his lectures in the University, he received the degree of Doctor, and was appointed regent of the Theological school in 1307.

In his lectures in Paris he controverted several of the positions taken by Thomas Aquinas, but he won his fame chiefly by his defence of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. He discoursed on this subject before immense crowds of enthusiastic followers, scattering, so said his admirers, two hundred objections raised against the doctrine by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and other Church Fathers and Doctors. In 1307 he obtained the crowning glory of his life, for it is on solemn record that, after pleading the cause of the Virgin, while he bowed before her image in deep devo-

[1] Milman, "Hist. Lat. Christ.," ix., 141.

tion, she condescendingly bowed her head, and thus afforded him evidence of her pleasure and assistance. As a more tangible result of his marvellous performances, he received the singularly suitable title of "the Subtle Doctor," and a festival of the Virgin was instituted to signalise the exposition and triumph of his views. In 1308 he was sent to Cologne by the General of the Franciscan order. The circumstances of this appointment illustrate his perfect submission to the will of his superiors, and show how little he had allowed his intellectual triumphs to puff him up with vanity. On a certain day he had retired to some fields outside of the city, accompanied by some of his pupils, and was indulging with them in pleasant recreation. There the letter was delivered to him from the Superior of his Order commanding him to Cologne. Immediately, without hesitating for one moment, without conferring with flesh and blood, he started, bidding the friends with him a kind adieu, but not returning to his convent to collect his books or writings, or to take leave of his brethren. Those who were with him asked him if he would not return to say farewell to the brothers in the convent, and his reply shows the entire, if not slavish, obedience of his soul: "The Father-General tells me to go to Cologne, not to go and salute the brethren in the convent."[1]

The reasons dictating his removal from the scene of his unrivalled popularity and fame cannot be ascertained, although it is surmised that his presence in Cologne was required in a dispute with the Beghards, who were then beginning to rouse into rebellion against the Pope a portion of the Franciscan Order; but it is more likely that his labours in Cologne were to be

[1] "Duns Scoti, Vita a," L. Wadding, 11.

used in the promotion of an intended university there. When he arrived in the city he was received with great honour, the nobles, magistrates, and chief citizens all turning out to welcome him. He did not live long in his new abode; he died in November 1308, at the age of thirty-four years. The same mystery seems to shroud the manner of his death as the place of his birth. It was sudden and startling, undoubtedly; his enemies—for such a man could not but have enemies—affirmed that for some secret crime he was smitten by God with unconsciousness, and after being placed thus in his coffin, he died in struggling to break open the lid. His admirers said that he was in a trance, or divine ecstasy, and was thus encoffined alive. Perhaps the more true, though less romantic, account is that he died of apoplexy.

That Duns should have died so young and yet have accomplished so much has been a matter of scepticism with many writers, but there is no real ground for rejecting the statement of his biographers except the unlikelihood of it. Such thoughtful and careful writers as Hareau and Cousin adopt the account of his age without scruple. If indeed he was so young when death came to him, he presents the most remarkable instance of intellectual productiveness and industry in the history of the race. His works were very numerous; the principal edition of them was that published at Lyons in 1639, in twelve closely-printed folio volumes, edited by Luke Wadding, who also wrote a life of him, filled with ridiculous legends and miraculous fables. Besides the works included in this edition he issued many more, consisting of commentaries on some of the books of the Bible and numerous sermons. The editions of his books only contain his philosophical and contro-

versial writings, and these are more wonderful for their characteristic features than for their extent. They do not contain one superfluous word; they are unrelieved by a trace of illustration or metaphor; they are an interminable series of perfectly faultless logical reasonings. His mind possessed the power of exquisite discrimination, and was of uncommon solidity—it seemed to be a logical machine of consummate and unparalleled completeness; but whilst working with the order and precision of a machine, he was not therefore destitute of the sensibility and devoutness of a pious heart. The estimate formed of his logical power by the eloquent historian of Latin Christianity is not more than just:[1] "The mind of Duns might seem a wonderful reasoning machine; whatever was thrown into it came out in syllogisms of the coarsest pattern, yet in perfect, flawless pattern. Logic was the idol of Duns, and this logic worship is the key to his whole philosophy. Logic was asserted by him not to be an art but a science: ratiocination was not an instrument—a means of discovering truth—it was an ultimate end; its conclusions were truth, even his language was logic worship."

In point of style his writings are not admirable. The Latin tongue, which at the best is not the sweetest instrument of thought, degenerates with Duns into the harshest jargon. He does not scruple to invent words for himself when the old verbal signs do not satisfy him, and this fact alone makes his writings unreadable by any but experts. Professor Maurice seems to disagree with this opinion. He says: "We have not found his language so entirely rugged and uncouth as it is often represented to be. Aquinas in many respects was less difficult; all who desire to have

[1] Milman, "Hist. Lat. Christ.," ix., 141.

their intellectual food cooked for them will resort to him. Those who like to prepare it, and now and then to hunt it for themselves, will find their interest in accompanying Duns."[1] But this statement really concedes what it is written to deny; certainly his style is as far removed from the ease and purity of that of Erasmus as that of Erasmus was below that of Cicero. This, however, is not the worst fault in the mode of writing adopted by Duns; it was immeasurably below the manner of Aquinas in philosophic dignity and calmness. He indulges in the rudest epithets against his opponents; they are "the most vile hogs, the Saracens," "the asses the Manicheans:" and the high-minded, learned Arabian Aristotelian is "the cursed Averroes."

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, Ritter reckons him to have been the most acute, subtle, and able of the Schoolmen, a verdict which cannot be accepted as satisfactory. The genius of Aquinas was essentially constructive, that of Duns was polemical. He could better attack and demolish the teachings of others than build up a positive and harmonious system of his own. A constructive genius is of a higher class *per se* than a critical one. Then he accepted, with unreserved submission, the teachings of the Church and all metaphysical conclusions which accorded with its decisions; but he rejected the philosophical grounds on which preceding Schoolmen had sought to establish them, and received them only in obedience to the will of God and the authority of the Church. This spirit led him to deny the position of Aquinas, that reason and Revelation are two distinct sources of knowledge, affirming that there is no true knowledge of anything knowable

[1] "Mor. and Met. Phil.," i., 646.

apart from theology as based on the Christian Revelation. The antagonism between him and Aquinas, both on this and other subjects, was more apparent than real; he did not intend to divorce faith and reason, philosophy and theology—he believed in their perfect harmony—but he insisted that reason required to be supplemented in its conclusions by Revelation, and that philosophy to be true must be in agreement with the doctrine of the Church. Not only so, when many of his controversial statements are fairly weighed and subjected to all the modifying and alleviating considerations which gather around them, there is found to be not nearly so much difference between him and those who he is attacking as at first sight would appear. The antagonism between him and Aquinas resulted mainly from their constitutional difference: Duns was essentially a critic and a polemic, Aquinas was a philosopher; the two occupying, as one writer points out, a somewhat similar position to each other as Kant held to Leibnitz.[1]

Owing to a severe scientific and mathematical training, and possibly also to his Celtic nature, Duns was led to submit all the presumed proofs from philosophy in favour of theological dogmas to the most keen and microscopical examination, and hence recognised that many of them were not real proofs at all, and could not stand the test of rigorous scrutiny. In one respect, therefore, we must suppose that the movement of Duns was a movement backwards; the struggle of his great Scholastic predecessors had been to rescue Christian Dogma from the clutches of mere Church authority, and to establish it on philosophical grounds according to the method of Aristotle; a great gain to the freedom

[1] Ueberweg, "Hist. of Phil.," i., 454.

of human thought, as giving opportunity for growth and speculation, but still far from being the ultimate or right foundation on which Dogma must rest. Still when the keen critical faculty of Duns was exercised to show the insufficiency of such a basis with a view of carrying it back to Church authority and tradition, it only proves how unprepared the world was for the great forward movement still in the dim future, when Dogma should be shown to rest on the clear and simple statements of the Word of God.

On the subject of Universals, Duns differs little save in words from Aquinas. He was if anything more of a pure Realist and less of an Eclectic than he. He accepted the teaching of the previous Schoolmen concerning the threefold existence of Ideas, *ante rem*, *in re*, *post rem*, *i.e.*, as Forms in the Divine Mind, as the essences of things, and as concepts arising out of cognitions. He rejects a bare Nominalism, and says that Universals must have real being, as otherwise any knowledge coming through our concepts would be without a real object. All scientific knowledge relates to Universals, and unless therefore real existence belong to them, Science is a mere system of logic. But Duns differs from the elder Schoolmen on the relation of the Universal to the individual. He draws a distinction between the Universal and its Form, and between the individual and Matter, because the individual as the last reality only arises from the Universal by the addition of positive determinations, and indeed it is only when the individual nature is added that the Universal is crowned with completeness. As a judicious writer aptly puts his view —"Just as *animal* becomes *homo*, when to life the specific difference of *humanitas* is added, so *homo* becomes *Socrates*, when to

the generic and specific essence, the individual character, the *Socratitas*, is added."[1] Still, Duns strongly affirms that the One Efficient Principle which is the groundwork of his system is the exemplar of all Forms

"Forms which are united to Matter are the more perfect, the more particular they are. Separate the Form from the Matter, and the case becomes reversed. Then, the more Universal the Forms are, the simpler they are; the more simple they are, the more they have of action and perfection. The highest Form is the simplest, for it includes all others within itself. The perfect Being is the self-existent Whole. All other beings exist by participation of this Being. The doctrine that the Efficient Cause is the end which all created beings are created to seek is deduced from the effort of the soul itself. That, he describes as the ground of all *our* certainty. Our aspiration after an Infinite Good is the witness to us that that Good is, that it is the cause of our existence, that we are meant to participate in it."[2]

Duns complained that, perfect as the system of Aquinas was, it had one great defect in it. It had no real principle of individuation. He sought to discover, therefore, not only how all things conspire to one great whole, but how each thing becomes that identical and particular thing apart from all others. This no doubt was a very important question, and is really agitating the world of mind at present as profoundly as ever. Duns attributed more substance to Universals than Aquinas, whilst the latter carefully excluded Matter from Universals, and said it was the individualising principle in separate things. Duns boldly affirmed that Matter was supposed in all spiritual existences, God excepted, and that the Spiritual Form has its corresponding Matter just as Corporeal Form has that which pertains to it and brings it into reality.[3]

[1] Ueberweg "Hist. of Phil.," i., 455.
[2] Maurice, Mor. and Met. Phil.," i., 648.
[3] Note A.

In examining Duns' views of Christian doctrine, it will be found that he departed very widely on some points from Aquinas, and this gave occasion for the bitter and resounding controversies of the rival Schools of Thomists and Scotists in the succeeding centuries. He gave a clear and forcible account of the grounds of his belief in the Christian Revelation, summing them up in the following particulars: the pre-announcement of great events, the entire concord existing among the several parts of Scripture, the tone of authority used by the writers, the diligence of those who received the Divine Unction, the agreeableness of the Gospel with reason, its freedom from all unreasonable errors, the celebrity of its miracles, and the stability of the Church. On each of these points he enlarges in a very succinct manner.

In treating of the Existence of God, he sought to show the unsatisfactory nature of the presumed arguments used by Anselm and Aquinas, urging that the doctrine of the Divine Existence was incapable of being proved, and that the Nature of God could not be comprehended. He urged that the manifestations which God made of Himself to the soul of man could alone satisfy the mind concerning His Existence. He insisted that the fact of His Existence is not proved from the mere idea which the mind entertains of Him, and that the argument, *à priori*, was equally invalid. He indeed held that there must be an ultimate cause of all things, which is also the ultimate end of all things, and that this is God; but he denied that this conclusion can be reached by any process of pure logic. He said that as man is created in the image of God, he may, by self-contemplation, enter on a course of life, the way of excellence, which will lead him to a knowledge of

God. He differed from Aquinas in his view that God could only be known through such manifestations as He might make known to man, and held that such knowledge as he had of the Divine Being was positive and direct. This subject was extensively debated in the rival Schools of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and at length subsided into a generally admitted theory that man has a direct apprehension of the Divine Nature, and not a mere knowledge of His Accidents or Habit, but that it is not an adequate or thorough knowledge of Him.

In writing concerning the Attributes of God, Duns was led to express opinions which brought him into decided difference with the leading Schoolmen. They had taught in reference to the Will of God that He is free in regard to all which is not an essential attribute of His Nature, as in those things which are finite, relative, and accidental; but that respecting His Essential Being and Perfections, all things are necessitated. Duns strongly controverted this position; he affirmed the entire freedom of the Divine Will in all things; he said that the whole method of man's Salvation, both as regards the Divine provision for it and the condition of its bestowment, was regulated by the Will of God. God migh not have exercised His creating power; He might in effecting an atonement for sin have assumed some other nature than that of man's; the sufferings of Christ were not a necessity, but were accepted by God as an equivalent which could be placed to the believer's credit, and thus free him from the results of his disobedience. He ventured even further than this; and whereas Aquinas, with some others of the School, taught that God ordains what is right because it is right, Duns insisted that right

became such when and because God commands it. He thus gives the Divine Will pre-eminent authority over all other Attributes and Perfections in the Divine Nature.[1] Ritter considers that in the outcome of their arguments Aquinas and Scotus are not widely different, as each of them introduces so many alleviating considerations which tone the apparent divergencies of their views into moderate harmony. He says: "One defines away necessity until it ceases to be necessity; the other fetters free will till it ceases to be free."[2]

The opinions professed by Duns upon the Will of God necessarily moulded his opinions on the nature of man. He held that man in his various powers and in the constitution of his being was the image of God; therefore the commanding position he assigned to the Will in the Divine he gave to it also in human nature. He adopted as the foundation of his psychology the axiom, "the will is superior to the intellect." This doctrine naturally influenced his views of the method of man's salvation, which laid him open to the charge of a tendency towards Pelagianism. Taking portions of his theological teaching and considering them without reference to his system, this charge would seem to be well founded; but on the other hand he so vehemently and persistently taught the sufficiency of Divine grace in the salvation of the sinner as to greatly neutralize the charge.

Holding that the Will of God in relation to this world is the primary and fundamental element in God, and that in relation to mankind He is absolutely arbitrary, and that we are relatively arbitrary owing

[1] Note B.
[2] Ritter, quoted by Milman, ix., 145.

allegiance to Him as Lord, it was not possible but that his views on the Incarnation of the Word, and the Atonement offered by the Lord Jesus, would be seriously affected. Believing, as above stated, that the Divine Will is far above every kind of necessity, he questioned whether either the Incarnation or Atonement were necessary at all, and urged that the work of Redemption might have been accomplished by an angel or a man, if it had pleased the Divine Will to have accepted such an offering as sufficient. In dealing with the subject of the Incarnation, he attributed more real significance to it than did Aquinas; he said the Humanity of Christ was a full personality, in that it possessed entire independence of personalities external to itself, and by many subtilties he laboured to show how an union between the Divine and human natures was possible. He sought to demonstrate that the human nature of Christ would have attained personality without union with the Word; that it would by its sheer power of will have cast its entire dependence on God, and that this it was which really enabled the human nature to become so really united with the Word. Despite the false reasonings and assumptions of this theory,[1] he evidently believed that Christ had a real human personality, not removed beyond the reach of human experience, as was attributed to Him by Aquinas. On the contrary, Duns said that His humanity underwent a process of growth both as regards knowledge and will, and that He endured suffering both of body and mind This susceptibility to suffering he explained by saying that the higher glory of Christ did not penetrate the lower powers so as to prevent them having the experience

[1] Dorner, "Person of Christ," div. ii., vol. i., 345.

natural to humanity. Still, his theory is vitiated, and the Incarnation deprived of much of its virtue and attraction by the original position assumed by him, that it is not the expression of the Love or Wisdom or Justice of Christ, but simply of His absolute, arbitrary, indeterminate Will, which as the expression of His Power is without heart or sympathy. He argued further that the Incarnation would have taken place even if man had not fallen, because it was willed not at the instance of another, but from the beginning and as a Divine end and aim. Christ was an end in Himself and not for humanity. He was the expression of humanity as God willed it, and as God wills the end before He wills the means so He willed the Incarnation of the Word as expressing His highest purpose in regard to man even before His foreknowledge of sin. It will be seen how this still further interferes with the close sympathy of Christ with humanity, as His assumption of human nature is not an interference by God to rescue a perishing world, but only an outward expression of His Will in regard to the final glorification of His grace. Logically, Duns' theory must have led him to the conclusion that the absolute freedom of God enabled Him at any time to take back the Creation and the God-man, and also that such an arbitrary exercise of Will would be an expression of Infinite Goodness, since what He wills is the measure and criterion of Goodness. But yet again he seeks to guard himself against this legitimate conclusion by postulating that as God has become Incarnate such an alteration has become impossible. But how impossible? If the foundation idea in God be that of absolute freedom and power, why should the Incarnation limit the exercise of that freedom? Duns thus

stipulates for the Infinite Liberty of God, and then binds Him in the rigid and inevitable bonds of facts, as firmly as the most extreme fatalist could have done. It is impossible to follow him through all his mazes and contradictions on this important subject; he was himself aware of some of his anomalous positions, and refused to follow where his logic would have inevitably led him.

His treatment of the subject of the Atonement was conditioned by his views of the Incarnation. He controverted the principal and favourite argument of Anselm as to the superabounding merit of the death of Jesus as a sacrifice for sin, and its being required as a satisfaction to Divine Justice. He said that the death of Jesus had not infinite merit, that it was only the human nature that suffered, and that it was only accepted as an atonement for sin by the Will of God. Thus he gave the sufferings of Christ a very inferior place in his system to that given them by Aquinas, and in fact lost the essential idea of Atonement altogether.

Duns exercised an important influence in the history of Church dogma, when he advocated, with great learning and eloquence, the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. A growing tendency in favour of this doctrine had been evident for some time, but many of the le ding theologians of the Church had refused to receive it. Bernard of Clarvaux had written energetically against it, stating that whilst Mary might have been sanctified in the womb, that she was not therefore free from original sin, and even intimated that the view he opposed, whilst not honouring Mary, was dishonouring to her wondrous Son.[1] In this view Bernard was followed by Albertus, Bonaventura, Anselm, Peter

[1] S. Bernardi, "Opera. Ep. 174, ad Canon," p. 1537.

Lombard, Alexander Hales, and Aquinas, who were followed by the whole line of Dominican monks; but Duns, with marvellous ingenuity and power, sought to prove that greater honour was done to Jesus by his view, inasmuch as He had Himself conferred this distinction on the Virgin by a prevenient virtue resting upon her even in the womb. He said that as God blots out original sin every day by baptism, He can do it as well in the moment of conception. He first promulgated his views with caution, and urged that the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin was possible and probable; and then, waxing bolder, he proclaimed it in the manner described in previous pages, with the effect of leading the University of Paris to identify its teaching with his views on this subject. So, at least, Wadding, his biographer, declares. The account is treated dubiously by some Church historians, although Perrone admits that he demolished the arguments of his opponents in a manner that was truly astonishing. From his day the doctrine grew, though not without numberless and bitter contests, into increasing favour with the Papal Court, until, in 1854, Pope Pius IX. declared it to be an article of faith in the Catholic Church essential to salvation. He held the doctrine of predestination in a very unqualified form, and sought to reconcile his theory of free will with that of necessity, by representing that the Divine Decree was not anticipatory as to time, but was immediately related to the action of the created will. Holding the view that only will could affect will, he combated the opinion of Aquinas, that the understanding guided or affected the will, and was led to adopt a very rigid theory concerning the operation of Divine grace.

He was the most strenuous supporter of Church

authority amongst the Schoolmen, and sought to subject all the knowledges to its dictum, thus exerting an influence diametrically opposite to the great Schoolmen from Anselm down to his day.

In psychology Duns took an important place, introducing and discussing some questions which are heard of in the heated discussions of the nineteenth century. He deals at great length with the question whether the Intellect apprehends external things directly as do the Senses, and if so, whether they are the same apprehensions as those of the Senses. He argues that the Intellect forms an image of the external object which is not it, but simply an abstraction of it, whereas the Senses are directly cognisant of it. The Senses *experience* the external, the Intellect *knows* it. But he says the latter is higher than the former, and really includes it; it does not simply substitute an abstraction of its own creation of what the eye can see, but it enters more thoroughly into the essential nature of it than the Sense can do. The living apprehension is *in* the intellect but *through* the Senses; it does not depend, however, on the appearance the external object may present to the Senses, but penetrates to the reality. He further argues that Species are given to the Intellect. It is only thus that it is delivered from mere phantasms, that it has the power of turning to pure and real Species and escaping from the erroneous proportions in things to which it would be subject if it were the prey of any phantasms which the Sense presented to it. The memory retains the Species before the Intellect when the object is absent, and he concludes that the mind is acquainted with itself and its operations. not by a Species impressed on it, as in external things, but a Species expressed from it. It has an

intuitive knowledge of itself. Stripped of the subtle and bewildering reasonings of Duns, his system seems to identify him with the Realists, although, as will be seen afterwards, his system contained much that aided in arousing the slumbering Nominalism which asserted itself so powerfully in the succeeding Scholastic ages. Literally he might be classed with those philosophers described by Sir W. Hamilton as Cosmothetic Idealists, and be placed in the category of those who view in the immediate object of perception a representative entity present to the mind, but not a mere mental modification, and thus was a forerunner of Malebranche, Berkeley, and others, whose systems logically led to Idealism. In one important respect also Duns anticipated Locke, viz., in his fundamental principle that all knowledge is derived through the double medium of sense and reflection, and even enounced it in a manner far more correct than Locke himself.[1] In the discussion also of the question whether the mind can be conscious of more than a single object at the same time, Duns anticipated the views of nearly all the leading modern philosophers by answering in the affirmative, in opposition to Aquinas and all the leading Schoolmen.

Notwithstanding the probable drawbacks of his system, Duns did good service to the cause of Christian truth by his powerful criticisms of the rigidness of opposing systems, and also gave clearer expression of the realness of Christ's human nature and of the ethical character of the Atonement than had yet been afforded.

"Between his Scholasticism and the Romanic Scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, there is indeed this distinction: that in the former clearer traces are discernible of the ethical tenden-

[1] Hamilton, "Met.," i., 235.

cies which distinguish the Germanic mind. Scotus presents to us the picture of a vigorous wrestling mind in which a new principle travails into birth, still struggling with the chains imposed upon it by the antagonistic principle which had held sway. Whereas previously the theoretical and physical necessity and nature (essence) had held almost undisputed sway, he now puts forth the claims of free will, though his mode of doing so is marked by abruptness and exclusiveness."[1]

With this estimate of Duns all competent authorities agree. Cousin says of him: "He possessed a mind of a fine and durable temper, and uncommon solidity." "Less a moralist than Thomas Aquinas, he was a greater dialectician;"[2] whilst another writer, not given to unduly praise writers of his School, declares of him: "His subtilty in general was not used to confuse principles and to make the worst appear the better reason, but to bring out distinctions which are of real value, and which the metaphysicians of the latest periods cannot afford to overlook."[3]

He was rightly named by the crowds that flocked round him in Paris and Cologne the Subtle Doctor; he made distinctions and definitions until he seemed to bewilder himself, but his erudition, his patience, his industry, and his dialectic skill, have not had a compeer altogether in European literature. The services he rendered to the cause of psychology and theology have never been fairly acknowledged; by giving extreme and undue prominence to one principle, which had been almost entirely overlooked by his predecessors, he banished others equally as important into the shade, and thus vitiated his whole system as a system, but he undoubtedly drew attention to some points which have

[1] Dorner, Div. II., vol. i., 346.
[2] Cousin, "Mod. Phil.," vii., 21.
[3] Maurice, "Mor. and Met. Phil.," i., 646.

never since lost their hold in philosophy or dogma, and which have tended to give increased richness and fulness to each of them. Had his genius been less critical and more philosophic, less merely microscopic and more comprehensive, he might have exercised an influence in no degree less mighty than his great Dominican rival.

NOTE A.

It was stated in the sketch of Duns' life that his writings were unrelieved by any attempt at illustration. One exception must be made to that remark. He seeks to explain his position in relation to form and matter by the following figure:—"It appears that the world is a very beautiful tree whereof the root and seed store is the primary matter; the moving leaves are accidents and contingencies; the boughs and branches are all things which are liable to decay; the flower is the rational nature; the fruit is that same in its perfection, the angelical nature. That which alone forms this seed and directs its unfolding from the beginning is the word of God, either by its immediate operation, as in the case of the Heavens, the Angels, and the rational soul, or mediately through such agents as work in the production of whatever is subject to birth and to death. True it is, that in the first root of this primary matter nothing is distinct. Then at once the root is divided into two branches, the corporeal and the spiritual. The spiritual branch is distinguished into three hierarchies; each of these into three orders, each order into thousands of thousands of Angels. A portion of these branches, being shaken by a blast of pride, was dried up at the beginning of the world. The corporeal creation contains two branches, the corruptible and the incorruptible, each of which has manifold offshoots. Thus the unity of the universe in its various elements is evolved at last out of this indeterminate matter. —*Maurice*, "Mor. and Met. Phil.," i., 651.

NOTE B.

His attempt to reconcile foreknowledge with contingency is a remarkable example of the power of human subtlety to keep up the appearance of a struggle, where it is impossible to make one real effort (Opera Lugdun, 1639, vol. v, p. 1320-27). But the most

dangerous of all the deviations of Scotus from the system of Aquinas is, that he opened the way to the opinion that the distinction of right and wrong depends on the mere will of the Eternal Mind. The absolute power of the Deity, according to him, extends to all but contradictions. His regular power, *ordinata*, is exercised conformably to an order established by Himself : si placet voluntati, sub qua libera est, recta est lex."—*Sir J. Mackintosh*, Works, i., 279

CHAPTER XVI.

THE INVINCIBLE DOCTOR—WILLIAM OF OCKAM.

"He knew what's what, and that's as high
As metaphysic wit can fly;
In school divinity as able,
As he that's hight irrefragable—
A second Thomas, or at once,
To name them all, another Dunse;
Profound in all the Nominal,
And Real ways beyond them all;
For he a rope of sand could twist
As tough as learned Sorbonist."

S. Butler.

XVI.

THE INVINCIBLE DOCTOR—WILLIAM OF OCKAM.

NOTHING is known of the parentage or early life of the great Schoolman now to be considered, William of Ockam. He was probably born about the year 1280, in the village of Ockam, in Surrey, from which he took his name. Whatever may have been the character of his early training, he seems to have had an unusually plastic mind, and as the times were strangely stirring, all the peculiarly English qualities of his nature were called into exercise. He is first mentioned in history as a student at Oxford, and then as attending the lectures of Duns Scotus at Paris. Here he afterwards became a master, and lectured on many subjects in theology and philosophy. He was a man of unusually broad sympathies, and was concerned about many interests; he was a warm politician; he was profoundly versed in theology; he was a born logician, and whatever subject he touched he felt himself in warm accord with it, and wrote on it with great force and clearness. The times were most exciting, and Ockam suffered himself to be carried into their rapid swim. In 1305 the temporal power of the Papacy sustained an enormous check by the Pope becoming subject to the influence of France, followed

by the removal of the Papal Court from Rome to Avignon, a neighbourhood as lovely as a Paradise, but far removed from the heart of public affairs. Not only so, the outward magnificence manifested by the successors of St. Peter, the humble fisherman of Galilee, was so infinitely lavish, that every means had to be used to extort money from the faithful in all parts of the Church. In 1316 Pope John XXII. assumed the Papal throne after the Church had been in the anomalous position of being without a Head for two years and four months in consequence of the violent quarrels of the French and Italian Cardinals. Clement V. had been venal and rapacious to an extraordinary degree, and his subjects were exasperated by his extortions, but he was surpassed by his successor John to such an extent that Italian historians testify that in his lust for money he ground the people severely, he practised simony so unblushingly that he sold Church benefices openly in the market.[1] This shameful truckster in ecclesiastical merchandise sought to console himself for his subordination to France by a fierce absolutism in relation to Germany. When a contest arose between the Archduke Frederick of Austria and Louis the Duke of Bavaria, for the crown of Emperor, he exerted all his energy to secure the decision of the contest for himself. After seven years of civil war, which drained the contending States of their blood and treasure, victory declared itself with the Duke of Bavaria, and he assumed the title of Emperor Louis IV. The Pope was frantic with rage that events had decided themselves without his manipulation or arbitration, and he

[1] Questi fu homo molto cupido di moneta e simoniaco che aqui beneficio per moneta in sua corte si vendea, etc.—Villani, "Hist. Fiorent," lib. ix. 59. Quoted Hardwick, "Middle Ages," 345.

indulged an unrelenting animosity against Louis, which led the new Emperor to form an alliance with the opponents of the temporal power of the Papacy, ther existing in great force in many countries, but chiefly consisting of the great Ghibelline party, against whom the Guolphs were indulging their merciless vendetta.

John launched his excommunication against the Emperor, and laid under stern interdict those portions of Germany which acknowledged his supremacy. Louis demanded that a General Council should be summoned where the matters in dispute between him and the Pope could be discussed and settled. The clangour and clash of controversy which raged at this time exceeds description; the interdict was observed in some places and not in others, and in some districts where the partisans of the Pope attempted to observe it the adherents of Louis rose up and expelled the recusants. Amidst the din and dust of the prevailing disorder there were some brave and noble voices raised in behalf of Louis, and arguing against the assumptions of the Pope in the warmest manner. Prominent amongst these were Marsilius of Padua, physician and religious teacher of Louis, who wrote the *Defensor Pacis;* and Michael Ceseno, a Franciscan monk, who affirmed the principle of absolute poverty in the boldest terms. The *Defensor Pacis* aimed to show that as Church and State had each its own natural province, their limits should be fixed and thus peace definitely settled between them. The popularity and influence of this book were amazing, and it aided much in preparing the way for the prevalence of views which not only revolted from the excesses of the Papacy, but undermined its whole foundation.

No one entered more enthusiastically into the great conflicts of the day than William of Ockam. Nothing can be said as to the growth of his mind in favour of the view that the Church should only be concerned with the control of things spiritual. But he was passionately aroused in opposition to the pride and sordidness of the dignitaries of the Church; he had been appointed head of the Franciscan Order in England, and strongly condemned the growing love of wealth in the Mendicant Orders; he even disapproved of the enormous sums of money which were being expended over the church building to memorialise the Founder of his Order, St. Francis of Assisi. Nor was this all. He took up and urged with the utmost boldness the rights of emperors and kings as against the claims of the Pope to temporal dominion. He issued a work called, "The Defence of Poverty," which was the most clear, logical, and powerful of all the productions of the day on the Papal disputes, and which astonished the whole of Christendom by the sheer audacity with which it opposed the pretensions of John. The Pope commanded two Bishops to examine the book and pass condemnation upon it. and Ockam, with two friends like-minded with himself, was seized and placed in confinement in Avignon. They mignt surely anticipate speedy death if they remained long in the hands of enemies so bitter and unscrupulous. They watched for an opportunity, and then escaped to Aiques Montes, taking ship to Germany and seeking refuge in the Court of Louis. Ockam addressed the Emperor in the well-known words, "Thou defend me by the sword and I will defend thee by the pen."[1] In this refuge he felt he could safely treat with contempt the

[1] "Tu me defendas gladio, ego te defendam calamo."

threats and fulminations of the Pope, and he issued two works on the current controversies, one of them, it is said, being composed in ninety days, both of which showed such independence of mind, such subtilty of logic, and such powerful reasoning, as to produce a profound impression on the public mind. They showed as burning a hatred to the Papacy as a temporal dominion as was ever manifested by Martin Luther; they are held in high esteem, even to this day, and are carefully treasured in the choicest libraries. Selden, whose learning and judicial calmness peculiarly fitted him to give an opinion, testifies—and as coming from a Protestant such a testimony should carry considerable weight—that his works were "the best that had been written in former ages on the Ecclesiastical Power." He lived in the protection and favour of Louis for some years, condemned by the Pope, disowned by Franciscans; almost flooded with sentences of heresy, deprivation, and imprisonment, for which he recked nothing, but pursued his course, stedfastly and earnestly devoting himself to the composition of works which were to make his name more famous as a dialectician than it was as an ecclesiastical reformer. He accompanied the Emperor in his descent upon Italy, with its brilliant success, followed by its discouragements and disastrous failure; then returned with him to his Court at Munich, where he ended his days in 1347. He was called by his followers "the Invincible Doctor" on account of the fearless tone he preserved both in his political and philosophical writings; and also "the Venerable Founder," because he re-established Nominalism on a new and more enduring basis. He became the real leader of the reforming tendencies of the times, and gave a decided

impulse to the philosophical thought of Europe on the sensational side.

William had studied under Duns at Paris, and was never able to divest himself of the influences such a powerful mind could not fail to exert on one equally powerful, but more responsive. Especially he was unfortunate in imbibing the obnoxious and vitiating principle which had corrupted the teaching of his master at the very root, and which also interfered materially with the teachings of the pupil, viz., that the distinctions of right and wrong depend not on the nature of God, but on His arbitrary will. He even went beyond Duns, and made the startling assertion that "moral evil was only evil because it was prohibited," and again that "if God had commanded His creatures to hate Himself, hatred of God would have been praiseworthy."[1]

The Realists amongst the Schoolmen had taught, as has been shown, that there were eternal and immutable Ideas of right and wrong in the Divine Mind, and on this basis they built an ethical system which has been accepted as irrefragable by the great body of Moral Philosophers throughout Christendom; but the ground on which Duns and Ockam based morality removes the foundations of moral government entirely. Cudworth affirms their opinions to be practically equivalent to Atheism. The verdict of the sober and learned Sir J. Mackintosh is:—

"As all devotional feelings have moral qualities for their object, as no being can inspire love or reverence otherwise than by those qualities which are naturally amicable or venerable, this doctrine would, if men were consistent, extinguish piety, or, in other words, annihilate religion."[2]

[1] Mackintosh, Works, i., 280. [2] *Ibid*, i., 41.

In dealing with the question which really lay at the root of all the controversies of the Schoolmen, viz., Universals, Ockam boldly and with great ingenuity argued that they were simply and only *post rem.* He rejected Realism utterly by the application of the principle which has since become a familiar adage in the study of philosophy, "Entities are not to be multiplied except by necessity."[1] He accordingly denied the hypostatic existence of abstractions. He said that even supposing that our knowledge rests on Universal conceptions, the Universal does not necessarily exist. To attribute real existence to the Universal leads on every hand to inextricable difficulty. He therefore strongly urges that the Universal does not exist either in things or before things, but simply after things, or as the product of the thinking mind; it is "a mental conception signifying univocally several singulars."[2] Even in the mind this conception does not exist substantially. It is a mere conception *in* the mind, and out of it, it is a mere word, a sign; but while a sign not a sacrament,[3] not representing anything invisible or eternal, but simply a representation to the inward consciousness, and in the external expression a word or a sign. This was Nominalism in its barest and purest form, and Ockam applied the same line of reasoning to both God and man. The Ideas, which Plato taught existed independently in the Mind of God, and which the Realists had believed, not as existing independently, but as types and patterns of visible and created things, he rejected, and declared the

[1] "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."

[2] "Conceptis mentis significans univoce, plura, singularis." —Ueberweg, "Hist. of Phil.," i., 462.

[3] Note A.

Ideas were simply the knowledge God had of particular things, as these are the only real existences.[1] He thus sought to frame a theory of the Divine Being's knowledge of things upon the pattern he had devised of human knowledge.

Ockam's Nominalism led him to the conclusion that the so-called Universals were signs which might be applied with equal propriety to any one out of a number of individual objects. In this he anticipated the teaching of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and Condillac, and also possibly suggested to Horne Tooke his theory of Words, which that philologist reduced to an extreme littleness of signification, which Ockam would have repudiated.

He also insisted that we have no experience of the human mind beyond what can be known from the experience of its operations, and thus he cast out from his range of enquiry all subjects relating to the thinking principle.[2] The mind, he said, was one in nature, holding with Duns and other Schoolmen of a later day, in opposition to Aquinas, that there was no real difference between the various faculties, or between the faculties and the mind, the distinctions usually made of the mental faculties being only formal or logical. He divided the cognitions of the mind into two kinds, intuitive and abstractive. Man knows by the senses the individuals from which all his knowledge comes; from the senses comes memory, from memory experience, and through experience the Universal, which becomes the foundation of all science. He was either the originator of the celebrated maxim, or enforced it more thoroughly than any other Schoolman :—"There is nothing in the understanding that was not previously

[1] Note B. [2] Note C.

in the senses." He understands by intuitive knowledge a knowledge by which we know whether a thing is or is not. The judgment then is passed upon the cognition by the intellect. The mind apprehends first, judges afterwards. Abstract knowledge is that which arises from the discrimination and comparison of objects presented through the senses.[1] Thus, really, he taught a similar doctrine to Locke's, which defined sense and reflection as the sources of all knowledge; and indeed Sir W. Hamilton affirms that he and other Scholastics made this distinction with more correctness than the great modern philosopher.

Ockam has won for himself great praise and renown for the bold and clear manner with which he reasoned against the universally received doctrine of sensible and intelligible species, or appearances of things which are the immediate objects of the mind when it perceives or thinks. These images or likenesses were held to be contemplated by the senses and the understanding, and to be necessary to perception and mental apprehension. The views of Ockam were put with even greater clearness by Gabriel Biel, his follower, than by himself. Biel has survived the lapse of centuries, not by any original power of thinking which he possessed, but solely by the remarkably clear and systematic style in which he expressed the principles of Nominalism. He says —

"A species was the similitude or image of a thing known naturally, remaining in the mind after it ceases to be the object of actual knowledge, or otherwise that likeness of a thing which is a previous condition of knowledge, which excites knowledge of the understanding, and which may remain in the absence of the thing represented."[2]

[1] Note D.

[2] G. Biel, ii., Sent., quoted by Tenneman, "Hist. of Phil."

Ockam affirmed that such species, moving from the object to the organ of sense, were supposed necessary on the ground that what moves must be in contact with what is moved. This position he stoutly denies; he quotes the instance of the loadstone which attracts iron to it without touching it. He said nothing was necessary to sensation save the power of sensation and the thing which is its object. Intermediate beings he discarded as being inventions of the imagination. They were mere chimeras, which had ruled men's minds since Democritus had propagated them under the name of εἴδωλα to the phantasms of Aquinas or the impressions, as of a seal, of Duns.

Thus Ockam raised in the mediæval age the warfare of Arcesilaus against the Stoics, and anticipated the battle which Reid fought on the principles of common sense in the eighteenth century.

His line of reasoning led him necessarily to reject the "intelligible species." He denied not only the reality of what was understood as the opinion of Aristotle concerning the species which moved from outward objects to the organs of sense, but also the Ideal Theory which has been credited to Descartes and all thinkers who have followed him in teaching the actual resemblance of our thoughts to outward things, thereby opening the way for the extreme idealism of Berkeley on the one hand and for the scepticism of Hume on the other. If Ockam's rejection of the doctrine that images or likenesses of things are necessary to perception, and his teaching that nothing can be known of mind but its operations, be carefully considered, in connection with the growing disregard of ecclesiastical authority as evidenced by Dante, and the tendencies towards the investigation of nature by Roger

Bacon, it will be found that already indications were manifesting themselves that in a future day an independent philosophy must arise which would be built by reason on the foundation of experience. Mr. Stewart considers[1] that, by his rejection of the doctrine of species, Ockam escaped the rock on which many philosophers have struck, and have been thereby plunged into scepticism. On this it is possible Mr. Stewart misunderstood some modern writers in their use of such terms as image, likeness, and resemblance, as it does not appear that they were ever applied by later writers to Ideas,[2] but were used only as illustrations or metaphors.

The theological position of Ockam is even less satisfactory than his philosophical. He was led to affirm that there can be no immediate perception of God by the human mind, and also rejects all the arguments, ontological, *à priori*, *à posteriori*, used by his predecessors in order to prove the Divine existence. Our knowledge of God comes in the same way as all abstractive knowledge of which the mind is cognisant. Being conscious of personality or individuality by coming into contact with men, the mind forms a concept of personality which it exalts into God, and which it endows with attributes and perfections the counterparts of those which it finds in man. He was led into the most extraordinary statements on this subject. It was impossible to prove by reason that there was only one God, a series of finite causes does not necessarily imply a First Cause, it is quite conceivable that there should be a number of worlds with separate Authors, and other opinions equally strange were soberly advanced by him. He said that knowing substances only through their

[1] Dissert. Encyc. Britt., ed. viii. [2] Note E.

attributes we can have no knowledge whatever of substances. This was true of the soul of man as well as of God. The mind may observe its qualities and frame conclusions concerning the substance from them, but of it in itself we can have no certain knowledge. The *Substans*, that which is below the qualities being thus unknown in itself, it may be simply a natural or material existence[1] and thus the immateriality or immortality of the soul cannot be ascertained. Therefore the exercise of faith is brought in, to whose grasp the region of real existence and real substances must be relegated. Here again Ockam and Locke join hands in the adoption of a principle which must lead to a philosophy of pure sensationalism, for "if there be no substance without attributes, then an attribute of a certain character being given, a substance of a nature opposed to the character of this attribute is necessarily excluded; thought being given as a fundamental attribute, a material substance is thereby excluded from thought."[2]

Ockam professed the most rigid orthodoxy on the doctrines of religion, and yet he held views on some points which led inevitably to scepticism. He held that no doctrine could be proved by reason, but was simply a matter for faith; so that according to him a *rational* theology could not be established. He admits the probability that the Three Persons in the Godhead have each the fulness of the Divine Essence; but states that on this and kindred subjects we must be entirely dependent on the statements of Scripture and of Church tradition. So far was he from seeking to reconcile Christian doctrine with reason or philosophy, that he affirmed the existence of two mutually contradictory kinds of truth, and thus opened a way for himself and

[1] Note F. [2] Cousin, "Hist. of Mod. Phil.," ii., 27.

his followers to profess a fervent submission to Church Authority, and still receive the findings of their philosophies.

Ockam was extremely reserved upon the great doctrines of the Christian faith; but he was led to deal with the tenet of Transubstantiation, and sought to justify its reception. He tried even to argue for it on philosophical principles, by seeking to show that Aristotle was wrong in affirming that a body could not move in two opposite directions at the same time. He admitted that the arguments of Thomas Aquinas in favour of the doctrine were insufficient, and even said that the statement of the New Testament, that the Body of Jesus was taken, did not prove it, as there were other ways of interpreting that statement. But inasmuch as the Church nad in solemn Council assembled affirmed the doctrine so definitely, its decision must have proceeded from a revelation. He also said that the Body of Christ could be contained in the elements in the same manner that soul and body occupy one and the same space at the same time; as the soul exists in every body, so Christ exists wholly in every single host.

The boldly sensational and decidedly empirical teachings of Ockam, both in theology and philosophy, roused many vigorous controversies, in which the leading thinkers of succeeding generations earnestly engaged. Henry le Grand, the Solemn Doctor (ob. 1293); Walter Burleigh, the Perspicuous Doctor (flourished 1337); Thomas Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury (ob. 1439); and Thomas of Strasburg (ob. 1357), ably defended the cause of Realism; whilst Durand de Saint Pourcain, the Resolute Doctor (ob. 1333); Jean Buridan de Bethune (ob. 1358); Cardinal Piérre

D'Ailly (ob. 1425); and Gabriel Biel, 1495, as firmly sustained the cause of Nominalism. It is not the province of this book to speak of these controversies at length; they are summed up sufficiently in these words of Victor Cousin:—

"The controversy represents very well the struggle of empiricism and idealism. It was sustained on both sides with much talent and skill, and both parties enlisted very commendable names; it continued nearly a century. Nothing else than scepticism could have sprung from it. But what scepticism could there be in the middle age? The human mind had not arrived at that degree of independence which enabled it to question the basis itself—that is, theology; scepticism could then only fall on the form, that is, scholastic philosophy, and it completely destroyed it. Hence the great decrial of Scholasticism among all the good spirits of the fifteenth century, and hence still the formation of a new system—of that system which we have hitherto seen issuing after scepticism, from the struggle between sensualism and idealism, I mean mysticism."[1]

The ground Ockam took in his works on the public events of the day constituted him the Reformer of the School. If Aquinas be reckoned the Philosopher, Bonaventura the Mystic, Duns the Logician, Roger Bacon the Scientist, then certainly Ockam may justly be reckoned the Reformer of the Scholastic movement. He courageously affirmed not only that the Pope had no right to interfere in matters of temporal interest or concern, but also that he was not to be trusted as infallible even in doctrinal matters. Many shared these opinions with him; but he seemed to surpass all his contemporaries in his reforming tendencies, for he even disputed the right of a General Council to be considered a Court of Final Appeal. This was anticipating the Reformers of the fifteenth century in a

[1] "Hist. of Mod. Phil.," ii., 30.

remarkable manner. He went further even than this in his boldness of opinion. He ventured to discard all human authority as being binding on his will and conscience. He disowned even the teaching of his master, and took a more daring stand in this direction than any man since the downfall of Ancient Philosophy. He said: "I do not support this opinion because he (Duns) lays it down, but because I think it true, and therefore if he has declared elsewhere the opposite, I care not." Such were his words; in the full exercise of the right of private judgment in the present century, such a vaunt would be the outcome of an empty mind, but as coming from a Franciscan monk of the fourteenth century, it was as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, "Prepare ye the way of the Lord," a sound more precious and important than scientific discovery or mechanical invention, because it was the harbinger of a condition of mind which carried in itself the secret of all human progress and intellectual expansion, and which would open out a path in which both Roger Bacon and Martin Luther might lead numberless throngs of followers in safety.

The works of Ockam have never been collected and published in an uniform edition. They are very scarce, and are carefully preserved in some of the great libraries of Europe. So difficult are they of access that Brucker, when he wrote his "History of Philosophy," had not seen them, and even one so widely read as Sir James Mackintosh had not been able to consult them. Tenneman and others have given extracts from them, which make their spirit unmistakably understood; whilst Prantl and Hareau have given to recent continental literature able accounts of his life and works. He wrote chiefly in the form usual to the Schoolmen,

of question and answer, and his writings ranged over subjects in logic, psychology, physics, and ecclesiastical reform. He raised Nominalism to its highest point of position and influence, and practised the critical method upon other theories with extraordinary ingenuity and force. He was a remarkable and unanticipated product of his age, and if he did not succeed in constructing a system of philosophy, which was so perfectly balanced and adjusted as to resist opposing influences, he did great service by exposing some of the drawbacks of existing systems, and especially by his bold defiance of ecclesiastical assumption prepared the mind of Christendom for a huge advance in the direction of perfect spiritual liberty.

NOTE A.

"The thought, the spoken word, the written letter are with him all signs. But they are not *sacraments*. They are not bound up with the thing to which they refer. They express *our* mind, not the mind of the Creator about that thing. They denote what *we* have apprehended of it. Out of these apprehensions come forth the judgments which are still ours, they are formed into a syllogism; these exercise a force upon our fellows."—*Maurice*, "Mor. and Met. Phil.," ii., 7.

NOTE B.

Mr. Maurice seems to disagree with this view. He says: "He affirms that Universals, having no reality in themselves, have a reality in God: that when you speak of His Nature, you discover a meaning for them which takes them out of the region of mere conceptions."—"Mor. and Met. Phil.," ii., 8.

Ockam, however, is very distinct on this point. He says: "Ideæ non sunt in Deo subjective et realiter, sed tantum sunt in ipso objective tanquam quæ dam cognita ab ipso . . . . ."—"In Magistrum Sentent.," I. Dist., 35, q. 5.

NOTE C.

"We are conscious that we understand and will, but whether

these acts be performed by an immaterial and incorruptible principle is a matter of which we are not conscious, and which is no further the subject of demonstration than it is of experience. All attempts to prove it must be founded on something doubtful."—*Ockam*, quoted by *Tenneman*, "Hist. of Phil."

NOTE D.

"The precise distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, and the different meanings of the word Object,—the want of which has involved our modern philosophy in great confusion,—I had long ago evolved from my own reflection, and before I was aware that a parallel distinction had been taken by the Schoolmen under the name *Intuitive* and *Abstract* knowledge (cognitio Intuitiva et Abstractiva or Visionis et Simplicis Intelligentiæ.) Of these, the former they defined—*the knowledge of a thing present as it is present* (*cognitio rei præsentis ut præsens est*); the latter—*the knowledge of a thing not as it is present* (*cognitio rei non ut præsens est*). This distinction remounts among the Latin Schoolmen, to at least the middle of the eleventh century; for I find that both Anselm and Hugo a Sancto Victore notice it. It was certainly not borrowed from the Arabians; for Averrhoes at the end of the following century seems unaware of it. In fact, it bears upon its front the indication of a Christian origin; for as Scotus and Ariminensis notice, the term *Intuitive* was probably suggested by St. Paul's expression, 'facie ad faciem,' as the Vulgate has it (1 Cor. xiii. 12). For intuitive in this sense, the lower Greeks sometimes employed the terms ἐποπτικος and αὐτοπτικος, a sense unknown to the lexicographers;—but they do not appear to have taken the counter-distinction. The term *abstract* or *abstractive* was less fortunately chosen than its correlative; for besides the signification in question as opposed to *intuitive*, in which case we look away from the concrete object, it was likewise employed in opposition to *concrete*, and though improperly as a synonyme of *Universal*, in which case we took away from each and every individual object of inhesion. As this last is the meaning in which *abstract*, as it was originally, is now exclusively employed, and as *representative* is otherwise a far preferable expression, it would manifestly be worse than idle to attempt its resuscitation in the former sense.

"The propriety and importance of the distinction is unquestionable; but the Schoolmen—at least the great majority who held

the doctrine of intentional species—wholly spoiled it in application; by calling the representative perception they allowed of external things by the name of an intuitive cognition, to say nothing of the idle thesis which many of them defended—that by a miracle we could have an intuitive apprehension of a distant, nay even of a non-existent, object. This error, I may notice, is the corollary of another of which I am soon to speak—the holding that external things though known only through species are immediately known in themselves."—*Hamilton's* "Reid," 812.

Note E.

The fortune of this word is curious. Employed by Plato to express the real forms of the intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of the sensible, it was lowered by Descartes, who extended it to the objects of our consciousness in general. When, after Gassendi, the school of Condillac had analysed our highest faculties into our lowest, the *idea* was still more deeply degraded from its high original. Like a fallen angel, it was relegated from the sphere of Divine intelligence to the atmosphere of human sense; till at last *Ideologie* (more correctly Idealogie), a word which could only *properly* suggest an *à priori* scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from the senses. Word and thing, *ideas*, have been the *crux philosophorum*, since Aristotle sent them packing (χαιρέτωσαν ἰδέαι) to the present day."—*Hamilton*, "Discussions," 69.

Note F.

Ockam and Locke seem to have held corresponding ideas on the possible materiality of the soul.

"We have the ideas of matter and thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if He please, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance, with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort

of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if He please, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as He thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think I have proved, it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first thinking Being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as, *e.g.*, pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves after a certain manner, modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of the body."—"Essay on Human Understanding," Bk. iv., c. iii., s. 6, p. 399.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE MOST CHRISTIAN DOCTOR.—JEAN CHARLIER GERSON.

"AND deem not profitless those fleeting moods
Of shadowy exaltation: not for this
That they are kindred to our purer mind
And intellectual life; but that the soul,
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense
Of possible sublimity, whereto
With growing faculties she doth aspire,
With faculties still growing, feeling still
That whatsoever point they gain, they yet
Have something to pursue."

WORDSWORTH.

XVII.

THE MOST CHRISTIAN DOCTOR—JEAN CHARLIER GERSON.

WILLIAM OF OCKAM closed the line of the *great* Schoolmen. Scholasticism culminated in Thomas Aquinas. Duns Scotus was on the whole a more accomplished logician, but he was not so great a philosopher, whilst Ockam, though inferior to both, still rendered such service to intellectual progress, and manifested such astonishing acuteness and vigour of thought, as to be well entitled to a position amongst the leading Scholastics. After him came the decline, which was both marked and rapid. No Scholastic who was at all equal to him arose in the noisy and passionate controversies which raged for a century after his death. It was the battle of idealism and sensationalism; it was maintained with great warmth and much skill by both sides; each school of philosophy sent men of great talent into the arena, and the result was undoubtedly much gain, gain to the cause of intellectual freedom, to the diffusion of religious truth, and to the advancement of intelligence throughout Christendom.

One effect of the spirited attacks of such accomplished writers as D'Ailly, Clemangi, and Biel, upon the long-established Realism of the Middle Ages, was the

decline, and eventually the destruction, of the form or method of Scholasticism. As the controversy prolonged itself after the death of Ockam, it gradually degenerated into mere lifeless subtilties, until the public mind became weary of the struggle, and several results ensued which the combatants could not have anticipated.

One result was the somewhat violent vibration of the intellectual consciousness of Europe in the direction of Platonism, under the influence of which Marsilio Ficino and others strove earnestly to diminish or destroy the overwhelming power of Aristotle. These writers proceeded so far as to raise Plato into comparison with the Lord Jesus Christ, and in their zeal for the revival of ancient classical literature invested the principles of the Christian religion with Ciceronian and Horatian phrase. Therefore, in the course of two or three generations the learned men of Southern Christendom had become comparatively paganized, and the Pope himself (Leo X.) was far more a Grecian *litterateur* than a humble minister of the Teacher of Galilee.

Another result of the reaction from the degenerate Scholasticism of the fourteenth century was a decided movement of the Christian consciousness in the direction of Mysticism. The later Schoolmen, in descending to frivolous refinements and mere dialectic subtilties, became divested of the spiritual life and power whereby their predecessors had been able to hold under their spell the devout, as well as the intellectually vigorous of the Church. Those therefore who yearned for a higher spiritual experience rebelled against the clamour of perpetual controversy, which failed to contribute to the Divine life in man. A spirit developed itself which longed for relief from the wearying din of strife; the

schoolboy is carried by time beyond the excitement of the debating class, and reaches a stage of life when deeper sensibilities and a widening future beckon him to sober reverie, and a more fervently conscious purpose. So the Christian life of the later Middle Age sought to send the multitudes away that it might depart into a desert place to pray, or that it might cultivate a fuller acquaintance with the profoundest realities of religion than the strife of the school permitted. The revolt was not a violent one, nor was it accomplished by loud demonstration; it was scarcely articulately expressed to themselves, even by those who were leaders of it; it was rather an unconscious growth from the minute and attenuated divisions and subdivisions of Scholasticism. It was an attempt to get back to the freedom and simplicity of the Gospel, to regain the childlike faith by which, unencumbered with logical method and form, the spirit could press into the hidden glory of the Divine Presence, where the Eternal Spirit and the human spirit could meet in fellowship, where special illumination could be enjoyed, where, instead of seeking to compress the truth into elaborate systems of Dogma, it might be partaken of freely and directly from the infinite Fountain.

Mysticism was not a new development of Christian life: it had appeared with much grace in the writings of Bernard, of Hugo and Richard St. Victor, of Bonaventura; but it was soon to revive and assume a position of greater importance in the lives and labours of Ruysbroek, of Eckart, of Tauler, and through them to aid in awakening a nobler spiritual life throughout Christendom.

One great spirit reflected more exactly than others this transition temper of the times. He was imbued

with the spirit of Scholasticism, but also responded quickly to the deeper spiritual life which was yearning for expression, and through him the nascent Mysticism of the century found a gracious utterance. This was Jean Charlier Gerson, a Frenchman, who became a brilliant link in the chain of pious and devout souls who as Mystics have given a large measure of brightness to the religious history of that nation.

He was born December 14th, 1363, in the village of Gerson, within the Bishopric of Rheims, and in the Department of Ardennes. His father was Arnulph Charlier, his mother Elizabeth de la Chardemere. They belonged to the peasant class of society, and were both characterised by a habit of humble and earnest piety. They strove to cultivate in their children the spirit of religion, and sometimes even by methods which were far from prudent, and which might have entirely frustrated the purpose they had in view. Dupin relates that in order to impress the youthful Jean with the reality and value of prayer, they taught him as often as he begged for cakes and sweetmeats to supplicate for them on his knees before God and after a short period of expectant waiting, they were thrown plentifully to him out of an upper window. It is evident, however, that there was a real power of godliness in their lives, for their children imbibed their spirit, and out of a family of twelve they were rewarded by seeing four of their daughters and three of their sons devoting themselves to a religious life. At the age of fourteen Jean was sent to Paris, and commenced his studies at the College of Navarre, which was then famous for the excellence of its lectures. Five years were spent here in assiduous study, at the close of which period he became a licentiate of arts. Then he

began a course of theological reading under Giles de Champs and Peter d'Ailly. Between Gerson and D'Ailly there sprang up a warm friendship, which endured through life, and in the course of which their relative positions became reversed, the student becoming the leader of his teacher. The youth rose rapidly into notice: when only twenty years of age he was elected Procurator in the university for the French nation, and was re-elected to the office in the following year. When he was twenty-one, he took the degree of Bachelor in Theology, and when twenty-four he was deputed, in company with the Chancellor of the University and others, to appear before the Pope in a case of appeal.

From his early manhood he imbibed the reforming spirit which was rising around him; he felt a noble anxiety to aid in pouring a new measure of spiritual life into the university, and to raise the standard of clerical morality, but especially he was fired with an intense desire to end the hateful schism of the Church in relation to the Popedom, which was the scandal not only of Christendom but of the world.

In 1392 he took his degree of Doctor of Theology, and three years later, when only thirty-two years old, he was elected the Chancellor of the University, and a Canon of the Cathedral of Notre Dame. The University was then in its full blush of fame, and the Chancellor occupied a very prominent and responsible position. He was sworn to maintain its rights and privileges intact against Pope or King or any aggressor, and he was often required to exercise his influence on affairs of critical importance. Upon him also devolved, at least ostensibly, the duty of securing the welfare of the many thousands of students who crowded to the great centre of learning from all parts of Europe. On

assuming this high and honourable office, Gerson assiduously applied himself to revise the entire course of study he found in operation. He strove to banish the methods of Scholasticism, and to introduce a system of biblical exposition combined with the study of the early Church Fathers. He seemed to anticipate the Reformers in his desire to establish a simple and natural method of interpreting the Scriptures. Like Luther also, he was led to adopt Nominalistic principles as the basis of his philosophy. A Nominalist pure and simple he could not be, and he sought to incorporate into his system many of the elements of Mysticism as taught by the monks of St. Victor. He sought thus to avoid the palpable errors of Nominalism on the one hand, and the equally dangerous Pantheistic conclusions of Amalric of Bena, and David of Dinanto, upon the other. He laboured assiduously to cultivate a noble spirituality in the life of the University, and won for himself the much-to-be-coveted title of *Doctor Christianissimus*, which he has worn in Church history interchangeably with that of *Doctor Consolatorius*, conferred on him in consequence of the rich spiritual comfort with which the devotional works of his later years are stored. The duties of his office as Chancellor were often intolerably irksome to him; so much was merely secular that he revolted from harassing occupations foreign to his mind, involving him in frequent wranglings, in petty disputes about money matters, and which especially deprived him of the opportunities for learned leisure which he greatly coveted.

With the view of ridding himself of many uncongenial duties, he laid down his high and honourable calling in the university, and accepted the quiet retreat of the Deanery of Bruges. But the times were too much in

need of noble and high-minded men like him to conduct the pressing and anxious discussions then occupying public attention, and ere long he was again called to the front, and reinstated as the Chancellor of the University. From this time his public life was devoted to destroy the great schism in the Papacy, which had become a scandal unendurable to Christendom.

In 1378 the Archbishop of Bari was elected Pope of Rome. He took the title of Urban VI., and for three months was acknowledged as such by the College of Cardinals and by the whole of the Church. Having given great offence by a course of harsh and haughty behaviour, the legality of his election was objected to, the Cardinals called upon him to resign his office, and then elected Cardinal Robert of Geneva to the Papal chair. He assumed the title of Clement VII., took up his residence at Avignon, and was acknowledged as Pope by Sicily, France, and Spain. Urban steadily refused to resign his dignity, and was received as Pope by the rest of Europe. Two lines of rival Popes cursed and anathematised each other for thirty-two years, when the council of Pisa was summoned by the College of Cardinals to consider how the disgraceful schism might be ended. The question of the validity of a General Council not summoned by the Pope was dealt with by Gerson in a treatise, in which he advocated, with the utmost boldness, and with profound learning, the perfect legality of the Council, and even vindicated its authority as being above that of the Pope. The rival Pontiffs refused to recognise the Council or to appear before it, whereupon it proceeded to depose them from their office, and elected an entirely new Pope, Peter of Candia, Cardinal of Milan, who took the name of Alexander V. Before him Gerson preached

sermon on the purity of the Church, which urged the reformation of crying abuses in the most forceful manner. The ghost of controversy and schism was not laid by this well meaning Council. The scandal was only aggravated, and well-wishers of the Church were horrified by now seeing *three* rival Popes urging their claims and raging against each other. In 1410, after a short and stormy pontificate of one year, Alexander died, and was succeeded by Cardinal Balthazar Cossa, who took the name of John XXIII. This man, who assumed to be the successor of St. Peter, and the vicegerent of the meek and lowly Jesus, was more than suspected of having poisoned his predecessor, and is described but too truly by his secretary, Theodoric á Niem, as indulging in extortions, cruelties, and debaucheries horrible and indescribable. His licentiousness when Legate at Bologna was such that two hundred maids, wives, widows, and nuns were counted as victims of his lust. Daily, victims were executed to gratify his exacting tyranny, and no depth of depravity seemed too low for him to descend into. It may well be concluded that, with such a professed Head, the body of the Church was far from being either holy or virtuous. Such a Pope aroused against himself all the pious sentiment and reforming temper of the age. He had also to face the deadly enmity of Ladistaus. King of Naples, who was a devoted partisan of one of the rival Popes, Benedict XIII. Ladislaus besieged Cossa in his imperial city of Rome, who when the city was taken escaped to Florence, and thence to Bologna. There he was induced, by the mingled power and skill of Sigismund, the Emperor of Germany, to take for him the fatal step of summoning the Council of Constance, which he hoped would establish him as

the undisputed Pontiff of Christendom. The Council was called by letters from the Emperor and a Bull from the Pope to meet in the autumn of the year 1414. Sigismund guaranteed his full protection to all who should attend the Council. It met in October, and John set out from the gates of Bologna with a heavy heart and ominous premonitions of evil, to open the assembly. He had abundant cause for his misgivings. Ere the Council had been long in session he found that his position was a dangerous one. He was boldly charged with the most abominable crimes, and one brave English Bishop went so far as to declare he should be burnt at the stake. A proposition was placed before the Assembly that he should be deposed from the throne, and he secretly fled from Constance, taking refuge in the Castle of Schaffhausen, which was owned by the Duke of Austria. The Council rose to the full height of its responsibility. It was called upon to declare that Christendom was not to be governed by a single despot, but by chosen representatives, the *αριστοι* of the Church. At this juncture the great Chancellor of Paris discharged the highest service of his life. He had already published treatises containing sentiments of a directly revolutionary tendency. He had placed the Emperor in an authority higher than the Pope, as the following expressions will show :—

"If an hereditary monarch may be deposed, how much more an elective! If an Emperor, des ended from a long unbroken royal lineage, how much more the son of a Venetian fisherman whose father and mother had not beans enough to fill their stomachs! The Pope ought to be more easily deposed than another prelate. If the Pope sins, all partake of his sins; not so if a Bishop. The canons on which rests the Papal authority were framed by fraud and craft. What is a Pope? A man! the son of a man! clay of clay! a sinner liable to sin! Two

days before the son of a poor peasant, he is raised to be Pope. Is he then above repentance, confession, contrition? a sinless angel? a saint? He is not above the Gospel."[1]

In the discussions of the Council Gerson insisted most strongly on the doctrine of the Headship of the Lord Jesus, that His presence alone is essential to the existence of the Church, and that the Holy Ghost alone is the infallible guide and director of the Church; that the Pope is not the Head of the Church save in a very inferior sense; that if he misconduct himself he is liable to be removed, that an Œcumenical Council of the Church has the power to disenthrone him, that the Pope is bound to obey the decisions of the Council and not to annul them, that the Council is bound to see to the faith and discipline of the Church being preserved in their purity, and that the supreme power of the Church lodges not in the Pope but in a Council, which is of unquestionable authority whether the Pope presides over it or not.

Such reasonings as these swayed the Council irresistibly to its determination to depose John from the Papal chair; it was inspired by them to an urgent desire to limit the assumptions of the Popes and to prevent from henceforth their daring usurpations. In its antipapal and reforming efforts, Gerson was undoubtedly the soul of the Assembly.

The bold spirit and exalted views of Gerson led him to take energetic action with regard to another matter which seriously affected his future course. The Duke of Burgundy was his patron, and he returned him for his patronage the gratitude he deserved. This royal patron, however was not above practising the low arts of ridding himself of rivals and enemies employed

[1] Milman, viii., 270.

by the nobles and kings of that age, and he treacherously procured the assassination of the Duke of Orleans. Jean Petit came forward as the apologist and defender of the crime, and in unambiguous phrase declared that on scriptural and moral grounds mischievous men might be destroyed by private violence. The principles affirmed in this treatise were repulsive and brutal in the extreme, and if put into general application would quickly unloose all the bonds of society. Gerson was filled with detestation of such teachings; he denounced them in his discourses to the people of Paris, in his prelections in the University, and finally with great force in the Council of Constance. Notwithstanding that through the course of wearying and painful debates Gerson argued the matter with great force of logic and learning, the Assembly would not condemn the monstrous tenets of Petit, except in the most faltering and compromising manner, and Gerson was left at the close of its sessions exposed to the bitter enmity of the Duke of Burgundy, who now burned to wreak vengeance on a friend who had dared to prefer the truth of God to his favour.

One more event signalised Gerson's presence in the Council, in the course of which he contracted what must be regarded as the one blot upon his reputation. Present there under the pledge of protection from the Emperor Sigismund was John Huss, of Prague. This noble man was of faultless purity of life; no suspicion of immorality was ever breathed against him; he was accused of unsound views on the doctrine of Transubstantiation, and of believing in the right of the laity to partake of the cup. He denied these charges with great firmness. He was then accused of having denounced the vices of the clergy, and of having

taught that the authority of popes and prelates depended not on their succession to the titles of the Apostles, but on their succession to their virtues. He was also taxed with seeking to disseminate the condemned tenets of Wycliffe, and of having undermined the power of the Keys. Repeatedly was he brought before the Council, and sometimes in chains. His enemies were unable to answer his calm reasonings from Scripture, but this only aggravated their rage against him. At last, in spite of the safe conduct given by Sigismund, he was condemned and burnt at the stake, his voice being heard above the crackling of the faggots, singing his own requiem. His ashes were afterwards collected and cast into the Rhine, that nothing so horrible as any remains of his mortal flesh might pollute the earth.

Strange to say, the person who in the Council sought his condemnation and death with most unflagging earnestness was Gerson. If his execution was a crime, then the responsibility of it belonged to Gerson more than to any other; no one urged his death so persistently, no voice carried so much weight and influence; and thus history records the strange fact that in that important Council one great Reformer, of noble talents and of undoubted purity of motive, was the principal agent in procuring the execution of another Reformer, as gifted and as pious as himself. To explain the anomaly satisfactorily is what no one has yet been able to do. Much may be accounted for by the different standpoints occupied by the two men. That of Huss was by far the higher. Gerson seems to have been inspired by a desire to preserve the unity of the Church; Huss was more anxious to preserve its purity. The Chancellor used all his great gifts to destroy the schism

which, as he believed, rent the Body of the Lord Jesus, and in all his efforts to destroy the despotism of the popes this idea predominated. So also it was in his determined opposition to Huss. He maintained that the Hussites were intolerant men who, representing that the Church was in error on matters which were not essential to salvation, were unnecessarily promoting discord and dividing the Church against itself. He believed they were quite impervious to reason, that they were dangerous to the peace of the Church, and therefore urged that they should be remitted to the secular arm, and that condign punishment should be meted out to them. The history of Gerson in this episode of nis career is unspeakably painful. He was himself a bold and ardent Reformer; he did not wish to be cruel, he would not be thought to be intolerant, but he was prepared to sacrifice Huss or any other man whom he thought sought to destroy the unity of the Church. He could not understand a man like Huss, whose absorbing idea in life was truth, and who would have sacrificed at any time, if needful, mere outward unity for its sake. The two men stood at opposite poles both on philosophical and religious views; they were equally distant in habit and temperament of mind, and hence there was no affinity between them by which Gerson could appreciate or sympathise with Huss. The Frenchman was a Nominalist, the Bohemian a Realist; the former sought the welfare of the Church through the preservation of its outward organisation, the latter through the spirit of truth being diffused in every part; Gerson in all his labours and struggles endeavoured to reconcile differences, and restore in the Church, in philosophy, in theology a lost solidarity, and in so doing was prepared to sacrifice what was

infinitely higher; and when he could attain his purpose in no other way, he would use the sword of persecution against those who dissented from him; but Huss, fixing his eye upon the supreme principle of Eternal Righteousness, lived and died for that sake, and in so doing took his place in that most brilliant line of heroes, "the noble army of martyrs," who have sacrificed all for the highest and noblest ends.

When the Council closed its sessions, Gerson was without a shelter. He had sacrificed his position and honours for conscience' sake; Paris was in the hands of the Duke of Burgundy, who was animated by a fierce resentment against him because of his resolute prosecution of Jean Petit, and it could no longer be a home to him. He fled from the Council in disguise: he who had swayed kings and nobles, and had so mightily influenced the affairs of Europe, was a forlorn fugitive; his busy and useful life became clouded, he hid himself in quiet retreats in Germany until the tempest had spent its force, and then ventured to Lyons, where his brother was prior in a convent of Cœlestine Monks, and commenced a school for little children. It is said that he refused to accept any recompense for his instruction except the promise that they would daily offer the prayer, "Lord, have mercy upon Thy poor servant Gerson." Here he lived calmly and peacefully till, on July 12th, 1429, he died, in a generous odour of sanctity. Succeeding generations have embalmed his memory as with sweetest fragrance, and the words of the French historian are scarcely too eulogistic: "Since the days of Bernard, the Church saw not any author of greater reputation, more profound knowledge, or a more solid piety, than Gerson."[1]

[1] Dupin, "Hist. of Church," iii., 304.

He left behind him several books to testify of his learning and piety. A Compendium of Theology was long ascribed to him, but is discredited by Dupin, the laborious editor of his works. Whether he wrote the book or not, it exactly represents the eclectic tendencies of his mind. In his *Regulæ Morales*, in his *Liber de Vita Spirituali*, and other of his books, there is the same combination of Scholasticism and Mysticism that characterises the Compendium, and which is the infallible mark of a transition period in human thought. It is not required for the purpose of this book to enter lengthily upon the special views of Gerson, either in theology or philosophy; it is sufficient to indicate his general position in relation to various schools of thought, and as illustrating the tendency of the times towards freer and higher enjoyment of truth than the withes of Scholasticism permitted. As a Schoolman he sought to define minutely questions in casuistry of the most delicate nature, that he might thus inform or soothe the conscience of the sinner; he insisted that the right to interpret Scripture was the sole privilege of the Church, and that a General Council could alone define and determine Christian doctrine. He imbibed from D'Ailly the principles of Nominalism, and from them he never wavered. With an acuteness almost worthy of Aquinas or Scotus, he laboured to make evident the distinction between mortal and venial sin. But as a Mystic he sought to surround Scholasticism with a warmth of spiritual life and power of which it had become entirely denuded. His great work, composed amidst all the exciting and multifarious engagements of the University, was the *Theologia Mystica*, which was the first work issued on Mysticism, called by that name.

The ultimate and objective point in Gerson's Mysti-

cism, as in that of all who belong to this school, is God. He sought to gain access to Him by some medium, either in nature or himself. This is the end of all Mysticism, whe her as expressed in the Ecstacy of Plotinus, in the Itinerary of the soul to God of Bonaventura, in the impassioned sermons of Eckart and Tauler, in the intellectual intuition of Schelling, or in the way to the blessed life of Fichte. All are inspired by an irrepressible desire to rise to a direct knowledge of the eternal Fountain of Being. Mysticism in Gerson based itself upon individual intuition, an inspiration which of course can be of no authority beyond the individual which is under its influence. This immediate intuition enables the soul to come into direct communion with the Divine Essence, by which it receives the internal light which enables it to attain with certainty all truth. Gerson stopped short of the extravagant views which were indulged in by some of the German Mystics; he was far from being carried into the dangerous fancies of Ruysbroek,[1] and still less into those of Suso or of St. Teresa. He attempted to combine with the *immediate intuition*, on which he grounded his system, *reflection*, which, gaining its knowledge through the senses, is the foundation of Sensationalism, and which is opposed to the very nature of Mysticism. While he rejected all such rapturous visions as Jacob Boehme and other extreme Mystics indulged, he taught that man rose to the height of blessed contemplation by a joyous love, and then, as if fearful of being carried into any ridiculous extreme, he insisted that this state was quite compatible with a calm self-consciousness. He is to be classed with the moderate and rational school of Mystics, who form a noble group with Bernard, the

[1] Note A.

Victorines, and Bonaventura as its shining ornaments, and who stopped far short of the excesses which have brought reproach upon the name of Mysticism. The Mysticism of Gerson marked an unmistakable reaction from the formalism and dogmatism of Scholasticism, although it was but a more positive and exclusive form of dogmatism seeking to cast down and destroy its predecessor. The authorised Theology of the age had degenerated, it had lost all the fervour and brightness of divine life, it was a jangle of angry words and sounding names, it placed growing emphasis upon the simply human in its composition, it rested wholly on the letter, and the Christian life of the age turned from the Scholastic to the Mystic, from the letter to the spirit, from dogmatic statement and angry controversy to the inward light and direct communion with the Eternal; it appealed from the casuist and the combatant of the school to the calm contemplative mystic of the cell, to open the fountains of spiritual life for the world's refreshment.

It is unnecessary to spend a line in considering whether Gerson had any hand in producing the most striking book of the fourteenth century, "The Imitation of Jesus Christ." If the evidence be insufficient to adjudge it certainly to the piety of the monk Thomas, of Kempen, it is much less satisfactory in relation to Gerson. Internal evidence is conclusive against him. The book itself is an exact and marvellous expression of the piety and fervour of the noblest Scholasticism, and of the nascent Mysticism. That it failed to afford a full view of Christian doctrine is true; it is not a handbook of Theology, but a guide to devotion; yet none could have written it who had not been trained thoroughly in the paths of the higher Scholasticism

No mere Scholastic could have produced it, but only one whose heart was responsive to the brightest and warmest piety of the past, and who laboured with intensest desire to express it for his generation. It supplied a crying need in the Christian life of that day, and its mission is not yet ended. It is full of sharp, shortliving sentences which speak to the heart and dwell upon the memory; it is the outcome of a soul absorbed in the vision of Christly beauty which has been revealed to it, and it is the most perfect guide to a merely devotional life which has ever been issued. But it fails to express a perfect idea either of Christianity or a Christian life. It is monastic Christianity it paints, and a monastic life it would lead to, and it must ever fail to be a spiritual guide-book for those who must busily mingle in the world's common duties and business, or who are inspired with the generous enthusiasm of humanity which is the most Christly outcome of a religious life.

Thus the glory and power of Scholasticism faded into the warmth and brightness of Mysticism; the high and noble aspirations of the greatest Schoolmen were gathered up by a new race who sought to divest religion of its logical bands and integuments, and who became the exponents of a noble if not a perfect system of spiritual truth. The work which Scholasticism had accomplished was not destroyed. It had built a gorgeous Christian temple, the noble proportions and stately grandeur of which are the wonder and admiration of all succeeding generations, but the saerifice and the incense, the fervent praise and the spiritual glow, had given place to the jangle of disputation and the formality of pharisaism; then a new order of men came, who sought to kindle a brighter flame on the altar, to diffuse a more

fragrant incense, to present a richer sacrifice of the spirit, and to rise upon the wings of a more venturous devotion. They by the violence of their movement were thrown into an extreme position, which resulted in errors and extravagances, as much to be deprecated as those from which they revolted; but the reaction from Scholastic rigidity was on the whole healthy, and served to prepare the way for the grand spiritual movement of Luther and the Reformers of the fifteenth century.

NOTE A.

"God dwells in the heart pure and free from every image. Then first, when we withdraw into the *simplicitas* of our heart, do we behold the immeasurable glory of God, and our intellect is as clear from all considerations of distinction and figurative apprehensions, as though we had never seen or heard of such things. Then the riches of God are open to us. Our spirit becomes desireless, as though there were nothing on earth or in heaven of which we stood in need. Then we are alone with God, God and we—nothing else. Then we rise above all multiplicity and distinction into the simple nakedness of our essence, and in it become conscious of the infinite wisdom of the Divine Essence, whose inexhaustible depths are as a vast waste, into which no corporeal and no spiritual image can intrude. Our created is absorbed in our uncreated life, and we are as it were transformed into God. Lost in the abyss of our eternal blessedness, we perceive no distinction between ourselves and God As soon as we begin to reflect and to consider what that is we feel, we become aware of such distinction, and fall back to the level of reason." — *Ruysbroek*, quoted in Vaughan's "Hours with Mystics," i., 328.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCHOOL AND THEIR WORK.

"Happy are they who have a lyre in their heart and a music in their mind, which their actions perform."

"Simple and sincere minds are never more than half mistaken."

"The devout are the practical metaphysicians."

"To reach the regions of light you must pass through the clouds. Some stop there; others know how to go beyond."

"Professional critics can appreciate neither rough diamonds nor bars of gold."

—JOUBERT.

XVIII.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCHOOL AND THEIR WORK.

THE brief notices of the great leaders of the School given in previous pages will have been some preparation for forming a judgment fairly appreciative of them and their work. It will not be supposed that with their opportunities and their surroundings they could attain either absolute perfection of character or a faultless style of work. But when all the circumstances of their times are taken into account, it will be found that there was very much, both in them and in their labours for the Church, to command the admiration and to merit the gratitude of succeeding ages.

They were men of devout habit, and of stainless piety. There is scarcely any line of men in all history who are so irreproachable as the Schoolmen. Scandal has left untouched but few of the leading men of history. Especially in the Middle Ages, but a scanty number were able to pass through the fiery ordeal of life without being scarred or branded by some sad act or habit of sin. Charlemagne and all kings, with but the rare exception of an Alfred, or a Saint Louis; Popes and Cardinals far too numerous to mention, and too hateful to recall; statesmen and warriors of all the civilized nations of Europe,—all were swept into the

evil habits of their times, and indulged in such forms of vice that the mind can only tolerate them by judging their conduct, not by the eternal and immutable standard of Divine righteousness, but by the imperfect and changing standard acknowledged by the public conscience of their generations. Even the clerical orders which arose to bear witness against the surrounding rapacity and licentiousness were unable to preserve themselves unspotted, and gradually suffered themselves to be drawn downwards by the prevailing spirit of evil until the half-developed moral sensibility of Christendom was horrified at their apostacy. Not only so the great thinkers and leaders of the modern world have far too seldom been able to pass the trial of human temptation without reproach; the great founder of French Idealism confesses that he could not preserve his chastity absolutely pure, the leader of the Inductive Philosophy is only rescued from being.

"The noblest, greatest, meanest of mankind"

by the plea that the low condition of public morality in his day excused or palliated the wrongs he committed in the course of his public functions; the greatest literary name in Germany, by his own free and unblushing confessions of immorality, is found to be tarnished with the saddest shame. And whilst these examples are numberless, let not the tribute of praise and admiration be withheld from a succession of men who through several centuries maintained an almost faultless confession of morality, and who deserve consecration in the estimation of the religious world for the rich odour of their piety. Of no other order of men, save only the Apostles, can the same be said. Not of the Fathers of the Church, for too often were both

their words and lives marred by uncharity, violence of temper, and the spirit of persecution; not of kings or emperors, of popes or bishops, nay not even of the line either of martyrs or reformers, not any of these passed the ordeal of history, and "the fierce light which beats" upon the leaders of men, and have come forth so morally unscathed as the Schoolmen. Abélard indeed sinned, but, like the royal sinner of the Old Testament, he manifested a royal repentance, and sought not only to obtain the forgiveness of God, but to atone in every way possible for him to the object of his sin. But Anselm was as conspicuous for his holy living as for his brilliant intellectual genius. Bernard was not more anxious to extend and strengthen the outward Church of the Redeemer than he was to have his whole soul steeped with the Divine Influence. Those of the Monks of St. Victor whose names are preserved on the bead-roll of Scholasticism shine like "stars apart,"—

"Satellites burning in a lucid ring,"

so radiant are they with sweet and fervent piety. Peter the Lombard, the most arid and uninteresting genius of the line, was a man of profoundly religious spirit. The great abilities both of Albertus Magnus and Alexander Hales were consecrated by a complete devotion to a life of Divine fellowship The two names best known and most revered, those of Bonaventura and Aquinas, are richly redolent with the fragrance of an ardent piety. This is certainly not the general feeling about Aquinas who has been described by some writers as though the spiritual side of his nature had been sacrificed to the merely logical. But of few men are more satisfactory testimonies to extraordinary spirituality preserved. When he preached,

his subject was chiefly the love of God and of Christ, and he enlarged upon the inspiring theme with kindling earnestness; when he engaged in the service of the mass, he was often melted to tears, in all his metaphysical labours, he sought to baptize his thinking by fervent and effectual prayer; and when, during a time of religious meditation, he fancied that the Saviour addressed him and said: "Thou hast written well of me, Thomas; what shall be thy reward?" the reply was, "To have more of Thyself." Thomas Aquinas was pure intellect, illuminated with Divine Love. Bonaventura adopted for his motto in life, having it engraved upon his study wall, the words of his Divine Master, "Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart," and in no act of his life does he seem to have done other than follow the instruction. Even his misguided worship of the Virgin was a manifestation of that love which, with better gospel teaching, would have been offered directly to Christ. The later leaders of the School, Duns Scotus, William of Ockam, and others, also bore undeviating testimony against the sins of their generation, and embodied a noble godliness in their lives; and if Gerson marred his splendid piety by his persecution of John Huss, it was rather the fault of his environment which prevented either him or others understanding the principles of religious toleration, or of liberty of conscience, than of any wavering from the standard of a lofty piety on his part.

Thus these men were not only of blameless repute, but unsurpassed holiness of life.

They were also men of the world. Not that they had the worldly spirit. If they had possessed the pride and ambition which were vulgarly common in their day, they might have been popes, kings, and

political leaders amongst men, but from all such low desires they were marvellously free. And still they were busily engaged in the public affairs of the nations of Christendom. They did not seek prominent positions, but they could not be hid, and such positions were thrust upon them, and when so thrust, they did not refuse the responsibility, but carried into the minute details of their functions the same untiring energy and conscientiousness which they manifested in their beloved intellectual pursuits. They are often referred to as being gloomy monks, of recluse habits, shut up in the cell or the quadrangle, dreaming and weaving metaphysical cobwebs down the long years of their lives. But of which of the Schoolmen could this be affirmed? They were familiar with royal courts and cabinets, they filled high ecclesiastical offices, they accomplished such an amount of labour in various departments of administration, as testified of enormous capacity for work and endurance. Anselm gave himself to his work as Abbot of Bec with such zeal that it became the brightest centre of religion and learning in Europe; then, with not so much prudence as courage, he fought a keen battle against William Rufus, in behalf of the right of the Church to govern supremely within its own province; and in the duties of his office as Primate of England, he showed extraordinary skill and industry. It was the same with Peter Lombard, when Bishop of Paris; with Albertus Magnus when Bishop of Ratisbon, and Grand Master of the Pope's palace; with Bonaventura as the Cardinal Bishop of Albano, and the Chief Director of the immense Order of Franciscan Monks; with Aquinas as called by the Pope to render aid in the urgent business of the Papacy, and by St. Louis to afford gracious moral guidance in the intrica-

cies of statecraft. In addition to which national and public duties, nearly all the Schoolmen were busily engaged with crowds of students who swarmed around them. They were the centres of the intellectual life of Europe, and filled the leading universities with their ardent and devoted followers.

Thus they were little likely to be absorbed by the *idola specus*, or to become curious specimens of intellectual fungi; they were, with an occasional exception, so circumstanced as to be in the very midst of the most influential factors of the day, fully abreast with the national and continental movements which agitated those restless and formative times; drawn into fellowship and counsel with the great makers of history; themselves deserving to rank highly in the grand catalogue of such leaders of men; called to assume great responsibilities, in council, in controversies on questions of Imperial magnitude, and having the highest honours of the Church and the Universities crowded upon them.

They were men of keen metaphysical acumen and of profound erudition, which they employed upon the highest and noblest themes. They were not weary, solemn triflers, expending the force of the most perfectly logical intellects in Europe in disputing concerning vain and silly trivialities. It is surprising to find, in a book of recent date, of great intelligence and discrimination, and generally of appreciative spirit, which deals with the growth of Christian Religion down the eighteen centuries of its history, that the only instance given of the pursuits and labours of the Schoolmen is contained in this sentence :—

"One feels naturally startled to behold a company of the most learned men of their day, meeting together in the pre-

sence of a crowded assembly, gravely and deliberately to discuss the question whether a hundred thousand angels could dance at one moment upon the point of a needle, or, whether two celestial intelligences could at one time occupy the same amount of space, or, whether a celestial being could be present on one spot of earth at the same moment, when he was present in another corner of the world." [1]

Judging from the fair and charitable temper of this book, no one would be more ready to admit than its author that the Schoolmen were mainly occupied by the consideration of questions of great importance, but to leave out all reference to the vital topics they handled, and to present the merely trivial to readers, many of whom may be totally unacquainted with the subject, is, to say the least, misleading. A summary of the subjects dealt with by Thomas Aquinas, and other leading Schoolmen, has already been given, by which the reader of this work will be able to form a clear idea of the subjects mainly studied and discoursed upon by these great men. It is true they indulged in petty disputes such as those just referred to, but these were as the occasional froth or bubbles on the surface of a reservoir of profound thought and learning.

This will appear the more clearly if it be considered how largely they anticipated the views and positions held by modern theologians and philosophers. Anselm framed what is known as the Ontological argument for the Existence of God. This was in the eleventh century. Six hundred years afterwards it was announced independently by Descartes; it was defended by all the Cartesians of the Continent; by Sir I. Newton and Dr. S. Clarke in England. In the present century a philosopher so profound as Hegel has largely built

[1] Matheson, "Growth of the Spirit of Christianity," ii., 100.

his whole system upon it, and even so late a writer as Dr. Caird has placed it with striking clearness before the present generation.

The question whether Saving Faith has its origin in the intellect or in the heart was argued by many of the Schoolmen from Bernard and Abélard, and this question was also vigorously debated by Rev. J. Hervey, Rev. R. Sandeman, and others in the last century.

All the various questions relating to the doctrines of predestination, election and reprobation, foreknowledge and contingency, were fought out in the Middle Ages by Peter the Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and others, and they were also subsequently debated with intense interest and passion by the Calvinists and Arminians of later centuries. The theory which finds the results of man's transgression in the loss of certain supposed "chartered blessings," as advocated recently by Dr. Payne and Rev. J. Frame, was also advocated and discussed by Alexander Hales and Bonaventura. It is more than likely that Fenélon, Jonathan Edwards, and others drew their doctrine of disinterested love from Thomas Aquinas, who wrote upon it with great clearness and force.

In the department of Morals, the Schoolmen certainly achieved great results, and occupied themselves mainly with questions of great human interest. Few of the subjects discussed by modern Ethicists were omitted from their consideration. They failed to distinguish with sufficient clearness between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Criterion of Moral Judgment, but they did incalculable service by setting up a lofty standard of morality, and insisting on the immutable obligations of the Moral Law. On this subject Sir James Mackintosh speaks with great force.

After speaking of their treatment of Metaphysical subjects, he says :—

"If not more remarkable, it is more pertinent to our purpose, that the Ethical system of the Schoolmen, or to speak more properly, of Aquinas, as the Moral Master of Christendom for three centuries, was in its practical part so excellent as to leave little need of extensive change, with the inevitable exception of the connection of his religious opinions with his precept and counsel. His rule of life is neither lax nor impracticable. His grounds of duty are solely laid in the nature of man, and in the well-being of society. Such an intruder as Subtilty seldom strays into his moral instructions. With a most imperfect knowledge of the Peripatetic writings, he came near the Great Master by abstaining in practical philosophy from the unsuitable exercise of that faculty of distinction in which he would probably have shown that he was little inferior to Aristotle, if he had been equally unrestrained. . . . The praises bestowed on Aquinas by every one of the few great men who appear to have examined his writings since the downfall of his power, among whom may be mentioned Erasmus, Grotius, and Leibnitz, are chiefly, though not solely, referable to his ethical works." [1]

In briefly referring to the metaphysics of the Schoolmen, Sir James Mackintosh also says :—

"We ought not so much to wonder at the mistakes of men so situated, as that they, without the restraints of the general understanding, and with the clogs of system and establishment, should in so many instances have opened questions untouched by the more fettered Ancients, and veins of speculation since mistakenly supposed to have been first explored in more modern times. Scarcely any metaphysical controversy agitated among recent philosophers was unknown to the Schoolmen, unless we except that which relates to Liberty and Necessity, and this would be an exception of doubtful propriety, for the disposition to it is clearly discoverable in the disputes of the Thomists and Scotists." [2]

The great divisional line which separated the

[1] Works, i., 48. [2] *Ibid.*, i., 46.

Schoolmen into Realists and Nominalists brought them into living contact with the great essential principles of philosophy, which have been argued by the greatest Metaphysicians since the so-called revival of learning. Whether the Mind can form General Ideas, whether the words expressive of Ideas are not simply terms which symbolise a cluster of particular conceptions, are questions which materially affect the nature of reasoning and the structure of language. They are questions which have set Hobbes against Descartes, Locke against Berkeley, Reid against Hume, Kant against Condillac, in succeeding centuries.

All metaphysicians are agreed that William of Ockam, by denying the existence of the species which had been taught by Aristotle as the direct objects of perception, and which he said interposed between the object and subject, took the same ground which has conferred immortality upon Reid and the Scotch school of Philosophers. There is also remarkable similarity, if not identity of view, be ween the theory of William of Ockam—that substances can be known only through their attributes, and that therefore the *Substans* can never be known by the understanding, but only by faith—and the celebrated doctrine of Locke upon the same subject.

Sir W. Hamilton repeatedly refers to their keen and discriminating acumen in his masterly lectures on Metaphysics. In treating on the philosophical application of the terms A tention and Reflection, he says :—

"From the Schoolmen Locke seems to have adopted the fundamental principle of his philosophy, the derivation of our knowledge through the double medium of sense and reflection, —at least some of them had in terms articulately enounced this principle five centuries previous to the English philosopher, and

enounced it also in a manner far more correct than was done by him." [1]

Also in his discussion as to whether the mind can know more than one object at the same time, he says :—

"The modern philosophers who have agitated this question are not aware that it was one canvassed likewise in the schools of the Middle Ages. It was there expressed by the proposition, *Possitne intellectus noster plura simul intelligere.* Maintaining the negative, we find, St. Thomas, Cajetanus, Ferrariensis, Capreolus, Hervaeus, Alexander Alensis, Albertus Magnus, and Durandus, while the affirmative was asserted by Scotus, Ockam, Gregorius Arminiensis, Lichetus, Marsilius, Biel, and others." [2]

Again, as to the vital distinction in psychology as to immediate or mediate cognitions previously referred to, Sir William has the following apt and generous remarks :—

"Such are the two kinds of knowledge which it is necessary to distinguish, and such are the principal contrasts which they present. I said a little ago that this distinction, so far from being signalised, had been almost abolished by philosophers. I ought, however, to have excepted certain of the Schoolmen, by whom this discrimination was not only taken but admirably applied; and though I did not originally borrow it from them, I was happy to find that what I had thought out for myself was confirmed by the authority of these subtle spirits." [3]

These proofs will sufficiently testify that these great leaders of the school did not exhaust their strength and learning in solemnly discussing themes ridiculous in their littleness, and unrelated to human sympathies Their acuteness and profundity were both exercised in the study of matters of enormous importance both in theology and philosophy, questions which absorbed the magnificent genius of Plato or Aristotle in the

[1] Lect. Met., i., 235. [2] Lect. Met., i., 253. [3] *Ibid.*, ii., 71.

golden age of Greek Philosophy, and which the exalted talents of a Kant, a Schelling a Hegel, and a Hamilton have sought to grapple with in more recent times.

It is also remarkable to find how mighty these men were in the Scriptures. It is scarcely possible to open the *Summa* of Aquinas at any page,—especially those pages which treat upon the Truths peculiar to Christianity, without finding numerous quotations from the Bible. Taking the recent edition of the *Summa*, in which the page is of octavo size, and casually turning over a few leaves, counting the Scriptural quotations each contains, it will be found that on an average each page has four or five quotations from the Divine Word; and if the large ancient folio editions be used, frequently it will be found that fifteen or twenty passages from the Bible are given in one page. So also is it with other of the great Schoolmen.

This being the case, it was not possible but that great clearness should characterise their treatment of the greatest doctrines of the Christian faith. Their theological system was undoubtedly vitiated by the accretions of pagan and Church traditions which had gathered round the truths of Christianity in the previous ages; but it is more a matter for wonder that they were able to magnify so pre-eminently the foundation doctrines of the faith, than that they should have imbibed a measure of the erroneous teaching which had become so rank a growth in the Church. One testimony on this point will be read with satisfaction, as being borne by one so earnestly Protestant as the great historian of the Reformation. He says:—

"For their exposition of the 'doctrine of salvation,' let us hear Anselm, the most influential perhaps of all the Philoso-

political Theologians, Anselm of Canterbury the second Augustine of the Latin Church, who knew so well how to unite the researches of philosophy with the purity of the Christian faith. The system of the Redemption is developed by him in a manner to satisfy at once the understanding and the heart. 'All rational creatures,' says he, 'are under obligation to submit their wills to the will of the great Creator. This law the first man transgressed, and thus destroyed the harmony of moral order. Now the law of eternal righteousness demands either that the human race should be punished, or that by some satisfaction proceeding from humanity, that order should be restored. Without this it would be altogether inconsistent that polluted man should hold communion with happy spirits. But man could not of himself accomplish this satisfaction. As human nature had been corrupted by one, so by one ought the satisfaction to be made.

"He who should effect this must be some being above creatures. He must be God Himself, and in the meantime he must be human also to the end that satisfaction may be applicable to humanity. This could be none other than the God-Man, the Mediator. This God man must deliver Himself up to death voluntarily, since He was not as God subject to death, and He must exhibit perfect obedience in the midst of the greatest sorrows. God would then owe to Christ a recompense; but Christ as God could need no recompense; He could therefore transfer His merits to the world, and demand for His reward the salvation of believers.' Thus speaks Anselm in his treatise, 'Cur Deus Homo.'

"But what is remarkable, considering the common opinion formed of these men, is, that they insist much on 'the sanctifying influence of faith.' 'The sufferings of Christ,' says Peter Lombard, the illustrious master of the 'Sentences,' deliver us from sin, for this immense sacrifice of Divine love inspires us with love for God, and this love works our sanctification.' 'The just man lives by faith,' says Robert Pulleyn; 'is already sanctified within, and exhibits good works as signs of his faith and sanctification; faith first produces righteousness of heart, and righteousness of heart produces good works.' Alexander of Hales, called the Irrefragable Doctor, says: 'Man in his original state never opposed himself to God. He had then need only of *formative* grace; but now that there is something in him opposite to God, man needs *transformative* grace

"There are undoubtedly some differences between these great men; but these differences only show how firmly established they were in the essential truth of salvation. Anselm, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, and others, supposed that the sacrifice of Christ effected the salvation of man, in virtue of an intrinsic value, *ex insito valore*, while many other Scholastics, and Duns Scotus in particular, contended that it was owing solely to the design and counsel of God. This was the difference; while all proclaimed that man was a lost being and saved only by the death of the God-man Jesus Christ." [1]

Whilst the Schoolmen laid the world under great obligations for their investigations into the various branches of human thought, they conferred upon it another great service, which it should hasten to acknowledge. The Schoolmen were the first great Reformers in Europe, and the names of Erigena, Anselm, Abélard, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Ockam, and others should be enrolled as amongst the first who vindicated the right of the human reason to judge for itself on matters of conscience and faith. They were leaders on the side of a wronged humanity in that firm-set struggle which raged through long centuries against a gigantic ecclesiastical despotism, which aimed to be the sole arbiter of man's faith, which sought to reign over all the domains of intellectual research, and which would have locked up even the treasures of Nature from the enquiring mind. There was never wanting a Schoolman to fight on the side of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought until the grand result was obtained, "without which there can be no philosophy, and no true enjoyment of life,—*The right of thinking as we will and of speaking as we think.*" [2]

They lived in the dawn of a new intellectual bright-

[1] D'Aubigne, "The Voice of the Church."
[2] Heeren, "Hist. Researches," 310

ness, amidst a growing mental activity, and they did much to welcome the light and to promote the vigorous growth. In common with all the ardent searchers after knowledge in Europe, they felt the blessedness of a rush of new life within them ; they became the propagators of that life and roused its pulsations in tens of thousands of fresh, warm, youthful souls, who crowded round them in the great Universities of twenty cities ; and although they wore the livery of the Church of Rome, and bowed in submission before its assumption of absolute authority, they were yet imparting, often unconsciously, that very principle already described, which in its full development produced the Reformation of the fifteenth century, and which must ever be the broadstone of all intellectual and religious freedom.

It is true, they were not allowed to use as they chose the key which might open to them the palace of intellectual enjoyment, but not the less did they furnish the key to others ; especially Aquinas did great service in this respect, as he laboured with great force to affirm the principle that reason equally with revelation must be regarded as a guide to truth and wisdom, and whilst on the one hand giving to Revelation the greater weight of authority, yet on the other allowing to reason the right to enquire, examine, and argue in regard to Revelation. This position is largely that taken by the great leaders of the Protestant moveinent, and but for the Schoolmen they could never have so boldly assumed it ; the preliminary work required before Christendom was ripe for their great work would have been left undone, and the victory of the Reformation deferred for some ages.

Dr. Hampden, whose appointment to the Bishopric of

Hereford prevented the only learned Englishman who seemed to have a living interest with this subject from pursuing his researches into the lives and labours of the Schoolmen, has clearly pointed out this fact both in his Bampton Lectures and his clear and concise life of Thomas Aquinas, which greatly needs to be re-issued in an accessible form. He says :—

"The Scholastic Philosophy, indeed, is pre-eminently a record of the struggle which has subsisted between the efforts of human reason, on the one hand, to assert its own freedom and independence; and, on the other hand, the coercion exercised over it by the civil or ecclesiastical powers. In the general survey of it, it will be observed to be distinguished by two very opposite characteristics; an unbounded liberty of discussion, that advances with unawed step into the most startling curiosities of minute enquiry; and a servile addiction to the previous determinations and sanctions of the venerated doctors of the Church. Both these facts, so conspicuous in the matured form of the Scholastic Theology, are the surviving evidences of that struggle under which its system gradually rose and established itself. It was by its artful combination of these two ingredients of the human judgment, the positiveness of dogmatism, and the waywardness of private reason, that its empire was decided." [1]

A German historian of Philosophy, of great sobriety and clearness of judgment, has also borne recent testimony to this fact, in the following admirable verdict :—

"Although completely in the service of the Church, Scholasticism originated in a scientific interest, and awoke consequently the spirit of free enquiry and a love of knowledge. It converted objects of faith into objects of thought; raised men from the sphere of unconditional belief into the sphere of doubt, of search, of understanding; and even when it sought to establish by argument the authority of faith, it was really establishing, contrary to its own knowledge and will, the

[1] Bampton Lect., 14.

authority of reason . it brought thus another principle into the world, different from that of the ancient Church, the principle of intellect, the self-consciousness of reason ; or at least it prepared the way for the triumph of this principle. The very defects of the Scholastics, their many absurd questions, their useless and arbitrary distinctions, their *curiosities* and *sootilties*, must be attributed to a rational principle, to the spirit of enquiry, the longing for light, which oppressed by the authority of the Church, was able to express itself only so and not otherwise." [1]

The following extract from the learned Bishop already quoted is so appropriate as almost to demand admission here :—

"The marks of the origin of the Scholastic Philosophy accompany it throughout in its development. As it arose in the struggles of Reason against an imperious authority, so Reason is throughout the principle with which it is concerned, and which alone it endeavours to satisfy. It had not for its object to win men to the truth : it sought only to justify and secure an obedience to which the unwilling intellect was constrained. Its whole tendency was accordingly to magnify Reason against the principle of mere authority. And on this account (though the assertion may seem strange) the Schoolmen must undoubtedly be reckoned amongst the precursors of the Reformation, both of religion and philosophy. By the temerity of their speculations, they inured the minds of men to think boldly ; and they raised doubts and difficulties which sustained the inquisitive spirit until at least a better day should dawn upon its efforts. Unconscious they were themselves of the benefit which was slowly and painfully resulting from their abortive endeavours. But what they were in themselves was merely accidental, and passed away with them. The spirit which they had nurtured survived beyond them to fight against the system within which it had grown up : as the system itself had fought against the arbitrary authority of the Church, within whose bosom it had been cherished. Thus we find some of the early Schoolmen strenuous opponents of the usurpations of Rome ; as Robert Grosstete, Bishop of Lincoln, in the

[1] Schwegler, "Hist. of Phil.," 147.

thirteenth century, and Ockam in the fourteenth. A reaction indeed took place, by which the conclusions of the Scholastic Theologians were expressly affirmed in the decrees of the Church of Rome; and invested with that perpetuity which the dogmatist of that communion claims for its authoritative declarations. This curious effect consequently has followed: that the same writers live as authorities in Theological speculation to the Roman Church, who as advocates of Reason against the Church system have raised up its most formidable antagonists both in Religion and in Philosophy."[1]

To the same effect may be again quoted the testimony of the venerated and learned historian of the Reformation, the extract is lengthy, but cannot well be abbreviated:—

"The general character of the Scholastic form, then, is the SPIRIT OF THE SCHOOLS, we may say, OF THE UNIVERSITY or OF SCIENCE. To apply philosophy to Christianity, to reduce Christian doctrines to systems; to show their connections, their internal proofs, and to measure them not only by the heart, but by the understanding; such is the tendency of the Scholastic form of Religion, so that if the first era of the Church may be called the form of Life, and the second hat of Doctrines, the third is that of system. There is yet life, there are yet doctrines; but that which prevails is the systematic. It was then that each Doctor published his system, his *Summa Theologiæ*. It was the age advanced of the Church, which naturally succeeded to its youth and manhood. It was the age which loves to arrange what it had before collected. It meditates; it has little of impulse, but more of reflection. There were indeed men of great force in this middle era, but the prevailing disposition was to reflection and system. Historical studies there were yet none; the exegetica were no more as esteemed, and yet the human mind was awakening with great force all over Europe. It needed a guide to direnl it, and this guide was found in Dialectic Philosophy, and as Theology was the science of the age, the human mind adventured upon this field under the auspices of their new leader. This tendency of the

[1] Hanipden, "Aquinas' Encyc. Met.," xi., 814.

Scholastic might lead to rationalism, to infidelity; but the good doctors of the age opposed to these the holy truths of Theology. 'The Christian,' says Anselm, the Father of Scholastic Theology, 'should come to understanding through faith, and not to faith through understanding. I seek not to comprehend in order to believe, I believe that I may comprehend. And I believe, even because if I did not believe I should not comprehend.' Immediately Abélard and his school avail themselves of the Scholastic principle, and become the advocates of free examination. They wish first to comprehend and then to believe. 'Faith,' said they, 'established by examination is much more solid. It is necessary to meet the enemies of the Gospel on their own ground; if we are not to discuss we must believe everything, the false as well as the true."[1]

So also Neander, after a chapter pointing out in a most deeply interesting manner how the great Schoolmen successively vindicated the right of the human reason to be considered one great factor of religious opinion, says: "The Schoolmen must undoubtedly be reckoned among the precursors of the Reformation, both of religion and philosophy."[2]

Even a writer so little disposed to consider sympathetically theological writers as Draper, has accorded to the Schoolmen credit for having done this much for Christendom. Speaking of the revival of learning in the Middle Ages he says:—

"Philosophy emerged not in the Grecian classical vesture in which she had disappeared at Alexandria, but in the grotesque garb of the cowled and mortified monk. She timidly came back as Scholasticism, persuading men to consider, by the light of their own reason, that dogma which seemed to put common sense at defiance—transubstantiation. Scarcely were her whispers heard in the ecclesiastical ranks when a mutiny against authority arose, and since it was necessary to combat

[1] D'Aubigne, "Voice of the Church."
[2] "Church Hist.," vi., 440.

that mutiny with its own weapons, the Church was compelled to give her countenance to Scholastic Theology."[1]

Coleridge repeatedly acknowledged the great service which the Schoolmen did in the cause of freedom of thought. On one occasion he said :—"All the great English Schoolmen, Scotus, Erigena, Duns Scotus, Ockam, and others, those morning stars of the Reformation, were heart and soul opposed to Rome, and maintained the Papacy to be Antichrist."[2]

The whole case for the Schoolmen under this head is well put by a living writer, who has done both great and good service as an historian of the Church :—

"Scholasticism opened the way for modern research and speculation. It awakened the human mind from its torpor, sharpened its faculties, and excited it to action. The Schoolmen were among the heralds and precursors of the revival of knowledge. Their antique garb is not agreeable to our modern taste; the functions of their office as harbingers and pioneers have been long since suspended by the arrival of that knowledge for which they prepared; but their antiquated forms should still excite veneration, and the remembrance of past good service should still awaken gratitude."[3]

It would not be altogether an unprofitable exercise to enter largely upon the question why the Schoolmen should have been condemned with such great severity and relegated into a humiliating position for centuries. The causes are various, but a few remarks on them are only required at present. The tremendous struggle with the political power, and the theological system of the Papacy, and the Titanic forces brought into stern battle at the Reformation, altogether unfitted the mind

[1] Draper, "Intell. Dev. of Europe," ii., 3.
[2] "Table Talk," 240.
[3] Stoughton, "Ages of Christ," 364.

of Europe for allowing to the Schoolmen their due position of honour or their full meed of praise. Then, the inferiority of the later Schoolmen, their degeneracy in earnestness and devoutness, their growing disposition to neglect the discussion of great questions of philosophy or theology, and to indulge in vain wranglings over trifling and unprofitable points, their position as adherents and servants of the Papacy—all conspired to lead the Reformers to assume an attitude of decided opposition against the very order of men who had done so much to prepare the way for their advent, and to hoard up material and weapons for their use. The later Schoolmen in their labours reproduced and exaggerated the defects of their great leaders, and minified their excellences; their methods of reasoning became more formal, the jargon of their style more barbarous, and the passion of their controversies more fierce, so that Scholasticism had become, or was fast becoming, a hindrance and stumbling-block in the path of truth. Therefore, when the providential hour had arrived when the mind of Christendom must take a huge stride forward, when the Christian consciousness required to be brought into acquaintance with a higher order of things, politically, intellectually, and ecclesiastically, an order so advanced above the old state of things as to absorb the attention, command the energy, inspire the developed capacity of that consciousness, in order that the due advance and full measure of possible progress might be attained, the Scholasticism which had become effete and obstructive must with a strong and firm hand be swept away. Necessarily Protestant Christendom, thus aroused, quickened, and developed, would require prolonged and leisurely opportunity to realise its position to adjust itself to its new conditions, to

conserve its new treasure and become accustomed to its novel duties and relations. And not till this had been done could it turn back to the past, and with philosophic calmness and appreciative wisdom survey and adjudicate upon all the circumstances and factors of the greatest revolution of time. Then only could the services and characters of predecessors be fairly weighed and accurately estimated. It may well be supposed that long centuries must be required to intervene before such an attitude of observation could be obtained, and such a spirit of judicial quietness and wisdom could be experienced. That time may properly be supposed to be approaching, and the words of the half-inspired Coleridge upon this subject may be deemed to be prophetic, when the intense interest excited in the Scholastics in Germany and France is considered, and also when the growing interest felt in them by English students is observed. He says:—

"It is not impossible that the high value attached of late years to the dates and margins of our old folios and quartos may be transferred to their contents. Even now there exists in the minds of reading men the conviction that not only Plato and Aristotle, but even Scotus, Erigena, and the Schoolmen from Peter Lombard to Duns Scotus, are not such mere blockheads as they pass for with those who have never read a line of their writings. What the results may be should this ripen into conviction I can but guess."[1]

One more extract from the same gifted genius may fitly lead to the close of this chapter:—

"It was the Schoolmen who made the languages of Europe what they now are. We laugh at the quiddities of these writers now, but in truth these quiddities are just the parts of their language that we have rejected, whilst we never think of the mass we have adopted, and have in daily use."[2]

[1] "Statesman's Manual," xxxvii. [2] "Table Talk," 58.

Let it be remembered that it is in the nature of earthly institutions to work themselves out, and with more or less precipitancy to become disorganised. They may have achieved great and permanent results, fulfilled important functions, and made signal contributions to human progress and happiness. They have thus fulfilled the mission given to them by Divine Providence, and having exhausted the vital force which inspired them to accomplish the purpose of their existence, they are either destroyed at once by some fresh and vigorous agent, or they languish gradually into death through the lack of vitality at the centre of being. It was thus in the case of the Roman Empire, which, having fulfilled a great and generally beneficent mission in the world, lost its inward life, and preserving only the external form of Imperialism, was struck to atoms by the hammer of the Huns and Vandals, but only for a new and better world to emerge from the elements which remained from the wreck of the former system, and which gave to the world in the course of time a Christian instead of a Pagan civilization.

This is the beneficent law of human life, without which progress would be impossible. It may be that the old institutions, and the agents employed in them, did not accomplish all that those, trained by more advanced masters, inspired by higher influences and living under happier conditions, deem to have been desirable or possible, but let blame be withheld until the circumstances and the opportunities of those institutions or agents are duly weighed, and at the least let them have credit for the help they afforded and the impulse they gave towards better things. Thus let the Schoolmen be estimated. They did not succeed in obtaining for the world the full blessing of liberty of

conscience, or freedom of thought and speech, or a perfect system of spiritual truth, or independence of an ecclesiastical despotism, but they were a powerful force in preparing for the battle which lay in the future; they sowed the seeds of political, moral, metaphysical, and religious truth; they kept the intellect of Christendom in healthful agitation by the depth and keenness of their controversies; and they succeeded in evoking a love of wisdom and a spirit of enquiry which could not and would not be restrained. Then their work was done, their weapons became rusty and worn out; they themselves lost the martial energy of earlier days, the garrulousness of old age began to characterise them, the forward glance of youth changed into the backward lingering gaze of second childhood, and they were left behind by new generations who, without due acknowledgment of the services, or tender gratitude for the sacrifices of their predecessors, swept into the full tide of battle and were borne on to a magnificent and enduring triumph. Meantime, those who had done so much to make the triumph possible were left to neglect and contumely until in the far distant future the morning should dawn when their services should have recognition, and their reputations a bright resurrection.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS.

"O DEAD! ye shall no longer cling to us
With rigid hands of dessicating praise,
And drag us backward by the garments thus,
To stand and laud you in long drawn virelays;
We will not henceforth be oblivious
Of our own lives because ye lived before,
Nor of our acts because ye acted well.
We thank you that ye first unlatched the door,
But will not make it inaccessible
By thankings on the threshold any more.
We hurry onwards to extinguish hell
With our fresh souls, our younger hope, and God's
Maturity of purpose. Soon shall we
Die also; and that then our periods
Of life may round themselves to memory,
As smoothly as on our graves the burial sods.
We now must look to it to excel as ye,
And bear our age as far unlimited,
By the last mind mark; so to be invoked
By further generations as their hallowed dead."

MRS. BROWNING.

XIX.

CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS.

THE Schoolmen have been subjected to much censure and obloquy during the three last centuries. Complaints of various kinds have been urged against them, and many objections have been raised to the utility of their work. It may reasonably be expected that in a work such as this some notice will be taken of such remarks.

It may clear the way to a brief consideration of these charges or objections, if some of the special circumstances of the Schoolmen are borne in mind. They, like all others, when they came into the world found their environment prepared for them. They were nursed and trained under the over shadowing influence of the great politico-ecclesiastical system which called itself the Christian Church. Under its shadow, and by its influence, they were moulded and educated. They never had the opportunity of experiencing a different discipline or coming within the range of other forces. The monasteries were the depositories and centres of intellectual life for centuries, and when the Schools established by Charlemagne expanded into Universities, the teachers and lecturers were mainly ecclesiastics, trained in the convents and

abbeys of the Church. So that the Schoolmen were closed round with certain influences, and, by no act of their own, were thrown upon them for all their knowledge and intellectual drill. Not only was there no better set of influences, there was no other. The question to be now considered is: did they do the best possible to them in view of their possibilities, or are they to be counted as unfaithful stewards?

It is scarcely just for those who live in a period distinguished for its perfect freedom of thought, its extreme licence of speculation, and for its triumphs of discovery in science, to look with blame and condemnation on those who lived in times when the iron grip of Ecclesiastical Authority was laid on all effort of progressive enquiry; when Gottschalk and Berengarius, Erigena and Abélard, Roger Bacon and Galileo, the theologian, the philosopher, and the scientist, were alike laid under proscription, and haunted by the spirit of persecution It is not for those who have in possession the grand results of the labours and sufferings of Apostles, Church Fathers, Martyrs, Schoolmen, Reformers, and Philosophers, to reproach their noble ancestry for not having achieved more than was possible to them. This is not the spirit of humility or of gratitude, but rather the temper of pretenders, who, had they been placed under the restraints, or lived in the comparative darkness of bygone days would never have accomplished a tithe of the noble work which was accomplished by the unwearied zeal and exalted faith of the men whom they condemn. No fair estimate can be formed of any man, nor of his work, unless the opporrunities afforded him and the conditions which closed around him are duly weighed and impartially considered.

It is a charge, often repeated, against the Schoolmen that they bound the living realities of religion in the withes of a hard, severe, unyielding Logical System. In considering this subject, it will be necessary to enquire wherher a Logical Method is required by, or is advantageous when applied to, Natural or Revealed Religion.

Let it be remembered that man is a *reasoning* being. The disposition or tendency to analyse, to classify, and to theorise concerning the knowledge he obtains by experience or observation, is a radical and inalienable part of his constitution. All departments of knowledge taken possession of by the enquirer, are therefore in time reduced to system. It is so with astronomy, botany, geology, medicine, chemistry, metallurgy, and all the sciences; it is so with ontology, psychology, ethics, political economy, and all the philosophies. Give men a multitude of facts in any domain of knowledge, and they will begin to analyse their nature and qualities to arrange them in classes, to frame theories and draw conclusions concerning them all, tending to Systematisation and Simplicity. This is so universally the habit of civilised man that the logical faculty must be admitted to be an essential of his nature. Thus have arisen the various Sciences, and thus also the great Philosophies have shaped themselves. It is impossible, with this inevitable tendency, that man should form systems of Natural Science, or of Metaphysical Philosophy, and should omit from analysis or classification the great facts and truths of religion. To object, if indeed any one would be bold enough to do so, to all such systematising processes, would be to object to the constitution of man, and to impugn the wisdom of Him who conceived and created

it. To object to one realm of knowledge being subjected to logical system, and permit the application of such method to others, is to give up the guidance of reason, and to become the victim of wayward and arbitrary decisions, determined by passion or selfishness. If a logical method be allowed in relation to scientific facts or philosophical principles, it cannot with fairness or reason be denied in relation to religion, and if it be of advantage in respect to the former, it cannot be of disadvantage in regard to the latter.

It is quite true that logical methods have been carried to an extreme, that the spirit of Religion has been thereby injured, and that Systems of Theology have been established in undue authority over the consciences of men. But these results form no true objection to the principle of Systematic Theology; they have not been the fruit of a true use of Logic, but the abuse of it, and the complaint made against Systems of Theology may also be urged against Systems both of Philosophy and Science. Many evils have arisen in both these latter mentioned domains of knowledge, by men attaching more weight to their own theories than to the lessons of experience or the phenomena of Nature, so that this fact is but an illustration of an old truth, often taught and often forgotten, that any tendency of man's nature, unduly cultivated, may prove to him a temptation and a snare. And it is also true that nothing more inimical to man's welfare can be attempted than to exalt theories or systems of knowledge over the reason and conscience of man, making them the standards of ultimate appeal, and giving them the authority of infallible oracles.

All history and experience testifies to the tendency there is in man to thus methodise his knowledge.

There could be, therefore, no exception in the matter of Religion, and in the history of Christianity this disposition has repeatedly manifested itself. When the infant Church had with such dauntless and burning earnestness delivered its message that the whole Empire of Rome was being moved by the quickening spirit of the Gospel, there speedily became visible the beginnings of a Christian philosophy by Origen, which was fostered and developed by Athanasius, Augustine, and others, until John Damascenus, with more articulate purpose and formal method, embodied in a system the results of Christian speculation and thought in the early Church. So also when the Latin form of Christianity had penetrated and permeated the civilised nations of Europe, when an intellectual activity was springing up, when learning was decaying in the East and vigorously seeking to extend in the West, it might have been expected that the logical faculty of the Latin and Teutonic mind would exercise itself on the Christian verities as that of the Greek and African mind had done, and the result was Scholasticism. It arose out of the combined necessities of man's nature and the exigencies of the times. The human mind seeks to express and justify its faith to itself in philosophic and logical form, because God has so willed it, in bestowing upon man the faculty of logic, and the natural desire to analyse and systematise his thought. If in some, the sentimental or practical element preponderates largely or almost entirely over the logical, then let them not judge dogmatically or harshly concerning those who are seeking to promote the glory of God and the progress of the world in a manner which they may not attempt, and indeed may not be fitted fairly to estimate.

The question immediately for consideration is clear and simple. The Bible contains all the elements for a full, clear, Systematic Theology. Those elements are scattered throughout the various Books and Letters of Scripture much as the phenomena of Natural Science are scattered throughout Nature. Is it right towards God, or helpful for himself, that man should arrange these various elements, and place them in relation to each other; to so classify the facts, truths and doctrines of Revelation, as that he may have present to his mind an orderly array of the articles of his faith, and the subjects of Divine teaching? The answer is found in the facts before given as to the nature of the human mind; the justification of forming such System of Theology is found in the same arguments which would justify the formation of Systems of Philosophy or of Science,—they are a necessity of human nature, the material for them has been abundantly provided by an Infallible and Omnipotent Providence, and great practical benefits have flowed out from them.

The Schoolmen only strove to express in clear systematic form what was the belief of the Christian consciousness of their times. A dogma has been said to be a formal statement of some known truth. Herzog has striven to show that dogma is representative and authoritative only as expressing the general consciousness of the Christian community; but besides this it must also have an element of definition or intellectual elaboration. This is essential, in order to constitute dogma a science of Christian belief. Dogma is not the original form of Divine Truth; *that* is not given to us in fixed propositions and systematic arrangement, not in logical sequence or methodical array; it is

given in various guises and by many instruments, "at sundry times and in divers manners," varied by widely-contrasting surroundings, drawn out by many occasions and uttered by many voices. The great Truths which compose Christian Theology were given human by voices, Divine, angelic, and human; they came in form of prophecy and precept, simple hymn and ravishing chorus, strophe and antistrophe, command and promise, they were unfolded by epiphanies of simple lives, of miraculous works, of gleaming symbols, and elaborate rituals; they were most signally and conspicuously revealed by the Incarnation of the Logos, and the pouring forth of the Holy Spirit. But though the media were legion, the Truth was one, having a million sides numberless relations, "unsearchable riches," but revealing all with the free *abandon* with which Nature discloses her charms to the eye of the student. This great Revelation of Divine Truth man can only understand, can only express to himself or to others, by comparison of part with part; by tracing the connection or the bearing of one doctrine with or upon another; by marking the interdependence of each upon each, and thus, by reverent and careful examination, comparison, classification, he is able to grasp more firmly, and apprehend more clearly, the truth of God; is prepared to realize more of its grandeur and express it in approximate adequateness for the benefit of the world. Not that the living Words of God which "are spirit and are life," can be poured into human types or moulds of human arrangement, so as to express the plenitude of Truth; no creed of Church or Council can interpret perfectly the infinite fulness of Divine Doctrine; nor can any system of Theology exhaust the richness of Eternal Truth, but the Symbols

of Churches and Councils, and the Systems of Theology, have done a great work in the past; they have been enormous helps in realizing to Christians what an inheritance of spiritual treasure they have in the Gospel, in preserving Churches and believers from being drawn away by dangerous errors, in enabling Christian propagandists to express more definitely and logically the glad tidings they had to communicate to civilised citizens or barbarous tribes, and in crystallising for the guidance of future ages the measure of Christian Truth already mastered and digested by the Church. It is true that the wine of the Divine Kingdom has sometimes burst the bottles of logical method in which the theologians of former ages have sought to preserve it; and it is equally true that it can never be so formalised or scientifically defined as to command universal assent. All dogmatic systems are fallible and imperfect, because they are human; hence they should never be forced on the acceptance of any by the sword of persecution or the arm of power. Neither should those who frame such systems take such delight in them as to prefer the logical method into which they have sought to pour the Truth, to the Truth itself. They should remember that the method simply exists to give the truth clearer expression and convenient form. That men should express definitely what they believe and profess is a necessity, and especially must this be so when they associate to enjoy common spiritual fellowship or agree to propagate on an extensive scale what in their souls they believe to be the truth of God.

There should be some consistency maintained when objections to systematic forms of theology are raised. The objection ought to be extended, also, to systems of science, or ethics, or mental philosophy. But, is any

one prepared to affirm that this could be done with safety or advantage to the race? The great systematisers of thought have been amongst the world's best benefactors. None have done so much to promote intellectual activity and growth as Aristotle, Proclus, Averroes, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Hamilton, Herbert Spencer, and many others of kindred spirit. None have laboured more faithfully or earnestly than these to diffuse knowledge, and to place knowledge in such orderly and succinct method before the world as to render its attainment by multitudes more easy. It is the same with the great theological thinkers of the past. If the great names of Origen, Augustine, Damascenus, Anselm, Aquinas, Duns, Calvin, Turretin, Bellarmine, Wessel, Limborch, with many of the present day who have signalised themselves by giving to their generation religious truth in logical form and method, were utterly extinguished, and all trace of their work obliterated, imagination could not conceive the infinite inferiority of the position which would be occupied by either Christianity or philosophy.

It is undeniable that the great truths of the Christian religion are ever being more fully realized and more intelligently held by the body of the Church, and this is made more possible by the great thinkers, who sum up in succeeding generations the latest results of religious discussion, who methodise what increased measure of truth the developing consciousness of the Christian community has obtained, and who thus make it possible for the next generation to expand in greater spiritual and intellectual power of apprehending the infinite truth. One more service is done by those who seek to present in systematic form the great truths of natural or revealed religion. By condensing, arranging,

and methodically framing those truths, they express for the multitude of believers the degree of truth realized or apprehended by the most advanced spirits of the age, and this becomes an exalted standard to which the more uneducated or undeveloped are called to attain. Thus is progress made and growth nurtured from age to age.

These considerations will aid in forming a fair judgment concerning the efforts of the Schoolmen to frame perfect systems of Religious Truth.

Allowing that the formation of such systems be advantageous to a certain degree, it is objected to the Schoolmen that they employed so slavishly the logical method of Aristotle.

It may be replied that there was no other method for them to use. Aristotle reigned as the intellectual Master of Europe. Aviccenna and Averroes raised him into being the idol of the Moorish Universities both in the East and the West, and from these he passed into being the almost universally beloved Philosopher of Christian thinkers. What other could the Schoolmen do? They were born, by the will of Providence, into a set of circumstances which prevented and surrounded them. One of those circumstances was the fact that Aristotle reigned over the learned world in unrivalled supremacy. "He was the parent of science properly so-called, the master of criticism, and the founder of logic."[1] So that the Schoolmen had no choice but to employ the one logical method in existence, or to frame another and a better for themselves. There was no other mould in existence into which they could pour the living Truth as it revealed itself to their understanding, and by which it could

[1] Coleridge, "Table Talk," 101.

receive a "local habitation and a name." To say that they should have invented or adopted another form, less rigid or elaborate, is to blame Providence for not having given to them a different mental constitution, and a more penetrating insight into abstract principles and things. It is to blame them for not creating when the material was not at hand, for not inventing in a day what could only be the outgrowth of ages of intellectual discussion and activity. If therefore they were by the inward call of duty, or by the peculiar tendencies of their minds, to cast the great realities and principles of Revelation into logical form, they could do no other than use the method which then reigned in Christendom, and beside which there was no other.

It has been objected that the Schoolmen pursued the habit of moulding the Truth into scientific form to an excessive and even ridiculous extreme. This charge must be admitted to have some force and propriety. But the blame will be greatly mitigated if the circumstances they were placed in are again considered. By the great Ecclesiastical Power which reigned in the name of God over Christendom they were only permitted to enquire and reason within a certain range. The Church stretched its dominion over all regions of knowledge, and sternly forbade, under awful penalties, both in time and eternity, any venturing beyond certain well-defined boundaries. Students and enquirers might reason as they listed within a circle, but they must not step beyond it, under pain of suffering or death. They might proclaim and defend what the Church sanctioned, and the utmost reach of their learning, ingenuity and genius was employed for this purpose, but they must not indulge in any speculation or entertain any opinion that it condemned or was uncertain of. In judging of

the work of the Schoolmen, these two circumstances must be considered. They were endowed with as keen and discriminating metaphysical faculties as the world has known, and they were confined within a limited range, and hampered with unnatural conditions in the exercise of their marvellous gifts. Thus their enormous intellectual power and, erudition were exercised with almost preternatural intensity within the region permitted to them. Men of commanding genius were often forced to comfort their chafed spirits by repeating the lessons of former generations, or to satisfy their raging desire for active and congenial intellectual exercise by exhausting the final possibilities of their position. They did all that was allowed them to do, they trod the extreme verge of the region permitted them; Erigena, Abélard, Peter Lombard, Duns, Ockam, and Bacon even ventured beyond the limit into the Debateable Land, but they were quickly thrust back by the threat of vengeance or the sword of persecution. What could they do? They could not be idle, they must give *some* expression to the grand and royal intellectual gifts they had received from a bountiful Father, and so they used and re-used the opportunity which was permitted them, and in dealing with the doctrines of Natural and Revealed Religion they exhausted the method possible to them, they divided and subdivided, they analysed and synthesised, they classified and combined their knowledge, they sought to cast Divine Truth into an infinite series of perfect syllogisms, until the marvellous edifice of Scholastic Theology was crowned by the *Opus Magnum* of the Middle Ages, the *Summa* of Aquinas.

The measure of blame which this charge is meant to convey belongs far more to the Spiritual despotism,

which prevented a free and natural exercise of their great gifts, than to the men who under such unfavourable conditions sought to discharge the work of life with painstaking and conscientious fidelity, and who were able, notwithstanding their limitations, to sow the seeds of religious freedom for a future blessed harvest.

Another objection repeatedly, and often without due care, urged against the Schoolmen is that they invented and used a harsh, crabbed, incomprehensible jargon, whereby to explain or illustrate their systems. It must be borne in mind that none can treat thoroughly of any science or philosophy without employing a terminology adapted to the subject in hand. Language has been described as "fossil poetry," but it may more fitly be said to be "fossilised thought," and the thought must prescribe the form of the fossil. If the thought is permitted to become extravagant, if it descend to analyses, and distinctions which are merely fanciful, the language will become abstract, or vain, or finally incomprehensible. It may be admitted that this was partly so with Duns, and with some of the later and lesser Schoolmen; but on the other hand, it is true that there are few terms employed by the leaders of the School which have not passed into the accepted philosophical and theological nomenclature of Europe. Such terms as, the "quiddity," "haecceity," "perseity," "supposit," "ubication," and a few others, may not have passed into modern phraseology, and sound forbiddingly harsh to the ears of modern students. But it would be fairer to the Schoolmen to think of the multitudes of terms used by them, which have been accepted by subsequent thinkers, and which are now in ordinary use, than to recall a few which have been rejected and fallen into disuse. The Schoolmen really

settled the philosophical and theological terminology of Christendom; they formed thus a highway for the interchange of thought for the world and for all generations, by which high and thorough discussion of all the great questions touching Essences, Existences, and Destinies are possible, without each thinker being called upon to elaborate a suitable terminology for himself.

Even while admitting that some of the Schoolmen indulged in harsh and vain jargon, and that they laid themselves open to blame thereby, it may be urged in their behalf that they are not sinners above all others in this respect. They are quite equalled, if not surpassed in this fault, by many modern writers both in science and philosophy, who indulge in a terminology which to a layman seems outlandish indeed. Few can write more fluent or pure English than Professor Huxley, when treating upon those sciences to the special study of which he has consecrated so many years of his life. Yet in the course of about twenty lines of one of his treatises we read of "the sacral axis," "the ilium," "the sacral articulation," "the acetabulum," "the pubis and the ischium," "the obturator foramen," "the obturator axis," "the iliopectinal axis," "the ventri rami of the pubes," "the symphisis," "the cotyloid ramus," "the metischial process," "the homologues of the rami, of the ypsiloid," with much more of the same kind.[1] All this occurs in describing one bone in the structure of an animal called the "Ornithorhynchus." In another treatise by the same writer such terms perpetually occur as "blastomere," "blastoderm," "nodal and internodal," "epiblast," "hypoblast," and "mesoblast," "apical and cambium,"

[1] Article "BIOLOGY," Encyc. Brit., 9th Ed.

"utricle and epithelium," "gemation," "fission," "gamogenesis," "ogamogenesis," "abiogenesis," "biogenesis," "urodele," "anurous," and so on indefinitely. From many modern works on Chemistry, Physiology, and Mental Philosophy terms might be quoted as harsh and abstract as these. Surely the Schoolmen are hardly dealt with if they are condemned for the use of a harsh aud crabbed Latinity, if these modern thinkers are approved and applauded. It may be that this style is a necessity, that it is of real service; but if so, may it not be fairly concluded that the terminology employed by the Schoolmen was also a necessity, and did real service in the cause of humanity in the past? It may also be that as the Sciences are yet only in their infancy, when they attain to maturity and ripeness the style of teachers will become more simple and pure, or, the educated intellect of the future will have become familiarised with what seems now strange and dissonant language, and may even be discourteous enough to smile at some terms which will then have fallen into disfavour as harsh, crabbed, and jargonous.

Without claiming for the Schoolmen absolute infallibility of judgment, or perfection of work, but on the other hand freely admitting many defects in their style, their opinions, and their method of labour, it is yet to be claimed for them that with unfavourable conditions they achieved extraordinary results, and it is for those who object to them, sometimes perhaps without due reflection, to show how, all things considered, they could have done better, or why, minor faults admitted, they should not have conceded and gratefully accorded the full meed of praise which their indefatigable and faithful labours in the cause of the Church and the world deserve.

CHAPTER XX.

THE RATIONALE OF SCHOLASTICISM.

"It is evident that there can be but One only Original Mind, or no more than one Understanding Being Self-Existent, all other minds whatever partaking of one Original Mind; and being as it were stamped with the Impression or Signature of one and the same Seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds in the several places and ages of the world have Ideas or Notions of things exactly alike, and Truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of Minds that apprehend them; because they are all but Ectypal Participations of one and the same Original and Archetypal Mind and Truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses, and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it, and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it; so when innumerable created Minds have the same Ideas of Things and understand the same Truths, it is but One and the same Eternal Light that is reflected in them all, the Light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world; or the same Voice of that One Everlasting Word that is never silent, re-echoed by them."—CUDWORTH.

XX.

THE RATIONALE OF SCHOLASTICISM.

THE phenomenon of Scholasticism, with its devotion to the subjects of philosophy and theology, and its untiring application to them of the Aristotelian method, is a strange growth in history, which it is not altogether easy to account for. The rationale of it may be partly found in one or both of two facts, either that the Schoolmen were before their time, or that the ordinary and primary factors of public feeling and sentiment had failed to operate in their due time and order. In the building up of a great intellectual civilisation, philosophy is not usually the eldest born. Poetry and Eloquence generally precede either Systems of Religion or of Philosophy. Thus, in the ancient civilisation of Greece, Hesiod and Homer preceded Thales and Anaxagoras; Eschylus and Sophocles preceded Plato and Aristotle. In the Roman civilisation, Virgil and the Latin poets preceded by long ages Seneca or Marcus Aurelius. In the history of England Shakespeare and Milton preceded Hobbes and Locke. It was quite different in the history of the Christian civilisation of the west. No great poet arose to cast a beam of glowing light upon the gloom of what are called the Dark Ages; no sweet singer had aroused

popular sentiment or awakened the public mind into kindling ardour by the rehearsal of noble deeds, or by lofty truths being linked to the music of harmonious strains. Erigena had issued his "*Divisione*," Anselm had formulated his great doctrines, Abélard had loved, laboured, and suffered, Peter had arranged the "Sentences," Albertus Magnus had aroused a continent to profound interest in science and philosophy, Aquinas had crowned Scholasticism by his marvellous summing up of the results of a thousand years' discussions in religion and metaphysics, before Dante awoke the heart of Europe by his sublime "*Divina Commedia*," or Petrarch had charmed the nations of the south by his alternate strains of languishing tenderness and martial fire.

One cause of this may be found in the fact, that in the tremendous catastrophe of the fall of Rome, the great philosophers of the ancient world were able to maintain an existence, and quickly to rise to a position of intellectual ascendency. It was not so with the great masters of other branches of literature, the poets and orators of the old world. They fell headlong into an abyss of darkness, from which they were not rescued until the dawn of the New Learning in Christendom. The great philosophers were preserved through the New Platonists of Alexandria, through the instrumentality of some of the Christian Fathers, through the agency of Porphyry and Boethius. So that when the vigorous germs of a new civilisation began to expand, and to throw out men of large heart, of exalted genius, of marvellous capacity for mental conception and labour, such men as make epochs, as carry the world forward in the arms of enlightenment, and mould a nobler future, they had to grow up without the free

inspiring and ennobling influences which an impassioned national poetry or a glowing oratory can supply. Therefore they were thrown for their inspiration upon the great Greek Metaphysicians, and the noble Fathers of the Christian Church. By the very necessities of their position they were cast into the arena of metaphysics and theology; these subjects absorbed their attention, engaged their learning, exercised their acumen, and as the ages rolled on they built up the stupendous fabric of the Scholastic system, a magnificent and marvellous structure indeed, in which all may find much to admire, and something to object to. They were not to blame for their position, they could not create material, they could but use that which was ready to their hands; men are moulded and stamped by the conditions which surround them, and can only be what those conditions will allow. For a man to be able to rise above them, to create the influences which must foster him, to invent a new and independent scene of action for himself, would be for him to be more than a man, to be a god.

The position of the Schoolmen will appear the more difficult and peculiar the more carefully and earnestly it is considered. They lived in a young world, which had emerged from the grave of an old world which had given itself up to vice and idleness, and which had proved but too sadly that "the wages of sin is death." The new society which had arisen was characterised by great strength and activity, and it was eager to exercise itself. Having no intellectual material on which to exercise themselves, excepting that furnished from the Greek Philosophers and the early Christian Fathers, they accepted it and commenced their operations. But they speedily found they could only put forth their

activities within such limits as the Church, which was the supreme ruling power in those ages, prescribed. Under such restraints as the Church permitted the Schoolmen might work, but only within those limitations. They rebelled not, the age of rebellion had not come, they had but one work they could do, and they attempted it. They set to work on the mass of philosophical and theological material within their reach. They had but one instrument whereby they could operate upon it. It was the finely elaborated logical method of the great Stagyrite, and by it they laboured to organise the shapeless mass into a symmetrical and harmonious whole. They adjusted part to part, they examined minutely, they compared diligently, they classified and arranged with admirable skill, and there came out, as the result, the most perfect, elaborate, and extensive system of Philosophical and Theological Truth the world ever saw. Not of unmixed truth; they were deterred from the attainment of unalloyed truth by the authority of the Church, which forced upon their acceptance the mingled truth and error which it had received and professed in its creeds and councils, and which it thrust upon all within its power with a firm and unrelenting authority.

But whilst receiving the mass of Church dogma as an act of faith, it was the earnest, persevering, laborious effort of the Schoolmen to justify the particulars of that mass of dogma to their reason and understanding. This was the continuous effort of Scholasticism, it was the secret of its struggles and agonies, the inspiration of its hopes, the stimulus of its life, and as the Scholastic Ages rolled on, the Schoolmen still sought to bring into perfect and everlasting harmony the doctrines of Theology and the reason of man. They

failed, but their failure was really their greatest victory; they, like the Alchemists, sought long for the Philosopher's Stone, which would turn everything into gold, and like the Alchemists they found it not. And yet, like the Alchemists again, they found a higher and a nobler treasure than they had hoped for. For, as out of the labours of the strange mysterious searchers into the secrets of Nature there came rich and blessed treasure in the discoveries and triumphs of modern chemistry; so out of the patient faith, the consecrated lives, the high reasonings, the elaborated structures, the elevated and elevating themes of the Schoolmen, there have come victories of faith, experiences of freedom, attainments in truth, possibilities of facile expression of the noblest subjects, the unrestrained exercise of reason and conscience, the enjoyment of a full Christian life, and the possession of an incalculably precious spiritual inheritance, which may be to all people and for all time.

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